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Abstract: 
 
The practice of deportation for those identified with “mental illness” in Canada is 
one unique and telling confluence whereby contemporary conceptions, interpretations, 
functions of discourse, and technologies of “mental illness”, “criminality”, and “race” can 
be studied through the shared texts of the mental health, criminal justice, and immigration 
systems. These systems rely on seemingly separate operations in order to continue 
common violent projects of segregation, confinement, removal, the application of harm to 
the physical body and the identification of people as inherently dehumanized. 
In this study, contemporary deportation appeal decisions documents, archival 
documents and secondary deportation appeals data are analyzed drawing on postcolonial 
theory, Gadamerian philosophy, an attention to confluence and the subjective, objective 
and symbolic modes of violence via Slavoj Žižek. The analysis imperils the reliance of 
immigration, criminal justice and mental health systems on constructions of the 
interdependent identities of the untreatable biomedically mentally ill, and the 
unrehabilitatable inherently criminal and the undeserving foreign alien Other in order to 
rationalize deportation. The practices and technologies of evaluation and decision making 
used by professionals, police, lawyers and experts are questioned for their participation in 
the perpetuation of historical forms of colonial violence through the enforcement of racial 
and eugenic policies and laws in Canada.  
   The historical developments of professional hegemonies, racial and eugenic laws, 
and direct professional practices at this confluence are interrogated for their complicity in 
the (re)making of the fantasy of the Canadian public, representing itself as just, fair and 
supportive while rationalizing violence at legislative, institutional, and professional 
levels. At the same time, notions of undesirability and exclusion based on race, class, 
ability, mental category, criminal history, or health status are reinforced. Opportunities 
for transformation of the identified colonial technologies and processes at the confluence 
of immigration, mental health and criminal justice systems are proposed through a denial 
of isolating individualistic identities, an appreciation of the hurtful advancement of 
colonial tropes and through connection to collective forms of resistance. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Outlining the problem: the confluence of mental health, criminal justice 
and immigration in the authorization of deportation 
 
The complexities of the mental health field are representative of the predicament 
of our present human condition. This complexity demands an acknowledgment of the 
historical, social, political, physical, and psychological aspects of people that have been 
created, inherited, and reproduced. The field also demands a consideration of the effects 
of these understandings of people as they become embedded in policies, practices, 
disciplines and the law.  An appreciation for this confluence of aspects of the human 
condition is crucial for an understanding of both the foundations of our wellbeing and the 
sources of our suffering.  
Social workers in the mental health field work in several areas including areas 
that require multi-disciplinary, multi-sector involvement (CASW, 2011). A recent 
Canadian study found that social workers “were accessed third most frequently for 
mental health care” (Towns & Swartz, 2012, p.215). When striving towards social justice 
in mental health, social workers have historically been allies to justice while also 
participating in historically driven structures that continue institutionalized forms of 
injustice (Rossiter, 2005).  This unique position demands a consideration of how 
practices, policies and disciplines can work together to enact violence toward 
marginalized and oppressed groups.  
The practice of deportation for those identified with “mental illness” in Canada is 
one unique and telling confluence whereby contemporary conceptions, interpretations, 
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functions of discourse, and technologies of “mental illness”, “criminality”, and “race” can 
be studied through the shared texts of the mental health, criminal justice, and immigration 
systems. These systems rely on seemingly separate operations in order to continue 
common violent projects of segregation, confinement, removal, the application of harm to 
the physical body and the identification of people as inherently dehumanized. 
The decision documents of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 
provide exemplary records of deportation decisions for people identified with mental 
illness who have become involved with the criminal justice system. They are the only 
known public records on deportation in Canada and include the reflex database of the 
Immigration and Refugee Board and the cases that go on to the Federal Court of Canada 
(Chan, 2005). This research focuses on an examination of the decision documents from 
the Immigration and Refugee Board’s Appeal division to answer my research question- 
How does an understanding of confluence at the site of criminal justice, immigration and 
mental health systems illuminate the construction, authorization and legitimization of 
mechanisms of state violence through the example of deportation? 
The criminalization and deportation of racialized people identified with mental health 
issues. 
 
In 2010, two reports were published on the significant problem of deportation for 
people identified with mental health issues. The Schizophrenia Society of Ontario’s 
report highlights that the immigration consequences of the criminalization of people 
identified with mental illness have not been adequately explored in Canada 
(Schizophrenia Society of Ontario, 2010).  The report also advocates for a fair and just 
process for addressing issues pertaining to criminal justice, immigration and mental 
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health (Schizophrenia Society of Ontario, 2010). A Human Rights Watch report was 
published by the American Civil Liberties Union also in 2010. The report “Deportation 
by Default: Mental Disability, Unfair Hearings, and Indefinite Detention in the US 
Immigration System” outlines multiple systemic injustices that occur within immigration 
and criminal justice systems for people identified with mental health issues who are 
deported from the United States (Human Rights Watch, 2010). The report also advocates 
for fair processes and condemns the use of extended incarceration. The authors indicate 
that there is a lack of research in this area and that, “while no exact official figures exist, 
the percentage of non-citizens in immigration proceedings with a mental disability is 
estimated to be at least 15 percent of the total immigrant population in detention—in 
other words, an estimated 57,000 in 2008” (Human Rights Watch, 2010, p.2).  
The criminalization of those identified with mental health issues (commonly 
understood as the disproportional representation of those diagnosed with mental illness in 
the criminal justice system due to lack of supports associated with deinstitutionalization), 
has been an ongoing problem in Canada as correctional facilities often have more people 
identified with mental health issues than the general population (Fazel & Danesh, 2002; 
Peternelj-Taylor, 2008).  A recent study found that people identified with mental health 
issues are represented three times more in correctional facilities (Olley, Nicholls & Brink, 
2009). In a report by the Canadian Mental Health Association, it was noted that “between 
2001 and 2002, the number of clients with mental disorders who appeared before the 
Toronto courts rose from 1800 to 2361- a 31 percent increase. In 2004, 39 percent of 
these cases involved Class 1 offences [crimes considered the least serious]; 42 percent 
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Class 2; and 17 percent, Class 3” (Lurie, 2009, p.3).  There are enough people identified 
with mental health issues on any day in Toronto area jails “to fill a psychiatric hospital”, 
300-400 people (Lurie, 2009, p.3).  
As the Schizophrenia Society of Ontario Report documents, in Canada, there is an 
over-representation of people of colour in the criminal justice system (Schizophrenia 
Society of Ontario, 2010). For Canadians of African descent, the rate is three times 
higher than for white Canadians (Farha, McKay, Neven, & Porter, 2009, cited in 
Schizophrenia Society of Ontario, 2010). As well, “black males are more likely to be 
stopped, detained, and imprisoned upon conviction” (Commission on Systemic Racism in 
the Ontario Criminal Justice System, 1995, cited in Schizophrenia Society of Ontario, 
2010). Systemic racism, over-policing, and racial profiling within law enforcement and 
judicial systems is common amoung “ethno-racial groups” (Interim Report of the 
Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System, 1994; Jiwani, 
2002; Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2003; Wortly, 2004, cited in Schizophrenia 
Society of Ontario, 2010) .  
While the Schizophrenia Society of Ontario report was a discussion of 
deportation, there is no mention of what happens to aboriginal Canadian men. It has been 
established that this pattern of overrepresentation of racialized groups in correctional 
facilities in Canada also includes aboriginal men and women (Roberts & Doob, 1997). As 
Roberts and Doob reported in 1997, Ontario census data revealed a trend in admission 
rates for black males in Canada to be “6,796 per every 100000 people compared to 1,326 
for whites and 3,600 for Aboriginals” (Roberts & Doob, 1997, p.481). 
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As a very recent report on federally sentenced women with mental health issues in 
Canada highlighted, “As of August 2010, there were 512 women serving federal 
sentences in Canada, of these, 34% (174 women) were Aboriginal” (Bingham & Sutton, 
2012, p.5). While there is no mention of black women in the report, Raimunda Reece’s 
2010 dissertation entitled, Caged (No)Bodies: Exploring The Racialized And Gendered 
Politics Of Incarceration Of Black Women In The Canadian Prison System details that 
black women in Ontario specifically are admitted to prison at a rate that is 7 times the 
admittance rate for white women (Reece, 2010). The rates of admissions for black 
women in Ontario prisons is also increasing (Reece, 2010). 
Also, researchers for the Department of Health in England and Wales reviewed 
Community Treatment Orders in the U.S., Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Israel, and 
Scotland as part of Department of Health project to review the Mental Health Act. Their 
international review revealed “that relative to the proportion of the general population 
comprised by their ethnic group, most ethnic minority groups might be over-represented 
amongst CTO recipients” (Churchill, R., Owen, G., Singh, S., & Hotopf, M., 2007, 
p.106). 
As Barbara Hudson describes, “the general charges against conventional western 
criminal justice systems in regard to race and gender are that they fail to protect women 
and members of minority racial or ethnic groups from harms that they suffer in virtue of 
their gender and/or race/ethnicity and that they discriminate by over-penalizing offenders 
to the degree that they are removed from the characteristics of white masculinity” 
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(Hudson, 2006, p.30). The practice of deportation of racialized minorities identified with 
mental health issues is dependent on the structures of criminal justice systems. 
In 2009, a law student at York University wrote a Major Research Paper entitled, 
“Sanism and Canadian Immigration System” (Perryman, 2009).  In the short paper (26 
double spaced pages of written text), Perryman sheds light on some of the structural and 
historical concerns at the intersection of immigration and criminal justice systems for 
people diagnosed with mental illness in Canada. In her conclusion, Perryman begins to 
make the connection that, “The link between mental illness and deportation is not unlike 
the link between visible minorities and offenders and deportation.  What is unique is the 
lack of attention that it receives” (Perryman, 2009, p. 26). Perryman also recognizes that,   
the decisions coming out of the Immigration Appeal Division have been 
disjointed and inconsistent, reflecting the conflict between the historical 
feelings of those with mental illness and reality.  Hence, those with mental 
illness are faced with a regime, overwhelmed with contradictions and 
unresolved discrepancies, consistent with Perlin’s sanism2 (Perryman, 
2009, P 26). 
The systems of identification, incarceration, and removal have a long history of 
discourses embedded in Canadian policies and law that utilize ideas of perceived genetic, 
racial, gendered and sexual difference to control for “types” of people rather than offering 
support to these populations (Dowbiggin, 1997; LaViolette, 2004; McLaren, 1990; 
Menzies, 1998; Chadha, 2008). Since the late 1800s and early 1900s, the deployment of 
2 “Perlin argues that one of the sanist myths circulating in our society is that if a mentally ill person refuses medication 
for their illness, that decision becomes an accurate predictor of future violence and the need for hospitalization, or in 
the context of immigration law, deportation” (Perryman, 2009, P. 15). 
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dehumanizing discourses (including racial, eugenic, ableist and mentalist discourses3) 
have been used in Canada, to rationalize deportation, to refuse of entry to Canada and 
thus to advance colonial nation building within Canada (for aboriginal peoples) while 
restricting access to social supports (Dowbiggin, 1997, McLaren, 1990; Menzies, 1998; 
Chadha, 2008; Roman, Brown, Noble, Wainer, & Young, 2009). This thesis exposes the 
concrete operations of power which enact violence rather than offer support. 
As a Canadian crime study of immigration status appeals cases revealed, 
racialized immigrants were deported more often than immigrants from Anglo-European 
countries (Chan, 2005). While the time period of analysis is not made explicit in the 
study report, it appears from the reference section that cases were analyzed from 
approximately 1995-2001. The top representing countries based on the number of appeal 
cases were Jamaica, Iran, India, Vietnam, Guyana, and Trinidad (Chan, 2005).The study 
illustrated that concerns around criminality rationalizes the ongoing regulation and 
surveillance of immigrants and the threat of deportation ensures their compliance (Chan, 
2005).   
Robert Menzies details his analysis of “provincial and federal government records 
and correspondence, institutional documents, print media clippings and patient files” to 
chronicle “the role of British Columbian provincial authorities and medical practitioners 
in engineering the deportation of psychiatrically disordered and cognitively disabled 
immigrants out of the province between Confederation and 1939” (Menzies, 1998, p. 
3 I argue in this thesis that these are not separate discourses but have been historically 
forged together. 
7 
 
                                                 
135).  Menzies argued “that the deportation of 'insane' and other 'undesirable' immigrants 
was nourished by the flood of nativist, rac(ial)ist, exclusionist, eugenist, and mental 
hygienist thinking that dominated British Columbian and Canadian politics and public 
culture throughout this 'golden age' of deportation” (Menzies, 1998, p. 138). 
Jay Dolmage has demonstrated how the rhetorical construction of disability and 
race were developed through the policing and limiting of immigration at Ellis Island from 
the early twentieth century into the 1920s. Specifically, Dolmage argues that through 
processes of medical inspections and eugenic selection,  
“that Ellis Island, as a rhetorical space, can be seen as a nexus—and a special 
point of origin—for eugenics and the rhetorical construction of disability and 
race in the early twentieth century. Importantly, constructions of class, sex, 
and sexuality were also always part of this racializing and normalizing 
process” (Dolmage, 2011, p. 28). 
 
From Menzies and Dolmage, the collaboration of medical professionals, 
immigration regulators, the policing of borders and the use of racial and eugenic 
technologies (such as identification and medical inspection) are revealed for their 
common purposes for colonial nation and population building. 
Remedies of violence 
In the recent past, inequities in mental health services (that fail to serve minorities 
and marginalized groups) have been addressed as an issue of “cultural competence” or a 
need for more “evidence-based practice” (Whaley & Davis, 2007; Hernandez, Nesman, 
Mowery, Acevedo-Polakovich, Callejas,  2009).  Researchers have highlighted some of 
the problems within these solutions including the methodological, epistemological, and 
political issues that make the project of cultural competence suspect for essentializing 
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culture and having impractical conceptual understandings (Aisenberg, 2008; Whitley, 
Rousseau, Carpenter-Song, & Kirmayer, 2011). Without an attention to the embedded 
Eurocentrism within critical approaches to mental health (which includes a lack of 
attention to colonization worldwide that relied on technologies of mental hygiene, 
eugenics, diagnostic categorization and hierarchies of professionalized knowledge), an 
opportunity to perceive the violence within these solutions and the genealogy of their 
basis in modernizing, eugenic, racial thinking is confined. 
 These contemporary solutions leave the systems intact that seek to taxonomize, 
finalize and encapsulate people into a general type, see them through the lens of 
difference, develop disciplines, professions and expertise on the “Other” who is always 
represented in terms of lack. These contemporary solutions also seek to control difference 
while at the same time working to identify the existence of the Other, the risk of the 
Other and the threat of the Other, thereby constituting its very representation, and 
constructing the violent Other through the production of discourse. As highlighted by 
Gayatri C. Spivak, the experiences of certain groups are often rendered invisible through 
the historical process of systematic oppression and hegemonic writing of history by social 
elites (Spivak, 1988). The voices of these subaltern groups are then excluded through 
discursive practices within institutions, disciplines, and academic knowledge. This 
research recognizes the violence within these forms of oppression and aims to privilege 
the subjugated perspectives and experiences of marginalized groups through an 
acknowledgement of the violence experienced and claims forwarded by psychiatric-
consumer-survivors or mad people with particular respect to racialized minority groups. 
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Some of the most violent forms of injustice are often misrecognized or 
unrecognized in our current mental health system even though the system itself is the 
current perpetrator of this violence. Harmful and forced treatments, forced confinement 
and the disproportionate deportation of racialized minorities who are diagnosed as 
mentally ill continue to be regular practices of the mental health system in collaboration 
with the criminal justice, and immigration systems.  These systems have inherited a 
common ancestry that must be considered within the context of the projects and 
outcomes of colonization in order to be appreciated for their capacity for violence.  The 
legacy of eugenic thinking, racial hierarchy, and colonial forms of violence become 
apparent when the common civilizing and respectabilizing mission of colonization is 
brought to the fore for consideration at the mutually constituting space of criminal justice, 
mental health, and immigration. In this thesis, I argue that the disavowal of historical 
and political considerations and the technologies that remove (or appropriate) the 
voice of the Other within the forensic mental health system renders the violence of 
these erasures, their effects, and their participation in neo-liberal and colonial 
projects- invisible.  
Research on race and mental illness appears to imply that “immigrants” and 
racialized minorities are “more prone” to mental illness and experience more 
discrimination in terms of access mental health services (Chakraborty & McKenzie, 
2002). This occurs due to a tendency in mental health research to reconstitute 
representations of racialized minorities as distinct from the core of society (Bhui & 
Sashidharan, 2003). This process can reinforce ideas of racial difference by focusing on 
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individual psychological differences rather than how power disparities operate 
(Sashidharan, 1993). A critique of the categorization processes of biomedical diagnosis, 
the forms of treatment applied, the confluence of mental health, immigration and criminal 
justice, as well as the historical and political contexts of these issues remain excluded 
from the research. Experiences of racism are expressed as inequality in access to services, 
and over representations in the mental health and criminal justice systems are attributed 
to the racism inherent in the diagnostic process, the racism of mental health institutions, 
or the results of racialized minorities living in a racist society (Fernando, 2010; Fernando, 
2003; Fernando, Ndegwa, & Wilson, 1998; Kaye & Lingah, 2000; Metzl, 2009; 
Thompson, 2005).  
An analysis that pays insufficient attention to the broader social, historical and 
political contexts of the development of mental health, criminal justice and immigration 
systems for colonial and imperial projects that were dependent on unjustified relations of 
recognition precludes an analysis of the use of dehumanizing discourse, the deployment 
of racial and eugenics ideas, the participation of disciplines and professionals, and the 
production of totalized ideas of difference within the systems themselves. As Nadia 
Kanani  has highlighted, “there are few studies that consider the intersections between 
race and madness, and fewer still that locate these intersections within the social and 
political contexts of colonization” (Kanani, 2011, p.1). This research will extend these 
analyses to attend to how mental health, criminal justice and immigration systems 
participate in the continuation of colonial and imperial projects through the 
institutional expression of social disrespect (such as dehumanized referents 
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including those with racial/eugenic implications).  This thesis is a contribution to the 
history of the present. 
Charting the course 
In the chapter 2, I outline suggestions for an extension to the contributions made 
in the critical mental health field. When we take a critical look at the history of 
biomedical perspectives in mental health (i.e., notables include: Foucault, Laing, Szasz, 
Basaglia & Ingleby) and the highly influential contributions of those who identify with 
and/or ally with  the psychiatric-survivor, consumer-survivor, ex-patient, or mad 
movements (such as: Judi Chamberlin, Irit Shimrat, Leonard Roy Frank , Bonnie 
Burstow, Geoffrey Reaume and Don Weitz) we can appreciate the many exposed 
epistemological, methodological, and ethical issues that (re)produce violence. What is 
often left uninterrogated is the reliance on a Eurocentric conceptualization of history 
within articulations of struggle and when attending to the political and social contexts of 
critique. The effect of this enduring Eurocentrism is often an inattention to the complicit 
influences of colonial and imperial projects on the practices and technologies of 
dehumanization, taxonomization, and the establishment of human hierarchies to 
rationalize violence through the implementation of racial and eugenic rationale.  
With regards to the specific critical mental health literature devoted to 
racialized groups and the mental health system or the forensic mental health system, 
disparities and racist practices are often noted. What remains absent is a synthesis 
of a postcolonial analysis with a critical race perspective (understood as a 
confluence) that questions the practices, processes and technologies of difference 
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and violence that become institutionalized in systems while also acknowledging the 
material realities for historically constituted marginalized groups. When 
synthesized, the potential for transformation becomes apparent within subjugated 
stories, practice and positions of resistance (i.e. Homi Bhabba’s ideas of hybridity, 
mimicry and ambivalence4).  
Rather than turning to the suggestion of developing cultural competence, or 
excavating indigenous or subjugated knowledges as “alternative treatments” in mental 
health systems, a synthesis of postcolonial theory and critical race theory permits an 
appreciation of cultures within their historical contexts as cultures of imperialism or 
cultures of dominance and subjugation (qua Said, 1994)5. This synthesized analysis 
allows for a refusal to accept solutions such as those that propose that “anti-racist” and 
“psychotherapy” can be commensurate. In a synthesis or confluence analysis 
technologies and disciplines such as psychotherapy are held as complicit in the 
formations and advancement of a normative subject (often centered as a white, Christian, 
able bodied, minded, heterosexual, cis gendered, male, speaking the King’s English, 
4 See Homi Bhabha, “Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse,” October 28 (Spring 
1984): 125-133. Mimicry is explored as a complex representation of the colonizer for multiple purposes 
including self-preservation of identity. Hybridity is explored in the colonial context for its affront to 
essentialization and ambivalence is described with respect to the colonizer’s position toward the colonized 
as a place for disrupting colonial binary relation of subordinate Other and colonizer.  
5 See Said, E. W. (1994). Culture and imperialism. London: Vintage. Edward Said complicated the idea of 
culture by connecting the idea of its development to it use value in colonial and imperial projects. The idea 
of culture was often bound to a process of categorization and essentializing that distanced one culture from 
another within a colonial or imperial project. Cultures are therefore position hierarchically in their 
essentialized encapsulation as dominant, subordinate. Becoming competent with a culture or appropriating 
cultural practices as “alternative treatments” are then always tied to colonization, imperialism and therefore 
to the establishment of racial hierarchies as well. 
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compliant with the law, etc.). The formations of this normative subject were/are of course 
dependent on identifying himself in relation to the Other, often at work to delineate 
himself by what he is not, generating an image of the savage, the uncivilized, the mad, 
and those deserving of violence. 
In chapter 3, I overview the contemporary interdependent policies and laws of the 
mental health system, the criminal justice system and immigration system relied on to 
accomplish deportation. By examining the Mental Health Act, the Criminal Code of 
Canada, and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, a position of authority is 
established through the validating commitment of each respective Act to its function 
within its own specialized boundaries of knowledge and purview. Functionally and 
practically, they work together through the complexities of the forensic mental health 
system that is resistant to the voices, interrogations or interpretations of those who are not 
legal, medical, or immigration authorities.   
Chapter 4 seeks to surface a conceptualization of violence capable of engaging 
with the complexity of historical, contemporary, and seemingly separate issues of 
violence within the construction, legitimization, and authorization of deportation for 
those identified with mental health issues in Canada. In order to recognize the historical 
violence embedded in contemporary practices and technologies or the violence 
institutionalized within professional discourses, within law, and governing policies, we 
must see the confluence of violence as an interdependent process. A concern for the 
violence of abuse, war, sexual violence, collective violence and state violence (referred to 
as subjective violence by Slavoj Žižek) must also acknowledge the violence that is social, 
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political, and economic, while appreciating the violence within the institutions and laws 
that through their contributing professions and knowledge authorities, (re) lay the 
groundwork for violent means to achieve violent ends (referred to as objective violence 
by Slavoj Žižek. This must then also consider the everyday practices and technologies 
that permit violence to continue while resisting inquiry, and transformation (referred to as 
symbolic violence by Slavoj Žižek). In order to achieve such a conceptualization, I 
convene contributions from theorists on violence that have attempted to describe the 
nuances, tensions and complexities of violence. 
 Through an exploration of various relevant and important theoretical works on 
violence, I argue that we can appreciate the capacity of  Slavoj Žižek’s conceptualization 
of violence (2008) to accommodate the necessary analyses of physical violence, 
structural violence (including economic relations and social relations) (via Karl Marx, 
Fredrich Engels, Franz Fanon and others), the day to day forms of violence (as Catharine 
MacKinnon describes through her examples of Marriage and Rape), epistemic, cognitive 
and rhetorical forms of violence (described from Mohandas K. Gandhi). We can also 
appreciate the capacity of Žižek’s conceptualization to accommodate recognition of 
violence as products and processes (Lawrence & Karim, 2007, p.12), as human creations, 
relations of power (via Michel Foucault), and modes of domination (from Pierre 
Bordieu), the cultural and social factors of violence (qua Amartya Sen), and the dangers 
of violent means to achieve unpredictable ends (pace Hannah Arendt). Via Žižek there is 
also the capacity to include a recognition of the violence resulting from the problem of 
identity requiring an Other or difference in order to exist (via William E. Connolly).  
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Chapter 4 also deliberates on oppression analysis. Complex issues relating to 
oppression are often approached through an intersectional analysis that understands that 
various forms of oppression are targeted at certain groups by virtue of their identification 
by race, class, age, ability, gender, sexual orientation, religion, language, etc.. 
Intersectional approaches often describe one or more “types” of oppression (i.e., racism, 
heternormativity, mentalism, ageism et cetera) working interrelatedly or together 
depending on the identity categories to which a person or group is understood as 
belonging. Criticisms of this approach have highlighted its lack of attention to hierarchy, 
to relations of power and the formation of subjectivities, and an overreliance on identities 
or subjectivities (Carbado, 2013; Nash, 2008; McCall, 2005; Heron, 2005). Some 
scholars have suggested a systemic analysis that looks at interlocking systems of 
oppression or a matrix of domination to reveal one historically related system and how 
they need and secure one another hierarchically (Collins, 1991; Nash, 2008; Heron, 2005; 
Razack, 1998). 
An ongoing problematic within such approaches (here mentioned together only by 
their common reliance and reproduction of categories of identity/difference or systems of 
domination/oppression/privilege that are discursively delineated as separate in analyses 
that perceive them as mutually constituting, interlocking systemically or intersecting 
individually) is the propensity to rely on predetermined analytical systems of oppression 
interlocking or aspects of identity intersecting. 
This reliance exposes an ongoing tendency to resist transformational analytic 
perspectives that permit an engagement with social issues without a reliance on systems 
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or relations or identities of difference that were forged through violent means for colonial 
and imperial projects. I suggest that it is possible to consider the material effects of 
segregation, oppression or violence that is targeting delineated groups without requiring 
the identification technologies of difference (including analytical categories named upon 
difference i.e. racism, patriarchy, ableism, sexism, classism, heterosexism, ageism), or 
the (re)establishment of hierarchies to advance a position of social justice or any ethical 
claims for recognition, redistribution or reconciliation. Although analyses of interlocking 
systems of oppression are useful, in some instances, a directed analysis toward the 
processes and technologies of difference rather than a systemic analysis can help to 
reveal a project or purpose that has been overlooked in the analyses of the workings of 
power or oppression. For example, the project of eugenics, and the systems of sanism and 
mentalism are often overlooked for their involvement within systemic analyses of 
oppression. The project of eugenics can never be separated into race, ability, mental 
illness as they were all products of a project delineating conceptualizations of 
undesirability based on perceived blood or genetic ranking and classification. There is no 
system of racism or ableism or mentalism that is ever distinct or separated from this 
history in order for them to be analytically interlocked for analytical purposes capable of 
analyzing any neo-eugenic project within colonial enterprise. Mental health, criminal 
justice and immigration systems have also been historically bound to each other and for 
this study; an analysis of these interlocking systems is not the focus. In this study, an 
attention to confluence focuses on the common practices and technologies within these 
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systems across temporal periods to reveal relations and operations of power and their 
common project. 
An analysis of confluence is offered as a departure from an intersectional or 
interlocking analysis in that a confluence is never static, no part is completely distinct 
from another, and there are multiple perspectives from which one can examine or trace 
the same idea, system, factor or influence. Confluence demands a historical 
consideration, an appreciation of the temporal. Imagine that no cubes of a matrix, spheres 
of intersecting difference or systems that interlock can remain static. Imagine that their 
relations are fluid and therefore time must always be an aspect for consideration. An 
appreciation of confluence acknowledges that all categories and systems of difference are 
suspect and focuses or redirects our attention to their common projects as well as their 
resulting fields of knowledge, practices and technologies.  An analysis of confluence also 
acknowledges identity/difference as complicit within and a product of historically 
perpetrated violence. When our methodology is commenced with a respect for 
complexity, we also commence with an appreciation for representations that are 
historically produced, our own historically influenced interpretations, the functions and 
powers of discipline specific discourse , the contours of a set of social relations (rather 
than the relations among different social groups themselves),  historically developed 
systems and the technologies that (re)create  hierarchical structures, as well as the 
interdependent set of hegemonic knowledge bases and practices, and governing 
processes. While the term confluence has been used as a guiding concept to study 
complex issues elsewhere (Joe, 2000; Rix, 2000; Sung, Mellow & Mahoney, 2010; Press 
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&Tanur, 1991; Dickerson, 2008: Phillips, Leathers & Erkanli, 2009), the above metaphor 
tracing the operations of power across temporal periods, within social relations, 
discourses, through the establishment of hierarchies and hegemonies and governing 
processes to reveal a project is my own contribution. 
In Chapter 5, we look specifically at the colonial practice and technologies of 
violence and difference at work at the confluence of mental health, criminal justice and 
immigrations systems. Here the intricate technologies and processes required for 
Orientalism are recognized as dividing practices and gendered discourses (re)deployed at 
the confluence of immigration, criminal justice and mental health systems. Also, the 
colonial practices and violence of erasure (the elimination of voice or aspects relevant to 
any consideration of a person including their histories, and circumstances), of 
appropriation (of acts of resistance as “evidence” used for the constructing of identities 
worthy of violence, and for the rationalization of positions that legitimize violence) and 
the processes of dehumanization are explored for their use value in colonial and imperial 
projects. The establishment and implementation of professional hierarchies and 
disciplinary hegemonies at the confluence of immigration, criminal justice and mental 
health are interrogated for their imbrication with and reflection of the establishment, and 
reproduction of human hierarchies and hegemonies of knowledge and authority. These 
practices, policies and technologies are also challenged for their complicity in the 
remaking of North-South divisions, their participation in the reinforcement of ideas of 
nationalism and the utilization of moral and ethical arguments for the justification of 
atrocities. 
19 
 
In Chapter 6, I describe the methods used in this study and argue for the necessity 
of a post-colonial analysis of confluence. This research aims to explore the confluence of 
discourses and practices in the mental health, criminal justice and immigration systems in 
Canada that have contributed to how deportation (understood as a mechanism of state 
violence) is framed (constructed) by colonial, racial and eugenic discourses/practices. In 
order to explore how violence as described by Žižek operates, a post-colonial theoretical 
approach drawing on theories of violence and an understanding of confluence, will be 
relied upon.  
From this vantage point, I also describe this study’s focus on historical 
continuities by attending to the temporal (that which is dynamic and changing and that 
which is continuous yet carried through time). I outline what is drawn on (partially) from 
Foucaudian genealogical analysis and how this method departs from this. I also describe 
how the methods used in this study attend to material continuities (how projects of nation 
building relied/rely on eugenic and racial knowledge formations and disciplinary 
processes and laws) through an attention to processes that discursively frame people to 
construct, legitimize and authorize violence. By acknowledging that all our interpretive 
and discursive structures are subject to historical influence, it is also pertinent that we 
also disclose the horizon of these interpretations. As Hans-Georg Gadamer made very 
clear in his magnum opus, Truth and Method, every person has a historically effected 
consciousness making claims to objective knowledge impossible. Through our 
concurrence with this position, we can appreciate that all vantage points are partial, 
contingent, and subject to representation and interpretation. The horizon of interpretation 
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in this study is committedly focused with an attention to the levels of analyses and 
contribution provided post-colonial theory. 
The method of a post-colonial analysis of confluence is described in application to 
the contemporary decision documents of the appeals division of the Immigration and 
Refugee Board of Canada, both contemporary and archival policies and laws, as well as 
archival correspondence relating to mental health, criminal justice and immigration 
practices that support deportation for those identified with mental health issues, non-
Canadian citizens and involved with the criminal justice systems.  
In chapter 7, archival documents including professional, administrative, and 
government correspondence resurface the practices of relying on racial and eugenic 
rationale to control for “undesireables” within Canadian practices, policies and law.  
Archival documents pertaining to the historical use of prison gaols for the detention of 
undesirables by the Department and Immigration and Colonization (1919), the practice of 
deportation of “hoboes”, “tramps”, and “undesireable aliens” (1915), and the designation 
of Ontario hospitals for the insane as immigration stations (1927) depict the continuation 
of processes of colonial nation building at the confluence of criminal justice, immigration 
and mental health systems. These examples illustrate the not-so peculiar practices at the 
confluence of immigration, mental health, and criminal justice systems that permit the 
use of violence through the selective referencing of law and authoritative texts, the 
exclusion and denial of racial and eugenic rationale (when not provided for in law), and 
the portrayal of abuses of power and authority as provided for within the discretionary 
authoritative powers of the state. Also exposed is the practice of delineating an idea of a 
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Canadian identity, one forged upon a devaluation of those whose characteristics are 
encapsulated as inferior, costly, threatening, or undeserving. While these archival 
examples provide a unique perspective at this confluence, they also provide an 
opportunity for inquiry into the practices of figures of authority, a perspective focused on 
the violence of professionals, organizations, and governmental structures. While 
individually they contribute an analysis of individual actors and decision makers, together 
they demonstrate the cooperation and interplay of criminal justice, immigration and 
mental health systems for common imperial and colonial projects.  
Chapter 8 details the cases and case data from the appeals division of the 
Immigration and Refugee board and cases that go on to the Federal Court of Canada 
analyzed in this study. These documents are the only known public records on 
deportation and were retrieved from the Canadian Legal Information Institute database 
and the Federal Court decision database. These cases provide both a representation of the 
technologies, practices and laws at work at the confluence of mental health, immigration 
and criminal justice systems specific to deportation in Canada while also depicting 
unique and powerful act of resistance to systems of dehumanization, identification, 
incarceration and removal in Canada. The analysis of the descriptive data for the 75 cases 
matching the criteria (those appeal cases for deportation for those identified with mental 
health issues) from 2001-2011 (the most complete and recent years for analysis at the 
commencement of this study), reveals the disturbing prioritization of racialized countries 
for deportation. This descriptive data had yet to be analyzed or shared prior to this study. 
The length of time people who were fashioned for deportation lived in Canada was 
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seldom a decision impacting factor. Also, access to psychiatric treatment was rarely an 
outstanding issue for the people in these cases as most had several years of affiliation 
with biomedical psychiatric treatment prior to their index offences. The ideas of fair 
procedures or due process are also held suspect when we see that an overwhelming 
majority of cases result in decisions for either deportation or the imposition of heavy 
restrictions, confinement, forced treatment and reporting requirements. In order to 
facilitate the reading of these complex cases, I provide in this section an overview of the 
Immigration and Refugee Board and the Appeals Division with respect to deportation 
decisions.  
In Chapter 9, I offer an analysis of a representative selection of contemporary 
decision documents of deportation appeals cases from the Immigration and Refugee 
board. The post-colonial analysis of confluence exposes the ongoing reliance on notions 
of the biologically inferior or untreatable, the unrehabilitatable criminal, and the 
undeserving alien. These themes reproduce a focus on the individual in biomedical terms 
that redirect responsibility solely toward the individual, a notion of inherent criminality, 
dehumanized and deserving of punishment, and a reproduction of the Other represented 
in terms of lack, who is not “one of us” or deserving of our support or care.  
The analysis also reveals the necessity of the mental health system, the criminal 
justice system and the immigration system to present as independent, objective and 
judicious institutional process while clandestinely acting in concert to resist appeals for 
adequate care, safety or a consideration of external factors. This nuanced 
interdependency uncovers the confluence of violence, identity/difference and systems of 
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oppression as contemporary manifestations of the legacy of colonial and imperial 
professionals of authority, the establishment and use of disciplinary hegemonies, and the 
discretionary manipulation of law to construct a dehumanized subject worthy of 
legitimized violence or expulsion.  The end result is the continuation of violent racial and 
eugenic systems, technologies and practices of population control and nation building, 
(re)producing ideas of the savage, mad, uncivilized Other and the pristine, civil, self. 
In the concluding chapter, we examine the implications of deeply hurtful and 
intergenerational forms of racialized and eugenic violence within professional practice, 
disciplines, policies, law, and within the operations and technologies of contemporary 
institutions. The use figurative language to represent contemporarily accepted forms of 
biologically inferioriority, inherent unrehabilitatable criminality, or to identify someone 
as an undeserving alien are no less violent than literal deployments of these meanings as 
their (re)produced outcomes are the same: a denial of care, responsibility, and humanity. 
In this study we will see the use of very particular colonial tropes for the constructing of 
identities of dehumanized difference and the reliance on racial and eugenic rationale to 
provide the authority for and legitimization of violence. These deeply historical 
interdependent processes revealed at the confluence of mental health, criminal justice, 
and immigration systems may have us question our conceptions of progress or 
advancement, of anti-oppressive or anti-racist proposals for their complicity in the 
continuation of the production of ordered subjects, a reliance on old colonial machinery, 
and the (re)positioning of authority and legitimacy through violence and difference. 
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Chapter 2 
An Addition to Critical Mental Health literature: 
 The field of critical mental health has a wide array of historical and contemporary 
contributors that is ever expanding. Although there are a great number of commonly 
appreciated fundamental epistemological contradictions, the Eurocentrism within critical 
mental health often results in the marginalization of attention to colonization and race. 
When appreciated, this level of critique has the potential to share a dynamic historical 
critique that will be incommensurable with technologies and practices that seek to 
maintain their hegemony by appropriating the discourse of resistance into traditional 
biomedical, individualized models of surveillance, and exclusion. 
 In this chapter, I offer suggestions for an extension to the contributions made in 
the critical mental health field. When examining the critical history of biomedical 
perspectives in mental health including the contributions of  Foucault, Laing, Szasz, 
Basaglia & Ingleby, as well as the highly influential contributions of those who identify 
with and/or ally with  the psychiatric-survivor, consumer-survivor, ex-patient, or mad 
movements (such as: Judi Chamberlin, Irit Shimrat, Leonard Roy Frank , Bonnie 
Burstow, Geoffrey Reaume and Don Weitz) one can appreciate the many exposed 
epistemological, methodological, and ethical issues that (re)produce violence. I challenge 
the tendency within critical mental health literature to rely on a Eurocentric 
conceptualization of history within articulations of struggle and when attending to the 
political and social contexts of critique, is challenged for its preclusion of a historical 
attention to colonization. The effect of this enduring Eurocentrism is often an inattention 
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to the complicit influences of colonial and imperial projects on the practices and 
technologies of dehumanization, taxonomization, and the establishment of human 
hierarchies to rationalize violence through the implementation of racial and eugenic 
rationale. 
A note on terminology: The mad, madness and sanism 
For people who have experienced the psychiatric system, the terms, ‘‘consumer’’ 
and ‘‘survivor,’’ often joined, as in consumer/survivor, and become among the more 
well-known forms of self-definition. ‘‘Consumer,’’ is a term that implies choice and 
autonomy in treatment, “an early demand of antipsychiatry activists, but with a 
significant difference—people who identify as consumers want to work for reforms from 
within psychiatry and accept the medical model of mental illness” (Reaume, 2002). The 
term psychiatric- survivor was initially identified with an antipsychiatry perspective, 
rejecting the concept of mental illness and wanting to replace psychiatry with survivor-
run alternatives in the community (Reaume, 2002).  
The term mad has been used “as a generic name for the whole range of people 
thought to be in some way, more or less, abnormal in ideas or behaviour” (Porter, 1987, 
p.6). Mad is used when referring to the experiences and plight of peoples deemed mad 
throughout history. The concept of mental illness, psychiatric disturbance, or insanity 
often apply to more recent societal constructs or differences in behaviour or ideas. As 
Roy Porter describes, “Madness may be as old as mankind (sic). Archaeologists have 
unearthed skulls dated back to at leaset 5000 b.c. which have been trephined or 
trepanned-small round holes have been bored in them with flint tools. The subject was 
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probably thought to be possessed by devils which the holes would allow to escape” 
(Porter, 2002, p. 10).  
 In Madness and Civilization, Michel Foucault outlines the historical and cultural 
developments that constructed mad people as a threat to the civilized and their need to be 
confines for moral and economic reasons (Foucault, 1965). According to Foucault’s 
historical analysis, madness was at one time a liberated existence, free from the 
technologies of identification that reify difference and justify confinement (Foucault, 
1965). Dale Peterson, Roy Porter, and others have used the term when referring to 
histories of madness from the perspectives of mad peoples who have historically been 
deemed mad (Beresford, 2000; Peterson, 1982; Porter, 1987; Reaume, 2006). The use of 
the term mad has been reclaimed to acknowledge the experiences and voices of mad 
people without invoking (thereby resisting) the contemporary and often anachronistic 
psychiatric diagnoses such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, et cetera. The use of the 
term also acknowledges those who have experienced being deemed mad, confined, exiled 
by the violence of difference and goes beyond the confines of defining mad people solely 
in terms of their relationship to psychiatry, i.e., patient, ex-patient, consumer, survivor 
etc.  
The field(s) of professional social work and social work education have been 
criticized for their complicity with the medical model thereby participating in sanism (the 
“systematic subjugation of people who have received ‘mental health’ diagnoses or 
treatment”). (Poole, Jivraj, Arslanian, Bellows, Chiasson, Hakimy, Pasini, & Reid, 2012, 
p.20). Social work’s participation in “sanist aggressions, such as pathologizing, labeling, 
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exclusion, and dismissal have become a ‘normal’ part of professional practice and 
education” (Poole et al, 2012, p.20).  
Fundamental epistemological contradictions 
The biomedical model of psychiatry can be said to adhere to a positivist 
epistemological approach to knowledge.  Modern Western Philosophy credits 
philosophers of the enlightenment era in Europe during the middle ages such as Descartes 
(1596-1650), and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) for recognizing (or revitalizing) the value 
of skepticism, and breaking free from Christian theology in order to engage with newly 
emerging scientific ideas that favored rational thought and critical inquiry to dogmatism 
(Foucault, 1984; Williams, 2001).  The ideas that stemmed from these contributors 
valued reason, empiricism, science, universalism, notions of progress, and a belief of a 
single uniform reality that could be observed. The Positivist paradigm or epistemological 
position developed from these ancient and modern enlightenment values and ideas. 
In the 1960’s famous resisters to this biomedical model included Psychiatrist 
Thomas Szasz who believed that mental illness was a myth; Michel Foucault, who 
exposed that psychiatry was more about social control and surveillance than compassion 
or treatment, and R.D. Laing who wanted to understand psychotic experience but 
opposed coercion and compulsory “treatment” (Szasz, 1981; Foucault, 1965; Laing, 
1960; Hopton, 2006). Laing’s work led him to a “therapeutic concern with fundamental 
existential issues” (Ingleby, 1981, p. 8). Laing criticized the process of psychiatric 
diagnosis, questioning the diagnosis of conduct and the use of biological treatment for 
issues related to one’s sense of self and one’s sense of being in the world (Laing, 1960). 
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Thomas Szasz “insisted that psychiatrists should return to a contractual relationship with 
the patient, aimed simply at promoting individual liberty” (Ingleby, 1981, p.8).  
Italy’s anti-psychiatrist, Franco Basaglia criticized the concept of a “humane” 
asylum in the 1960s. Basaglia believed that confinement and separation were at the core 
of the psychiatric system of control and this was inherently inhumane. Basagli was 
appointed to supervise the deinstitutionalization of the Ospedal Psichiatrico in Trieste in 
1971. Basaglia represented his principles in practice through the development of 
decentralized community services (Ingleby, 1981, p.17).  
For Basaglia, ‘mental illness’ arises from the contradictions experienced by 
the individual in his or her social situation, and it can only be ‘cured’ by 
tackling these contradictions themselves; this, of course, is an idea shared by 
many theorists- but the striking achievement of Basaglia and his team is the 
concrete realization of this principle in practice.(Ingleby, 1981, p17) 
 
As Szasz, Laing, and Basaglia suggest, there are fundamental epistemological and 
ethical problems with biomedical psychiatry. Their contributions also highlight the 
need for attention to social and political factors in our understanding of mental 
“illness” and challenge our ongoing use of the inhumane processes of confinement 
and seclusion. 
A substantial amount of literature on the anti-psychiatric movement is written in 
the voices of activists themselves. Some examples include Judi Chamberlin’s On Our 
Own: Patient-Controlled Alternative to the Mental Health System (1978); Irit Shimrat’s  
Call Me Crazy: Stories from the Mad Movement (1997); Leonard Roy Frank’s The 
History of Shock Treatment (1978); and some examples edited by psychiatric-survivors 
include Shrink Resistant: The Struggle Against Psychiatry in Canada, edited by Bonnie 
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Burstow and Don Weitz (1988); and Mad Pride: A Celebration of Mad Culture (Curtis, 
Dellar, Leslie, & Watson, 2000). As Mel Starkman describes in the a 1981 issue of the 
Anti-psychiatric magazine Phoenix Rising, the movement gained wide attention in the 
U.S., Canada, Europe and through international conferences in Central and South 
America (Starkman, December, 1981). 
David Ingleby criticizes the adherence to positivistic epistemological stances within 
the profession of psychiatry and questions the notion of objectivity that has been 
critiqued as early as Durkheim in 1895. As Ingleby notes, “Positivism assumes…that 
observations can be made objectively-that measures can be defined operationally, and 
applied in a precise, replicable fashion; and…that theories can be constructed on the same 
causal, deterministic basis as in the natural sciences” (Ingleby, 1981, p.28). Ingleby 
recognized the possibility in principle of stating exactly the criteria for applying physical 
concepts but also recognized the impossibility “to do so for concepts describing human 
activities and states of mind” (Ingleby, 1981, p.32).  As he describes, the descriptions of 
human activities and states of mind are always subject to interpretation, “not in the sense 
that there are no criteria, but that the criteria are unstated ones, lying in the culture itself” 
(Ingleby, 1981, p.32). 
The “breakdown of traditional empiricist philosophies of science and the public 
mistrust about the goals of scientists” has ushered in a discursive space from which the 
social and political roots of science can be exposed (Ingleby, 1981, p.12). Through these 
discursive spaces,  
Psychiatry’s claim to impartial, objective authority is nothing but a 
smokescreen concealing a highly partisan position. ‘Treating people as things’ 
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is not only a questionable methodological precept, but a highly objectionable 
policy. This policy, I argue, has to be understood as reflecting not on the 
private attitudes of individual psychiatrists, but the social role which 
psychiatry has acquired in the course of its history (Ingleby, 1981, p.13). 
Ingleby offers two explanations for how and why historical, social and political 
factors are underrepresented in the research on mental health, first that social and political 
analyses “do not fit in with psychiatry’s mandate to change not society but the individual; 
they are not investigated because psychiatry quite literally has no use for them” (Ingleby, 
1981, p.14). Secondly, the available analyses and research on social and political factors 
does not satisfy the conventional criteria of ‘scientific’ research, “because those criteria 
are not the appropriate ones to use when interpreting the social intelligibility of human 
action; we are not dealing with simply a different theory, but a whole different paradigm” 
(Ingleby, 1981, p.14). As Ingleby succinctly describes, “to ascribe deviant behaviour to 
“illness” rather than ‘badness’ is to rectify it, and locate its significance in the individual 
rather than their surroundings” (Ingleby, 1981, p.15).  
Ingleby also exposes the political use of objective science within psychiatry through 
his analysis of “genetic” research, and the operationalization of “physical indicators of 
anger or sadness” located within the individual and validated by “excessive crying” or 
“foot stomping” (Ingleby, 1981). Research in psychiatry also uses clinical judgment as a 
“blank check” within which to embed “tacit biases and unwritten rules” (Ingleby, 1981). 
As Ingleby highlights, psychiatric research often uses scientific research terminology 
such as Randomized Control Trials in social situations where it is impossible to either 
control or randomize conditions in a vacuum as in some natural sciences (Ingleby, 1981). 
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Also, psychiatric research is used to support clinical judgment as evidence of the 
existence of a biological disorder, never to verify diagnosis (Ingleby, 1981). 
Eurocentrism within critical mental health: a preclusion to colonial analysis 
Ingleby’s analysis of the methodological problems of psychiatric diagnosis is 
exemplified in his description of the Rosenhahn experiment. The experiment where 
“eight perfectly sane volunteers spent several weeks in mental hospitals without their 
sanity being detected, suggests that absolute diagnosis may be wildly inaccurate” 
(Ingleby, 1981, p.32). As Ingleby illustrates, the fact that all the medical staff agreed that 
the eight volunteer were insane was completely irrelevant, “they were wrong!” (Ingleby, 
1981, p.32). Ingleby’s analysis offers both an epistemological and methodological 
critique of biomedical psychiatry but his analysis of the “social and political” is deeply 
imbedded in the Eurocentric view of historical development. Specifically, he looks to 
theorists and research from America, Britain, France and Italy. Ingleby’s social and 
political concerns engage with issues of democracy and advanced capitalism. Ingleby 
demonstrates his awareness of the importance of historical and political development in 
the understanding of the formation of disciplinary hegemonies with peculiar projects. He 
also notes that his work “is directly influenced” by the Frankfurt School and the writings 
of Jurgen Habermas (Ingleby, 1981, p.19).  
Eurocentrism assumes that there are two time periods in history, that up until the 
renaissance (pre-capitalist society) and the growth of capitalism from the renaissance 
onward. Eurocentrism also assumes “that imitation of the Western model by all peoples is 
the only solution to the challenges of our time” (Amin, 1989). This imitation often 
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alludes to a specific construction of history in Europe from Greek antiquity through the 
middle ages to the “enlightenment”. Enlightenment ideas focus on the search for 
universal truths through the use of reason. As Foucault demonstrates for us, much of what 
constitutes reason, (according to Emmanuel Kant) depends on the judgments of what is 
privately and publically considered reasonable (Foucault, 1984). Any pre-capitalist, pre-
modern, pre-enlightenment countries, periods, or ideas are seen as naïve or archaic. 
Within the Eurocentric view, the “maturity” to use reason represents a type of evolution 
of society. What is assumed in Eurocentrism is that a “freedom” is achieved through the 
use one’s reason but according to Kant when one is reasoning as a member of reasonable 
humanity, a person  
“makes a private use of reason when he is ‘ a cog in a machine’; that is, when 
he has a role to play in society and jobs to do; to be a soldier, to have taxes to 
pay, to be in charge of a parish, to be a civil servant, all this makes the human 
being a particular segment of society; he find himself thereby placed in a 
circumscribed position, where he has to apply particular rules and pursue 
particular ends. (Foucault, 1984, p.36)” 
 
Foucault describes the period of the enlightenment and European modernity as an attitude 
that is based on a particular conceptualization of history (Foucault, 1984). This history 
also happens to be a history of Europe. The modern, enlightened, rational, reasonable 
human, must of course not use her or his reason in ways that place her or him outside of a 
circumscribed position. This would constitute irrationality and unreason, or madness. 
The Eurocentrism evident in Ingleby’s work presents itself through a lack of 
attention to critical analyses outside of a European context as well his reliance on a 
Western conceptualization of history (confined to North America and Europe). Also, all 
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of the contributors to his work, Critical Psychiatry: The politics of mental health are 
professionals and academics. In doing so, the contributions of psychiatric-survivors 
specifically and the analysis advanced from first-person perspectives generally, is 
precluded. Although Ingleby’s analysis advocates for a consideration of culturally 
accepted “truths” and their alignment with capitalism and democracy in Western nations, 
there is no discussion of particular historical political projects such as a specific attention 
to colonization or an analysis pertaining to the production of difference and race.  
Ingleby does however provide a thorough critique of the problems with the 
universal truth seeking imperatives of modern psychiatry and their failures in advancing 
“objective” and “impartial” categories and diagnoses in the field of psychiatry. Ingleby’s 
dependence on empirical, or modernist arguments to counter those of modern psychiatry 
participates in the perpetuation of professionalism and academic knowledge while 
devaluing the perspectives and knowledge of those who have experienced mental health 
systems dominated by biomedical psychiatry. These voices and perspectives reveal to us 
the context of oppression and the discourse of a person’s understandings of their 
experience. First person perspectives are also revealing of the dominant cultural norms 
and political circumstances of the time. 
Ann Laura Stoler’s book, Race and the education of desire: Foucault's history of 
sexuality and the colonial order of things (1995), provides a careful analysis of 
Foucault’s first volume of The History of Sexuality to point out that the colonial context 
is absent from Foucault’s genealogy. The consequences of Foucault’s inattention to 
colonization when tracing the history of sexuality and the formation of the European 
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Bourgeois subject are both: 1) a constrained writing of history and 2) a limitation in the 
discourse on sexuality. Without attention to colonization, Foucault’s History of Sexuality 
participates in the ongoing violence within Eurocentric knowledge production. Stoler 
attempts to raise questions and investigate tensions between the Foucault’s writings and 
speeches and help us “rethink the connection between European and colonial 
historiography, between a European bourgeois order and the colonial management of 
sexuality, as well as how those tensions might bear upon how we go about writing 
genealogies of race today” (Stoler, 1995, p.viii).  
For Foucault, a discourse of sexuality was activated as an instrument of power in 
the 19th century, “not as a Freudian account of Victorian prudery would have it, by 
injunctions against talk about sex and specific sexual couplings in the bourgeois family, 
but by patterned discursive incitements and stimulations that facilitated the penetration of 
social and self-disciplinary regimes into the most intimate domains of modern life” 
(Stoler, 1995, p.3). Biopower was a key political technology identified by Foucault; it 
was a means by which mechanism of life could be drawn into the calculations that forged 
the distinctions of bourgeois identity (Stoler, 1995). Biopower could then also be a means 
by which knowledge and power could be leveraged for social transformation. Stoler 
demonstrates that a number of studies that pay attention to the colonial context have 
contributed that “the discursive management of the sexual practices of colonizer and 
colonized was fundamental to the colonial order of things” (Stoler, 1995, p.4). Discursive 
practices of sexuality helped classify colonial subjects into distinct types, and “policed 
the domestic recesses of imperial rule” (Stoler, 1995, p.4). Stoler looks to how Foucault’s 
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insights play out in colonial settings as well as to how “the discursive and practical field 
in which nineteenth-century bourgeois sexuality emerged was situated on an imperial 
landscape where cultural accoutrements of bourgeois distinction were partially shaped 
through contrasts forged in the politics of language and race” (Stoler, 1995, p.5).   
The histories of the West and Europe are often presented in neat divisions without 
mention or inclusion of the Others upon which “the West” was founded. The reference 
point of “the savage, the primitive, the colonized” is not apparent in Foucault’s work. 
Stoler’s analysis reveals how “bourgeois identities in both metropole and colony emerge 
tacitly and emphatically coded by race” (Stoler, 1995, p.7). For Stoler, racism is not an 
ideological product of the universalistic principals of the modern liberal state but a 
foundational friction within it. Stoler demonstrates that Dutch, French, and British 
notions of the Bourgeois subject were defined through “a language of difference that 
drew on images of racial purity and sexual virtue” and this cannot be analyzed from 
Europe itself (Stoler, 1995, p.10). Bourgeois identity was fundamentally tied to notions of 
being European and being “white”. Stoler highlights how “an implicit racial grammar 
underwrote the sexual regimes of bourgeois culture in more ways than Foucault explored 
and at an earlier date” (Stoler, 1995, p.12). From Stoler, we see that pointing out Western 
methodological and epistemological problems from a Eurocentric viewpoint can facilitate 
a continuation of discursive practices that take Eurocentric histories as transparent. 
Without a colonial context embedded within critical perspectives, we can miss the 
violence infused in the very professions, disciplines, and practices we wield to address 
issues of social justice. In mental health systems and research, a lack of attention to this 
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violence allows for movements of resistance to be compromised within the professional 
technologies of difference and civilizing, moralizing projects.   
The necessity of an attention to colonization 
David Ingleby’s 2005 book, Forced Migration and Mental Health 
Rethinking the Care of Refugees and Displaced Persons, includes both first person 
perspectives and contributors that offer a critique the humanitarian aid programs offered 
to refugees and displaced persons. The context provided references the numerous 
political conflicts that have resulted in increased numbers of displaced persons since 
World War II (Ingleby, 2005). Ingleby and the other contributing authors suggest that the 
Western concept of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder often looks at an individual who is 
coping with a stressor or traumatic event in a “disordered” way and pays little attention to 
the specific political context or situation for groups of refugees leaving war-torn parts of 
the world (Ingleby, 2005). What he proposes is a move towards understanding the 
contexts and cultures from which displaced persons and refugees experience trauma and 
the use of programs that adhere to the humanitarian principles upon which aid programs 
are based (Ingleby, 2005).  
Although Ingleby and the contributing authors offer a critique of the Western 
analysis of the experience of trauma and its ramifications for mental health services for 
refugees or displaced persons, little analysis is given to the historical context upon which 
many of the political conflicts have arisen. There is little attention to the historical 
imperial and colonial projects of division of both land and people as well as resource 
extraction through the processes of the production of essentializing taxonomies of both 
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culture and race. With consideration of this deeper historical context that examines the 
technologies used during colonization to advance ideas of difference across geographic, 
cultural, and racial domains, the proposal of remedying current problems by 
“understanding” the specific cultural and political experience of refugees would be 
exposed for reproducing Western colonial methodologies aimed at “helping” those as 
they are defined and separated in term of lack. This remedy could then never been 
described as being one that helps a person or group cope with or resolve the experience of 
dehumanization and loss experienced as a result of political conflict and trauma. Rather 
we would again have a system that looks at individuals in their present context without 
recognition of the ancestry of the violence imbedded in our conceptualizations of 
identification and treatment that ignore the violence within our methods, the projects of 
moral therapy and of helping Others by imposing on them what is dominantly considered 
reasonable and civilized. We would again have a system that sees Others as more at risk 
for developing “illness” and “their” need for treatment. Our techniques of treatment and 
therapies attached to colonial moralizing and civilizing projects do not escape 
dehumanization. 
Vicki Coppock and John Hopton’s book Critical Perspectives on Mental Health 
(2000) attempts to provide a “cohesive” critical perspective on mental health that builds 
upon critics failures “to acknowledge the positive contributions made by mainstream 
medical psychiatrists and clinical psychologists to our understanding of mental distress 
and….the failures of critics of psychiatry to recognize the existence of critical and radical 
discourses within the mainstream” (Coppock and Hopton, 2000, p.3). Coppock and 
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Hopton suggest that psychiatric drugs “can be used in a way which ‘empowers’ service 
users” (Coppock and Hopton, 2000, p.8) They cite the need to use “tranquilizers such as 
Valium (diazepam) and other benzodiazepines…to manage acute anxiety as part of a 
wider strategy of short term crisis intervention” but express “reservations about the use of 
electro-convulsive therapy (ECT) and psychosurgical intervention” (Coppock and 
Hopton, 2000, p.8). Coppock and Hopton also suggest an “eclectic and skills-based” 
model of psychotherapy. The authors acknowledge the use of mental health systems for 
social control and that “collective political action is more useful than individual therapy” 
(Coppock and Hopton, 2000, p. 157 & p.171). They continue by stating that a “truly anti-
oppressive, anti-discriminatory model of mental health care should…incorporate 
biological, psychological, and social perspectives…and…it should have anti-racist and 
anti-sexist dimensions to it (Coppock and Hopton, 2000, p.168).  They advocate for a 
bio-psycho-social model of aetiology and intervention, as well as user-centered 
approaches. The authors also suggest that collective community development approaches 
could be used to address discrimination within mental health systems and political issues 
(Coppock and Hopton, 2000, p. 170).  
Coppock and Hopton’s chapter on gender and race critiques fails to integrate the 
connection between the historical projects of colonization, the construction of difference 
and the common ancestries of the violent technologies used within academic and 
professional disciplines including psychiatry. An analysis of the technologies that use 
coercion, harmful procedures and diagnostic mechanisms to pathologize and control 
difference offers a critique that can help to explain the disproportionate diagnosis and 
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lack of access to “treatment” offered to women and racialized minorities. This analysis 
would problematize the “user-centered” approaches and recommended techniques of 
psychotherapy, the use of tranquillizers and (addictive) benzodiazepines as focusing on 
the individual and rationalizing the application of harm. If we consider the histories of 
psychotherapies such as “harassment therapy” and “rage reduction therapy” aimed at 
“bringing out inmates’ inward-turned anger at the controlled environment” that consists 
of “therapeutic beatings” ranging from “tickling to heavy blows”, we might question the 
use of and research behind “eclectic and skill-based” psychotherapies and their 
participation in dehumanizing physical punishment and moral therapy” (Stannard, 1978).  
As D.L. Stannard describes, the application of rage reduction therapy resulted in 
therapeutic beatings that allegedly caused the death of one patient and back injuries to 
another (Stannard, 1978). A jury in San Jose California awarded $170,000 to a person 
who had “undergone thirteen hours of rage reduction therapy in which she claimed to 
have suffered near-fatal kidney damage, severe bodily bruises, and a lacerated mouth” 
(Stannard, 1978, p. 127). Also, Stannard describes the experience of Jane, who he 
witnessed (Stannard working as an attendant) being forced to scrub a shower room with a 
tooth brush. She was “harassed” as part of her therapy kicking over her wash pail and 
throwing finger paint onto the floor as she cleaned (Stannard, 1978, p. 128).  Although 
Coppock and Hopton provide a thorough catalogue of the existing critical perspectives on 
mental health and psychiatry, their suggestions offer little relief from the violent 
technologies embedded within individualistic, biomedical approaches and civilizing 
moral therapy. Their work represents an attempt to appropriate the discourse of resistance 
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to the system and empowerment into a “cohesive” discourse that allows harmful 
treatments and civilizing therapies to persist.  
Barbara Cruikshank provides an analysis of how the concept of self-esteem has 
been wielded by professionals (including social workers) as a “technology of citizenship” 
that enforces conformity through self-government (Cruikshank, 1999). Although consent 
is appropriated for self-esteem based therapies, power operates upon the self to regulate 
behaviour. The language of empowerment is appropriated from social movements to 
construct the subject as those who “lack self-esteem”, ignoring poverty, sexism, and 
racism (Cruikshank, 1999). Social responsibility is placed on the individual and those 
who do not present with the appropriate responsible, respectable behaviours are viewed 
as a risk or threat to society (Cruikshank, 1999). Shoshana Pollack has demonstrated how 
the operations of self-governance within social assistance structures also act to 
(re)produce subjectivities such as the “submissive lone mother” (Pollack, 2009). The 
refocus on the individual continues the practice of silencing the political and historical 
ancestry (including colonization) of violence within moralizing, and civilizing projects 
while subjugating acts of resistance that provide potential for transformation. 
Suman Fernando’s book, Mental Health, race and culture (2010) challenges 
modern Western approaches to mental health with his analysis of race, culture, ethnicity 
and identity in contemporary mental health systems. Fernando exposes racism within 
Western based mental health services and suggests alternative ways of thinking about 
mental health from perspectives around the globe. Fernando overviews the many 
problems with Western traditional approaches to mental health through an analysis of the 
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development of modern Western psychiatry from Hippocrates, Galen and early Islamic 
understandings (Egypt in AD 683, Syria [then Aleppo] in AD 755, etc.) continuing with 
the rise of Enlightenment ideas in Europe, positivism and the development of asylum and 
community mental health services. Fernando provides a thorough analysis of racism 
within Western psychiatry and offers suggestions for alternative approaches for 
understanding mental health (with examples from spiritual and Asian understandings) 
and alternatives for treatment (Yoga, Herbal remedies, Acupuncture, Meditation etc.) 
(Fernando, 2010).  Fernando describes the traditional Western approaches as “the culture 
of psychiatry” and suggests that a multi-cultural perspective that allows for a pluralistic 
view of mental health will also provide the basis for universal understandings.  
The final vision is that a concept of illness may well remain but it will be very 
different from the present one, and will not be fixed in firm categories that are 
supposed to be universally applicable. Different societies will develop 
variation on what may be, eventually, one or more universal themes; and 
culture will be an integral part of the way that illness will be defined and 
recognized…Any one type of explanation will not be seen as superior to 
another because they will all be embedded within their cultural but 
understandable on the basis of universal themes- and hence, not ‘culture-
bound’ (Fernando, 2010, p. 175). 
 
Fernando begins by describing the contours of race, culture, ethnicity, identity 
communities, and racism. Fernando cites Emmanuel Eze to highlight the racism within 
Eurocentric, enlightenment thinking (Fernando, 2010). Prominent “enlightenment” 
figures including David Hume, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and Immanuel Kant 
played an influential role “in articulating Europe’s sense not only of its cultural but also 
racial superiority...”reason” and “civilization” became almost synonymous with “white” 
people and northern Europe, while unreason and savagery were conveniently located 
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among the non-whites, the “black”, the “red”, the “yellow”, outside Europe” (Eze, 1997, 
p.5 cited in Fernando, 2010, pg. 7). David Hume reasoned that a civilized nation never 
existed that was not white or “any individual eminent either in action or speculation” 
(Fernando, 2010, p. 7-8). Immanuel Kant wrote that the differences between white and 
black races “appears to be as great in regard to mental capacities as in color” (Eze, 1997, 
pp. 33-35, cited in Fernando, 2010, p.8). These ideas continued in Darwinian notions that 
saw race as species and subspecies. Sociological concepts of race saw race as playing 
more of a social role rather than a biological one but continued to influence the structure 
of humanity. Fernando cites Omi and Winant to define race as “a concept which signifies 
and symbolizes social conflict and interests by referring to different types of human 
bodies” (Omi and Winant, 1994, pp. 54-5, cited in Fernando 2010, p.9). 
 For Fernando, culture is more complex. Culture has been understood in multiple 
ways: from being synonymous with being civilized, to a unique way of life, a mix of 
behaviour and cognition “arising from shared patterns of beliefs, feeling and adaptation 
which people carry in their minds”(Leighton an Hughes, 1961, p. 447 cited in Fernando, 
2010, p.9), to the culture of occupations or professions (such as police, social work, 
psychiatry referring to the “ethos or the intangible underlying determinants of people’s 
behaviour in a particular context” (Fernando, 2010, p.9). Culture also refers to groups 
identified by specific characteristics and experiences (i.e., youth culture, drug culture 
respectively). Fernando also notes that understandings of culture have changed over the 
past few decades. From Foucault and Gerd Baumann (1996), “there was an increasing 
awareness of the relationship between discourse – fields of knowledge, statements and 
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practice, including those in medical, psychiatric and psychological practice - and power. 
Hence, categories which lump peoples or experiences together have become suspect” 
(Fernando, 2010, p.10).  Also, culture has been described as something people assume 
passively but this has been problematic alongside the idea that cultures are the “products 
of human volition, desires and powers” (Bauman, 1996, p.31, cited in Fernando, 2010, 
p.10). Fernando notes that in the post-modern context culture is seen as variable and 
dependent on historical and political perspectives in a context of power relations abut 
also dynamic and changing.  
Wendy Brown has articulated how the cultural discourse on Tolerance acts to 
position “liberal and non-liberal subjects, cultures, and regimes” through operations of 
governmentality that homogenize cultures and stratifies identities of the tolerant, the 
tolerated and the intolerant. These orders have continuing and propagating effects on 
global relations and conflict (Brown, 2006, p.4). 
 Fernando describes the contributions of Homi Bhabha as adding emphasis to the 
“hybridity of cultural forms and behaviour in today’s world” (Fernando, 2010, p.10). For 
Fernando, Edward Said’s analysis in Culture and Imperialism (1994) “unravels the 
intimate connections between the understandings of culture presented in Anglo-American 
literature and European domination- nowadays called globalization” (Fernando, 2010, 
p.11). Beginning with Fernando’s contribution, it is crucial that we expand our cultural 
analysis beyond the two concepts hybridity and globalization of Bhabha and Said6. When 
6 See footnote from page 20 re: Homi Bhabha, “Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial 
Discourse,” October 28 (Spring 1984): 125-133. Hybridity is explored in the colonial context for its affront 
to essentialization but also Mimicry is explored as a complex representation of the colonizer for multiple 
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considered with a greater degree of attention, we might also glean from Bhabha that 
cultures and histories constantly intrude on the present and resist colonizing formations in 
particular ways understood through Bhabha’s concepts of hybridity, mimicry, 
ambivalence, etc. (Bhabha, 1994). From this degree of attention, we might begin to see 
perceive that oppressed groups resist representations and practices that reproduce colonial 
form of violence from the past in the present. We might also perceive the value of this 
voice in transforming current systems and practices.  
Said also insisted that colonization had a strong ideological component. Although 
formal colonization may come to an end (the physical inhabitation and appropriation of 
resources), the ideological influences remain (Said, 1994). Through art, literature, music, 
and science, the discourse of empire and domination persist. Said provides examples of 
how a conquering nation rationalizes and justifies to its own people why it is necessary to 
dominate another nation (Said, 1994). The language of the “civilized” and “uncivilized” 
are formed and science becomes the means through which colonization is facilitated. 
Race also becomes attached to the “civilized” and “uncivilized” which creates a hierarchy 
that becomes internalized amoung the colonized (Said, 1994). As the attitudes of 
dominance and civilization permeate the public discourse, the colonizers view themselves 
as the superior, bringing civilization to the world. The process changes the social 
purposes including self-preservation of identity. and ambivalence is described with respect to the 
colonizer’s position toward the colonized as a place for disrupting colonial binary relation of subordinate 
Other and colonizer.  
6 See Said, E. W. (1994). Culture and imperialism. London: Vintage. Said refers to contemporary 
globalization as the current workings of imperialism through the forced imposition of political, social and 
cultural institutions on countries targeted by Western powers. 
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relations within a nation and becomes a culture of imperialism, a culture of dominance 
and subjugation. Often some of the colonized internalize these values and begin to 
idealize the colonizer and feel the need for them.  This extension of Said’s Culture and 
Imperialism (1994) demonstrates the processes whereby Fernando’s suggestion can be 
problematic. Hierarchies (of profession, of discipline, of race) remain in non-Western 
countries which can structure how difference is (re)produced when trying to appropriate 
the “cultural practices” of those identified as Other.  
Fernando identifies that imperial and colonial projects are linked to the rise of ideas 
of difference and race and that these become institutionalized in mental health services.  
Upon this foundation, it is necessary that we additionally provide an analysis of the 
historical developments of the processes and mechanisms that (re) produce hegemonic 
disciplines, professions, and discourses that dominate mental health systems and juridical 
structures in relation to colonization and imperialism. This analysis would allow for 
recognition of the social relations that position Western biomedical perspectives as 
superior to Others and would problematize the processes of taxonomization and of 
categorization of difference for civilizing and moralizing projects. Fernando’s analysis 
describes Western psychiatry as a racist culture (Fernando, 2010, p.11). For Fernando, if 
we add multiple perspectives from multiple understanding across cultures (i.e. Ayurveda 
training for psychiatrists suggested on p. 12), we can reduce the tendency for Western 
models of psychiatry to target people of colour within mental health diagnosis and 
treatment by allow for a spectrum of services and understandings. With this suggestion, 
the historical projects that (re)produce ideas of difference through identification, 
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categorization and essentialization are relied upon to appropriate culturally specific mental 
health interventions.  
This approach to racism within mental health services is permeable to eugenic 
thinking and civilizing, regulating projects as it seeks to fix that which is represented as 
abnormal through systems of inspection, taxonomization, and the application of 
treatments to erase difference. There is also the vulnerability to overlook the violence 
within the processes of cataloging “cultural practices” and the (re)packaging of these ideas 
for offering mental health services and treatment (I do not imply that this is what 
Fernando intended, I merely name the climate of commodification, appropriation, 
exploitation that would benefit from a postcolonial critique). The appropriation, reduction 
and colonial violence resulting from some of these suggestions would go unnoticed 
without also including a thorough analysis of the historical development, eugenic ideas, 
and colonial projects whereby these “alternative cultural approaches” could be perceived 
as dangerous when wielded to “help” those identified as different.  
Suman Fernando, David Ndegwa and Melba Wilson provide a more specific 
analysis of race and culture with respect to forensic institutions in Forensic Psychiatry, 
Race and Culture (1998). The authors overview the glaring disproportionate 
representation of people of colour in Forensic institutions in the U.K.. “Black mentally 
disordered offenders” are more likely to be: “remanded in custody for psychiatric reports; 
subject to restriction orders, detained in higher degrees of security for longer; be referred 
from prison to medium secure units or special hospitals” (Fernando, Ndegwa, & Wilson, 
1998, p. xviii). Also African-Caribbean people formed 37 percent (compared to 2.3 
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percent in the general population) of regional secure unit beds over a 12 year period in the 
North Thames Forensic Psychiatric Service (Fernando, Ndegwa & Wilson, 1998). The 
authors question the process of diagnosis, the issues of racism and bias in forensic 
practice, public policy and the legal pathways between criminal justice and psychiatric 
systems. The suggestions for change involve providing “anti-racist” psychotherapy, 
assessment, separate services, training (on racism), and changes to both legal and 
medication practices. Through these suggestions, there is again an underestimation of the 
impacts of the history of eugenic and racial thinking, moral therapy and difference 
producing mechanisms embedded within the specific fields of criminal justice and mental 
health.  Also marginal to this analysis are the difference-producing effects that remain, 
once racialized people are treated the same as everybody else. With these kinds of 
suggestions, the value of patient’s perspectives are often overlooked, and the historical 
and political projects (such as colonization) that reveal the incongruences between an anti-
racist perspective and the existence of forensic-psychiatry itself, cannot be perceived.  
There are two other books that pay specific attention to race and culture in forensic 
psychiatry. Charles Kaye and Tony Lingah’s Race, Culture and Ethnicity in Secure 
Psychiatric Practice (2000) and Melissa Thompson’s Race, gender, and mental illness in 
the criminal justice system (2005) both point to the racism within forensic psychiatric 
practice but offer little consideration of the historical and political relations that are 
infused within professions, disciplines, and practices based on colonial eugenic and racial 
thinking, and the dehumanizing discourse upon which ideas of dangerousness and threat 
to Western civilization take root. Phil Fennell’s Treatment Without Consent: Law, 
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Psychiatry and the Treatment of Mentally Disordered People Since 1845 (1996) provides 
an overview of the development of forensic mental health laws and practices in Britain, 
exposing the use of physical violence and the suspension of rights. Fennell’s work 
examines specific acts and policies without attention to the political histories of 
capitalism, colonization, eugenic and racial thinking from which this violence was 
rationalized.   In Lynda Frost and Richard Bonnie’s book, The Evolution of Mental Health 
Law (2001), a little less than two and one-half pages are devoted to issues of colonization 
or race. This discussion is particular to the temporal parallel between the rise in attention 
to the rights of those diagnosed with mental health issues and the civil rights movement 
since the abolition of slavery in the U.S (Frost and Bonnie, 2001). 
In Robert Menzies book, Survival of the sanest: Order and disorder in a pre-trial 
clinic (1989), 592 forensic cases are evaluated from the Metropolitan Toronto forensic 
service (METFORS). Menzies examines medical and criminal records to trace how 
forensic decision making work in collaboration with police, courts, social workers, 
psychiatrists and other medical experts. The 592 “patients” are followed from their initial 
arrest until two years after their initial assessment (Menzies, 1989). Menzies demonstrates 
how professions work in “concert” as “knowledge brokers” who assume the task of 
creating formal knowledge that translates directly into coercive power. Although the clinic 
and clinician’s only task is to assess a person’s fitness to stand trial, they are found to 
consistently make sentencing recommendations and assess “dangerousness” (Menzies, 
1989). In Menzies’ follow-up research he found that clinicians and psychiatrists were 
wrong more than half of the time in predicting future violent behaviour. Clinicians and 
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psychiatrists adjust their knowledge to adhere to legal systems and terms so much so that 
their recommendations (including imprisonment, confinement, or alternative dispositions) 
are often accepted by the courts. Clinicians, police and courts work together “to justify 
and legitimate the most coercive sanctions in terms of scientific knowledge and medical 
expertise” (Menzies, 1989, p. xviii). This collaboration functions while advancing the 
careers and expertise of clinicians and legitimizing clinical judgment as a measure of risk 
and dangerousness (even though it is incorrect more than half of the time). The “helping” 
aspect of the clinical profession is abandoned, the accused’s voice and identity are erased 
and the “clinic’s only source of knowledge is itself” (Menzies, 1989, p. xvii). Menzies 
examines the patient’s prospects for freedom, labels as deviants and indicators of 
criminality within their records as well as the number of carceral or therapeutic control 
agents to determine how well they are doing after their experience with the clinic. The 
accused repeatedly emerge from the clinic in worse condition than they entered (Menzies, 
1989). 
Through our review of the contributions to critical mental health, it is apparent 
that there continues to be commonly appreciated methodological, epistemological and 
ethical problems within individualized perspectives on mental health as well as within 
biomedical mental health disciplines. An enduring Eurocentric view of history, embedded 
within the bases of political and social critique within critical mental health literature also 
persists. The effect of this enduring Eurocentrism is often an inattention to the complicit 
influences of colonial and imperial projects on the practices and technologies of 
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dehumanization, taxonomization, and the establishment of human hierarchies to 
rationalize violence through the implementation of racial and eugenic rationale.  
A postcolonial analysis insists upon a consideration of Eurocentrism and provides 
a critique that allows for a refusal to accept solutions such as those that propose that 
“anti-racist” and “psychotherapy” can be commensurate. Postcoloniality demands that 
one interrogate the projects of cataloguing people by differentiated type based on lack, 
that holding positions of superiority over Others by professing to “know” the Other and 
what is required for their “cure” through the application of moralizing and civilizing 
therapies is by design a dehumanizing technology. The rise of the technologies of 
psychotherapy in Europe were crucial to the success of the colonial enterprise and were 
dependent on racial and ablelist hierarchies (Metzl, 2009; Roman, Brown, Noble, Wainer, 
& Young, 2009). This level of critique appreciates that the technologies of civilization 
and colonization (including the fields, knowledge bases and practices of criminal justice, 
mental health and immigration) were violently produced to consolidate notions of the 
civilized upon the creation of the savage and the mad. 
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Chapter 3 
The Canadian Forensic Mental Health System: an overview 
The term forensic mental health system is often used to refer to the intersections 
of the mental health system and the criminal justice system (Betteridge, & Barbaree, 
2004). Here, I will provide a brief overview of aspects of the Ontario Mental Health act, 
the Criminal Code of Canada and the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
relevant to the topic of deportation for those identified with mental health issues. The 
Mental Health Act applies to every psychiatric facility with regards to rights or 
prohibitions for people identified as having a mental disorder. It includes provisions or 
restrictions regarding voluntary and involuntary examination, admission, treatment, 
consent, detention, psychosurgery and community treatment orders. These policies and 
laws are continually being rearticulated to reinforce ideas of an unrehabilitatable 
criminal, a untreatable mentally ill person, and undeserving foreign alien. The Not 
Criminally Responsible Reform Act passed the House of Commons on June 19, 2013; the 
Faster Removal of Foreign Criminals Act received Royal Assent on June 20, 2013 
(Department of Justice, 2013; Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2013b). These laws 
are dependent on the continuations of colonial technologies and practices that channel 
ideas of racial hierarchy, eugenics, and foreign exoticism. Individually, these changes and 
laws can be presented as progressive maneuvers working to improve safety, save tax 
dollars, or to be responsive to the public while adhering to old systems of refusal of entry, 
confinement, punishment, containing and ejection. Together, these changes and laws can 
be seen as maintaining their eugenic and racial regulatory functions.  
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Criminal Code of Canada and Mental Disorder 
The Criminal Code of Canada is currently an 1128 page document governing 
criminal law in Canada. The sections pertaining to “Mental Disorder” include section 
672.1-672.95 of Par XX.1 of the criminal code. It includes provisions and restrictions 
regarding assessment orders, assessment reports, protected statements, fitness to stand 
trial, the verdict of not-criminally-responsible, dispositions, review boards, appeals and 
transfers.  Within the criminal code, the courts (either a judge or justice) or a medical 
practitioner (someone licensed to practice medicine) can order a psychiatric, forensic 
assessment for a maximum period of 60 days (5 days maximum for an assessment of 
fitness to stand trial, a 30 day maximum and a maximum 30 day extension if the Review 
boards finds there to be “compelling circumstances”) (1991, c. 43, s. 4; 2005, c. 22, s. 5). 
Also, as outlined in section 672.16 of the criminal code, the courts, a medical 
practitioner, or a review board can order that the person be assessed be detained in 
custody.   
Review boards are established for people found not criminally responsible for a 
criminal act by reason of mental disorder (NCRMD) or unfit to stand trial (Criminal Code 
of Canada, 1985, section 672.121). The review boards must be comprised of at least 5 
people (appointed by the lieutenant governor), 1 of whom must be a psychiatrist 
(Criminal Code of Canada, 1985, section 672.38). The Review boards conduct annual 
reviews until a disposition of absolute discharge is granted for someone found NCRMD 
or until someone found previously unfit to stand trial, becomes fit (able to understand the 
legal proceedings and the nature of their crimes). Section 672.19 clearly states that “No 
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assessment order may direct that psychiatric or any other treatment of the accused be 
carried out, or direct the accused to submit to such treatment” (Criminal Code of Canada, 
1985).  
The Mental Health Act (Ontario’s Example) 
The Mental Health Act offers a provision permitting the restraint, observation, and 
treatment of people detained in a psychiatric facility under Part .1 of the Criminal code of 
Canada7 (Mental Health Act R.S.O. 1990, CHAPTER M.7). A police officer, a justice of 
the peace or a physician (a person licensed to practice medicine) can order an assessment 
(involuntarily) if that person has “reasonable cause to believe that the person, 
(a) has threatened or attempted or is threatening or attempting to cause bodily 
harm to himself or herself; 
(b) has behaved or is behaving violently towards another person or has caused or 
is causing another person to fear bodily harm from him or her; or 
(c) has shown or is showing a lack of competence to care for himself or herself,” 
And “has reasonable cause to believe that the person is apparently suffering from mental 
disorder of a nature or quality that likely will result in, 
(d) serious bodily harm to the person; 
7 See section 25- Mental Health Act R.S.O. 1990, CHAPTER M.7: 
Detention under the Criminal Code (Canada) 
25.Any person who is detained in a psychiatric facility under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code (Canada) may be 
restrained, observed and examined under this Act and provided with treatment under the Health Care Consent Act, 
1996. 2000, c. 9, s. 8. 
 
54 
 
                                                 
(e) serious bodily harm to another person; or 
(f) serious physical impairment of the person. (Mental Health Act, R.S.O. 1990, 
c. M.7, Section 15, 16, 17)” 
This authority is granted for 7 days after the application form is signed by a justice of the 
peace or a physician. Permission is then granted to forcibly take the person to be assessed 
by a physician and held for 72 hours (Mental Health Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, Sections 
15, 16, 17). See, 
“Authority of application 
(5)An application under subsection (1) or (1.1) is sufficient 
authority for seven days from and including the day on which it is signed 
by the physician, 
(a) to any person to take the person who is the subject of the application in 
custody to a psychiatric facility forthwith; and 
(b) to detain the person who is the subject of the application in a psychiatric 
facility and to restrain, observe and examine him or her in the facility for 
not more than 72 hours. R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, s. 15 (5); 2000, c. 9, s. 3 (6). 
(Mental Health Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7, Sections 15, 16, 17)” 
Once, taken to a physician and assessed, if the person is admitted to hospital 
because they are deemed a threat to themselves, to others or physically impaired, 
they can be “certified” involuntarily as outlined below, 
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Authority of certificate 
(4)An involuntary patient may be detained, restrained, observed and 
examined in a psychiatric facility, 
(a) for not more than two weeks under a certificate of involuntary admission; 
and 
(b) for not more than, 
(i) one additional month under a first certificate of renewal, 
(ii) two additional months under a second certificate of renewal, and 
(iii) three additional months under a third or subsequent certificate of renewal, 
that is completed and filed with the officer in charge by the attending physician. R.S.O. 
1990, c. M.7, s. 20 (4) (Mental Health Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.7). 
Both the Mental Health Act and the Criminal code of Canada contain the 
definition “mental disorder” means a disease of the mind” (Ontario Mental Health Act, 
1990; Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46).  Both Acts are prohibitive, the forensic mental 
health system “exists” because “Society believes it is unfair to punish people for a 
criminal act if people have a mental illness that: 
• prevents them from understanding what they have done, or  
• prevents them from realizing what the result of their actions will be” (Betteridge, & 
Barbaree, 2004, p. 4).  
For people who have committed a minor offence and require connections to 
mental health supports, where available, a mental health court option may be suggested.  
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Mental health courts have been initiated in Ontario and New Brunswick, Newfoundland 
and Labrador, British Columbia, Manitoba, Nunavut and Yukon (Reiksts, 2008). These 
courts offer a court support worker, connections to mental health services and programs 
to divert people away from the criminal justice system. As outlined by CMHA Ontario,  
In general, mental health diversion programs take one of three forms: (a) 
police pre-arrest, or pre-booking diversion; (b) court diversion and; (c) 
mental health courts (MHCs). Arrest diversion allows the police to use 
their discretion in laying charges. Court diversion programs, on the other 
hand, are post-booking, pre-arraignment programs that involve staying 
charges for eligible offenses if the person agrees to treatment. In addition 
to the mentally ill defendant and her or his family, MHCs involve a 
dedicated judge, crown, defense, and court support worker (CSW). 
Characteristics of MHCs include: (a) all identified mentally ill defendants 
are handled in a single court/docket, (b) the use of a collaborative team 
which includes a clinical specialist who recommends and makes linkages 
to treatment, (c) assurance of availability of appropriate clinical placement 
prior to the judge making a ruling, and (d) specialized court monitoring 
with possible sanctions for noncompliance (Steadman, Davidson & 
Brown, 2001 cited in CMHA Ontario, 2013). 
 
Through the mental health courts, if psychiatric services or psychiatric based treatments 
are refused, the accused person is pursued by the criminal justice system.  Conditions that 
mandate psychiatric treatment or psychiatric-based services can be added to a person’s 
bail conditions and in other cases, a community treatment order can be established by the 
mental health service providers that become involved with the accused.  A community 
treatment order under the Mental Health Act can require that a person follow psychiatric 
treatments or psychiatric-based services.  
The forensic system exists because the criminal justice system and the mental 
health systems do not individually provide supports that encourage rehabilitation and 
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reintegration into the community. Those who operate or work at this intersection are 
often either legal or mental health professionals with experience working in both systems. 
There are a number of areas related to the intersections of the mental health 
system and the criminal justice system that are not mentioned in the Mental Health Act or 
the Criminal Code as they relate to the everyday practicalities of how this system plays 
out on the lives of real people.  I have mapped this out in figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: (ORB=Ontario Review Board, CTO= Community Treatment Order) 
The forensic system is very complex.  This is a very basic overview. The yellow areas refer to the 
traditional criminal justice system. The grey begins the overlap of the criminal justice system and mental 
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health system, the green refers to the jurisdiction of the Ontario review boards and the blue is the mental 
health courts.   
 The forensic mental health system in Canada offers access to voluntary and 
involuntary psychiatric and psychiatric-based treatments and services sometimes 
delivered when the accused is living in the community, in hospital, or in custody (some 
are quite reluctant to differentiate these three when mandated reporting, treatments, 
permitted intrusions, and a violation of personal freedoms are permitted). At every stage 
or area of the system, the opportunity for the individual to be detained or forced into 
treatment is present. Failure to comply with the psychiatric-based assessment and 
recommendations sends one back to the criminal justice system, or escalating measures 
of the forensic system by default. Until 2013, without someone being an imminent threat 
to themselves or others or being criminally responsible for a crime, they cannot be 
detained or forced into a relationship with psychiatry. The NCRMD defense, the mental 
health courts, the restrictions on powers to detain or force treatment were advocated for 
to value the notion that people who are unwell deserve care, not punishment. 
The Canadian Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and the Forensic Mental 
Health System 
The Canadian Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) “renders any non-
citizen convicted of a certain level of offence inadmissible on the grounds of criminality 
or serious criminality8, meaning they can be involuntarily removed from Canada and 
barred from returning. Additionally, non-citizens who are sentenced to a term of 
8 Emphasis added 
59 
 
                                                 
imprisonment of two years or more are denied the right to appeal their case to the 
Immigration and Refugee Board” (Schizophrenia Society of Ontario, 2010).  Specifically, 
the IRPA states in section 36 (1), 
A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on grounds of 
serious criminality for 
(a) having been convicted in Canada of an offence under an Act of 
Parliament punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 
years, or of an offence under an Act of Parliament for which a term of 
imprisonment of more than six months has been imposed; 
(b) having been convicted of an offence outside Canada that, if committed 
in Canada, would constitute an offence under an Act of Parliament 
punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years; or 
(c) committing an act outside Canada that is an offence in the place where 
it was committed and that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an 
offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by a maximum term of 
imprisonment of at least 10 years (Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Act S.C. 2001, c. 27). 
 
The application section includes the following specificity, 
(c) the matters referred to in paragraphs (1) (b) and (c) and (2)(b) and (c) 
do not constitute inadmissibility in respect of a permanent resident or 
foreign national who, after the prescribed period, satisfies the Minister that 
they have been rehabilitated or who is a member of a prescribed class that 
is deemed to have been rehabilitated (Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Act S.C. 2001, c. 27). 
 
With the IRPA, non-citizens can be deemed inadmissible and a removal order can then be 
issued to deport non-citizens from Canada. Serious criminality is a construct that a can be 
adjudicated at the discretion of the Minister of Immigration. The initial report can be 
made by any officer appointed by the Ministry of Immigration, 
 
44. (1) An officer who is of the opinion that a permanent resident or a 
foreign national who is in Canada is inadmissible may prepare a report 
setting out the relevant facts, which report shall be transmitted to the 
Minister (Immigration and Refugee Protection Act S.C. 2001, c. 27). 
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Sections 54-61 go on to outline the permissions of the IRPA to detain or remove a 
foreign national. An officer of the Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration can order 
detention for the purpose of assessment or examination, under “reasonable” grounds that 
the person is inadmissible for serious criminality, if the person is deemed to be a threat to 
the public, or unlikely to attend hearings, examination or proceedings (Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act S.C. 2001, c. 27). The Minister also has the authority to impose 
any conditions that he/she considers necessary on a foreign national upon release 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act S.C. 2001, c. 27).  
Current immigration law in Canada requires medical guidelines that state,  
 “38. (1) A foreign national is inadmissible on health grounds if their health condition (a) 
is likely to be a danger to public health; (b) is likely to be a danger to public safety; or (c) 
might reasonably be expected to cause excessive demand on health or social services” 
(Immigration and Refugee Protection Act [S.C. 2001, c. 27}). 
The current Canadian immigration guidelines include the following specificity: 
“Examples of “excessive demand” include ongoing hospitalization or institutional care 
for a physical or mental illness” (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2013a). 
Currently the legislation in place regarding deportation is the Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act (Bill C-11) and was adopted in 2002 (Chan, 2005). The old 
Immigration Act existed since 1976 with numerous amendments until it was eventually 
replaced.  Under the old Immigration Act, individuals ordered to be deported were 
granted a right to appeal. The appeal process was up to the sole discretion of the Appeal 
Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) (Chan, 2005).  The Appeal 
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Division is required to examine all the circumstances of the case and decide whether or 
not the person should be removed from Canada. The factors that outline what the Appeal 
Division needs to consider in its exercise of discretionary jurisdiction include: 
1. The seriousness of the offence or offences leading to the removal order; 
2. The possibility of rehabilitation or, alternatively,  
3. The circumstances surrounding the failure to meet the conditions of admission; 
4. The length of time spent, and the degree to which the appellant is established in 
Canada; 
5. The family in Canada and the dislocation to the family that removal would cause; 
6. The family and community support available to the appellant;  
7. The degree of hardship that would be caused to the appellant by the appellant’s 
return to his or her country of nationality (Chan, 2005). 
 
In 1995, these factors were amended to include a Minister’s power to override the 
board’s decision with regards to “danger to the public”. If a person was assessed by the 
minister as a danger to the public, there was no right to appeal (Chan, 2005). The current 
appeals process legislation (Bill C-11) has greater restrictions, appeals are even more 
difficult to access, and the process is currently described as expensive and slow (Chan, 
2005). The current legislation allows for the systematic deportation of immigrants and 
refugees with mental illness who become involved with the criminal justice system, 
whether they are criminally responsible or not. For those who cannot be deported, they 
can be forcibly confined and treated with harmful medications or psychosurgical 
procedures (i.e., ECT).  Jamaica was the number one ranking country of origin for 
criminal inadmissibility (unable to appeal) cases in 2006, 2007 and 2008 in Canada 
(Schizophrenia Society of Ontario, 2010). 
If any protections or provisions were made available by the forensic system for 
people identified with mental health issues who had become involved with the criminal 
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justice system, they can be overruled by the Immigration Division if someone is a non-
citizen. Any conditions, including detention, hospitalization, reporting, and psychiatric 
treatment can be imposed on someone who is deemed by an officer of the Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration to be a “threat to the public” or a “serious criminal” 
(Immigration and Refugee Protection Act S.C. 2001, c. 27).  Here, for a person already 
deemed a non-citizen, already involved with the criminal justice system, and already 
identified with mental health issues, a determination of their freedom is left to someone’s 
discretionary evaluation of them being a potential “threat” or a “serious criminal”. This 
evaluation is only open to the input of legal professionals involved in reporting via the 
criminal justice system and the input of medical professionals or psychiatric-based 
mental health service professionals. This privileged authority on issues pertaining to 
criminality, or to mental health is granted by the Criminal Code of Canada and the 
Mental Health Act and confined to the fields of law and medicine respectively. When a 
discretionary authority is granted in this way, it is permeable to and a conduit for many 
judgments, prejudices, and beliefs governing historically forged laws and contemporary 
practices in immigration, criminal justice and mental health.  As this thesis will show, the 
legacy of eugenic and racial thinking in the biomedically dominated mental health 
system, criminal justice and immigration system is both persistent and crucial to current 
research and practice, especially so for the problem of deportation. The legacy of 
eugenics and racial thinking at the confluence of immigration, mental health and criminal 
justice systems includes ideas of the untreatable, the unrehabilitatable, the foreign 
undeserving other.  
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With the new changes to the Criminal Code and the IRPA, additional powers are 
being granted to the courts to deem someone "high risk" overriding the current criminal 
code's provisions that allow people found NCRMD to get an absolute discharge. The 
courts now have the discretion to make decisions "to protect the public" through the Not 
Criminally Responsible Reform Act. Also, with the new Faster Removal of Foreign 
Criminals Act, the right to appeal is being removed at the discretion of the courts. 
Absolute authority is being granted to the courts, enacting a rule of law that removes 
freedoms from those deemed as a threat to what is (re)consolidated as the "Canadian 
public". These changes however are actually historical continuities, entrenching notions 
of Canadian nationalism, of foreign as threat, and individualized notions of mental 
"illness" and criminality. This unified front allows for a common outcome: the seclusion, 
ejection, or tranquilization of anyone who is deemed permanently mentally ill, 
unrehabilitatable criminal, or an undeserving foreign threat. These determinations of 
dehumanized identities, deserving of violence and undeserving of care must rely on one 
another to achieve their common outcome.  The technologies and practices of 
dehumanization and expulsion must also be resilient to change and overturn amendments 
to the contrary in order to ensure the reproduction of a white, ablest, “civilized” Canadian 
national identity.  
Policies and procedures of the Canada Border Services Agency (for identifying people 
for removal from Canada) 
 
The Canada Border Service Agency (CBSA) is charged with the enforcement of 
removal orders (or deportation orders) for foreign nationals. The Minister of Public 
Safety and the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration have the power to delegate this 
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authority to the CBSA. The procedural policies are outlined in the Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada operational manuals subtitled “enforcement”. The removals 
program objectives stated on page 8 of the document “ENF 10” highlight the following: 
 
(Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2010). 
When a person in Canada who is either a non-citizen or a citizen commits a crime, 
calls the police, reports a missing person et cetera, that information is entered into the 
Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC) database. The CPIC information is available 
to law enforcement officers across Canada including the CBSA (see appendix ii).  As a 
2011 national news report revealed, CPIC captures information about people identified 
with mental health issues, whether they have committed a crime or not. This information 
is also being shared with the US department of homeland security and has led to refusal 
of entry (to the US) for people who have called the police in the past for mental health 
reasons (Bridge, 2011, September 9). As Bridge’s article states, suicidality is not a crime 
in either Canada or the US, yet this information from a CPIC is shared nationally and 
internationally (Bridge, 2011, September 9). Put simply, the criminal justice system’s 
database is used to identify mental health system information (i.e., harm to self) to the 
immigration system by implying that the person could be dangerous (without serious 
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criminality or threat to the public) by virtue of their mental health issue identification and 
can be used to for an international denial of entry.  
Here we see how at the practice level, the systems of enforcement and regulation 
for people identified as “alien”, “criminal”, or “mentally ill”, reproduce outcomes based 
on a devaluing of the foreign Other, a propagation of a notion of inherent criminality 
residing within an individual, and of a sick person that is permanently a threat both to the 
“Canadian Public” and the Canadian economy. People identified as criminal, foreign, or 
mentally ill are cast outside the lines of the Canadian public or the Canadian economy. 
As will be revealed in the contemporary cases, they are deemed as a cost, an intrusion, a 
subhuman pathogen.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Conceptualizing the violence of deportation at the confluence of 
criminal justice, mental health and immigration systems 
 
In this chapter, a conceptualization of violence is suggested, capable of engaging 
with the complexity of historical, contemporary, and seemingly separate issues of 
violence within the construction, legitimization, and authorization of deportation for 
those identified with mental health issues in Canada. In order to recognize the historical 
violence embedded in contemporary practices and technologies or the violence 
institutionalized within professional discourses, within law, and governing policies, we 
must see the confluence of violence as an interdependent process. A recognition of the 
violence of abuse, war, sexual violence, collective violence and state violence must also 
acknowledge the violence that is social, political, and economic, while appreciating the 
violence within the institutions and laws that through their contributing professions and 
knowledge authorities, (re) lay the groundwork for violent means to achieve violent ends. 
This must then also consider the practices and technologies that permit violence to 
continue while resisting inquiry, and transformation. In order to achieve such a 
conceptualization, I convene contributions from theorists on violence that have attempted 
to describe the nuances, tensions and complexities of violence. 
Complex issues relating to oppression are often approached through an 
intersectional analysis that understands that various forms of oppression are targeted at 
certain groups by virtue of their identification by race, class, age, ability, gender, sexual 
orientation, religion, language, etc..  Intersectional approaches often describe one or more 
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“types” of oppression (i.e., racism, heternormativity, mentalism, ageism etc.) working 
interrelatedly or together depending on which identity categories a person or group is 
understood as belonging to. Criticisms of this approach have highlighted its lack of 
attention to hierarchy, to relations of power and the formation of subjectivities, and an 
overreliance on identities or subjectivities (Carbado, 2013; Nash, 2008; McCall, 2005; 
Heron, 2005). Some scholars have suggested a systemic analysis that looks at 
interlocking systems of oppression or a matrix of domination to reveal one historically 
related system and how they need and secure one another hierarchically (Collins, 1991; 
Nash, 2008; Heron, 2005; Razack, 1998). 
I suggest that it may be possible to consider the material effects of segregation, 
oppression or violence that is targeting delineated groups without requiring the 
identification technologies of difference, or the (re)establishment of hierarchies to 
advance a position of social justice or any ethical claims for recognition, redistribution or 
reconciliation.  
An analysis of confluence is offered as a departure from an intersectional or 
interlocking analysis in that a confluence is never static, no part is completely distinct 
from another, and there are multiple perspectives from which one can examine or trace 
the same idea, system, factor or influence. Confluence demands a historical 
consideration, an appreciation of the temporal. Imagine that no cubes of a matrix, spheres 
of intersecting difference or systems that interlock can remain static. An appreciation of 
confluence acknowledges that all categories and systems of difference are suspect and 
focuses or redirects our attention to their common projects as well as their resulting fields 
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of knowledge, practices and technologies.  An analysis of confluence also acknowledges 
identity/difference as complicit within and a product of historically perpetrated violence. 
While the term confluence has been used as a guiding concept to study complex issues 
elsewhere (Joe, 2000; Rix, 2000; Sung, Mellow & Mahoney, 2010; Press &Tanur, 1991; 
Dickerson, 2008: Phillips, Leathers & Erkanli, 2009), the above metaphor tracing the 
operations of power across temporal periods, within social relations, discourses, through 
the establishment of hierarchies and hegemonies and governing processes to reveal a 
project is my own contribution. 
Conceptualizing violence 
 
violence is a structure….a fundamental force in the framework of the ordinary works and 
in the multiple processes of that world” (Lawrence & Karim, 2007, p.5). 
 
This thesis examines how deportation is constructed through the confluence of 
mental health, criminal justice and immigration systems where these systems operate 
interdependently in order to accomplish deportation.  Each system brings its specific 
history of violence and the moment of deportation enacts the confluence of systems 
required to sustain the mission of nation building through exclusion.  The purpose of this 
thesis is to analyze this process in order to expose mechanisms of racial violence cloaked 
as protection of Canadian society.  
Introducing a discussion of the meanings of the term violence or a theorization 
that captures the violence of the process of deportation for people identified with mental 
health issues (including its contributors, interlocutors, practices and products) is 
impressively difficult. Often when we think of the term violence, images of physical 
combat, war, physical abuse, sexual violence, or collective violence come to mind. When 
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we proceed from these prime images, we can soon come to the consideration of examples 
of violence including social, political and economic forms of violence between 
individuals, groups, communities and states. We can speak of violent means and violent 
ends. My goal here is to approach a theorization of violence that permits the analysis of 
the nuances, tensions and complexities involved in the construction, authorization and 
legitimization of deportation. This is not an attempt to resolve outstanding debates on the 
reification of violence or an attempt to rectify projects aimed at essentializing violence. I 
in no way purport to provide a raison d'être for violence but rather to encourage 
exploration and contestation of all forms of violence as they manifest in our daily lives. 
Two key, exemplary Canadian reports have summarized how racism (recognized 
as a form of violence) can adversely affect the health and wellbeing of people by 
affecting or restricting their access to healthcare services. Racist systems and services 
create unequal opportunities to access treatment or receive equal qualities of healthcare 
treatment (The Inner City Health Strategy Working Group, 2010; Nestel, 2012). 
Experiencing racism itself can affect one’s health and wellbeing, increasing the 
likelihood of cardiovascular disease, mental health issues, diabetes, cancers, and exposure 
to physical violence etc. (The Inner City Health Strategy Working Group, 2010; Nestel, 
2012). Also, racism at structural levels in society can effect one’s opportunity to attain 
the social determinants of health and well-being i.e., education, housing, employment, 
food, etc (The Inner City Health Strategy Working Group, 2010; Nestel, 2012).  These 
two reports are exemplary because they cite well-respected literature from critical race 
scholars and theorists on racism in the health care system while contributing to this 
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knowledge base from specific studies in the Canadian context (Braveman, 2006; 
Brondolo, Gallo,  & Myers, 2009; Brown, 2003; Fernando, 2002, 2003; Galabuzi, 2001; 
Galabuzi and Labonte, 2002; Krieger, 2000, 2011; Nazroo, 1998, 2003).  
While we must appreciate these varying forms of racism as violence, we must 
also acknowledge the discursive, historical social and political structures that these forms 
of violence operate from and within.  If a healthcare treatment or service 
disproportionately identifies people with an illness or pathology due to a systemic or 
structurally embedded form of racism, gender discrimination or ablism, would we want to 
advocate for people to have “equitable access” to it (i.e. a treatment or service that is 
racist, ablest or gender discriminatory and has historically developed to pathologize 
difference)? If there are differences in health statuses for people of colour or those 
identified by some other difference category, how do we identify a need without 
reproducing a discourse that will wield biological and genetic difference as a rationale for 
social stratification (i.e, thereby reinforcing discourses of eugenics and racism)? When 
we advance an argument that suggests that marginalized groups of racial, sexual, 
gendered, able or mental difference require “specialized” access to social determinants of 
health, how do we not reproduce tendencies toward constructing cultural competencies or 
segregated services (reproducing boundaries of nations, groups, us and them, the 
deserving and undeserving)? Violence must be appreciated at all of these levels in order 
for transformation to occur. This can only be appreciated if it can be acknowledged with 
a multi-focal, historical, social and political analysis. 
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Theories on violence 
As Bruce Lawrence and Aisha Karim outline in their 2007 book, On 
Violence,  
 
Theories provide a deeper reflection on what otherwise seem to be but 
momentary aberrations in a well-oiled, economy-driven machine of global 
order. Theories provide a way of linking corporate scandals with inner-
city gang wars, the war on drugs with the war on terror, civil wars with 
genocide (p.5). 
 
The World Health Organization once defined violence as “The intentional use of 
physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a 
group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, 
death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation” (Krug, Dahlber, Mercy, Zwi, 
& Lozano, 2002, p.5).   
From theorists such as Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, G.W.F. Hegel and Franz 
Fanon, however we can acknowledge “that violence is a structure….a fundamental force 
in the framework of the ordinary works and in the multiple processes of that world” 
(Lawrence & Karim, 2007, p.5).  Engels has argued that economic forces are central to 
subjugation. Capital “has a logic of its own” and does whatever is required to achieve 
economic prosperity (Lawrence & Karim, 2007). For Engels, the bourgeois revolution 
occurred so the political conditions could support the changing economic ones. Military 
innovations were and are instrumental for economic gain and at the same time a threat to 
it. This dialectical progression of history perpetuates violence (Lawrence & Karim, 
2007). For Marx violence is necessary in the evolution and maintenance of capitalism. It 
is required in order to compel people to conform to a system of exploitation, the working 
day and wage-labor (Lawrence & Karim, 2007, p 21). 
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Violence must be also understood in our day-to-day practices as well, “Violence 
in marriage, for instance, must be framed within a theory of the structure of 
marriage…Rape, too, must be analyzed within the structure of gender relations, sexuality, 
and society” (Lawrence & Karim, 2007, via Catharine MacKinnon, p. 7). Violence is 
historical, rhetorical and practical, and all require confrontation (Lawrence & Karim, 
2007). Epistemic violence can take the form of rhetorical or cognitive violence that can 
for example, assume that European, American, or other Western designs and imperial 
frameworks are superior to the rest of humankind (i.e. Mohandas Gandhi has described 
the violence of occupation and external rule that embeds the acceptance of the belief that 
British, American and Anglo juridical, educational, structures, even calendars and clocks 
are superior to all others- this is an example of rhetorical violence9) (Lawrence & Karim, 
2007, p. 11). 
Violence can be viewed as both a product and a process. Products are easier to 
recognize, as events, patterned occurrences, however “a product of violence is never just 
a single product with a seamless narrative or a fixed meaning” (Lawrence & Karim, 
2007, p.12). “As process, violence is cumulative and boundless. It always spills over. It 
creates and recreates new norms of collective understanding (Lawrence & Karim, 2007, 
p.12).  
For Michel Foucault, violence is a human creation and circumstance (Lawrence & 
Karim, 2007). Through Foucault’s analysis of the processes of subjectivity, he exposes 
9 The rhetoric of superiority of knowledge in the Western form is also understood as epistemic 
violence. 
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how texts and institutions and discursive practices historically develop to mark difference 
and mask hierarchy within networks of relations of power (Lawrence & Karim, 2007). 
These are the foregrounds of violence.   
Pierre Bordieu asks that we focus our attentions to the modes of domination (that 
exist on a continuum) within social life and understanding those power relations as they 
participate and foster violence (Lawrence & Karim, 2007,p 188).  
Amartya Sen (2008), reminds us that, 
 Cultural and social factors, as well as features of political economy, are 
all quite important in understanding violence in the world today. But they 
do not work in isolation from each other, and we have to resist the 
tempting shortcuts that claim to deliver insight through their single-
minded concentration on some one factor or another, ignoring other 
central features of an integrated picture (p. 14).  
 
Hannah Arendt describes violence as instrumental and as distinct from power (the 
ability to act and act in concert), force (like an energy i.e., force of nature) or strength 
(individual) (Arendt, 1970). Violence can destroy power but can never increase power 
and is often a response to a lack of power. For Arendt, although violence has the potential 
to effect power and to diminish power,  
The very substance of violent action is ruled by the means-end category, 
whose chief characteristic, if applied to human affairs, has always been 
that the end is in danger of being overwhelmed by the means which it 
justifies and which are needed to reach it. Since the end of human action, 
as distinct from the end products of fabrication, can never be reliably 
predicted, the means used to achieve political goals are more often than 
not of greater relevance to the future world than the intended goals (p.4). 
 
In William E. Connolly’s foundational work, Identity/Difference, he maps out the 
problem of identity requiring an Other or difference in order to exist (Connolly, 1991). I 
include Connolly’s analysis here to provoke the paradoxical thinking required for any 
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conceptualization of violence. Within his example we see a tendency to attempt to 
resolve human questions (regarding good and evil), resulting in the forging of identities 
and differences, the necessity of violence to vindicate or secure the self, to mark the other 
as heretic, to assume that any of this is indispensible and blind ourselves to the structures 
that reproduces evil or violence.   
Connolly introduces a primary example to begin to engage with this problem. As 
Connolly describes, with regards to theological and moralistic theoretical endeavours 
focused on good and evil, evil has been conceptualized by Augustine as a product of 
individual will, while good is what is designed for in our nature (by God in Augustine’s 
work) (Connolly, 1991). Evil is then “a voluntary falling away from the good” (Connolly, 
1991, p. 6). The primacy of will permits a gap between good and evil that locates 
responsibility, action, identity and deviance- in people (Connolly, 1991, p. 7). This 
position is alternative to a Manichean10 stance which might see a duality rather than a 
distinction. In Augustine’s view, God is understood as benevolent and people solely 
responsible for their will. This provides the gap between good and evil. The human then 
becomes “a deep, confessing self and a responsible agent” (Connolly, 1991, p.7). Both 
the faith and the identities of the faithful are established, and “any position that might 
10 i.e., “ a postpagan sect in a larger constellation called Gnosticism that itself moved ambiguously within and 
against the hegemony of Christianity” believed that good and evil were dualistic as “a cosmic force of light 
haunted by a powerful secondary force of darkness. The force of light lacked the ability to expunge darkness 
in the first instance, but it radiated with the possibility of subduing it in the last. These opposing forces were 
held to compete both in the world at large and within the interior of the self; and the redeemer, assuming 
serial earthly manifestations including Jesus of Nazareth and Mani himself, helped those who heeded its 
words to attain deeper gnosis or insight into the truth of transcendence and salvation” (Connolly, 1991, p.2).  
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compromise the conviction of its universal necessity or intrinsic truth becomes a threat to 
the integrity of one’s faith and identity” (Connolly, 1991. p. 7). 
As Connolly describes, this problem is pervasive within contemporary 
conceptualizations of identity, difference, responsibility, right and wrong, evil and good. 
The indispensability of one conception of divinity, evil, and will is 
established by defining what deviates from it as a heresy that must not be 
entertained as a counter-possibility. Humans drawn to paganism or 
Manicheanism must be made to suffer in order to vindicate the self-
identity of those who find their deepest hopes disturbed, destabilized, or 
threatened by these alternative possibilities of interpretation. In a more 
general sense, Augustine’s solution to the first problem of evil both 
delimits the sites at which responsibility can be located and intensifies the 
demands to identify agencies of responsibility. We are still living out the 
effects of this legacy (Connolly, 1991, p. 8).  
 
For Connolly, a  
second problem of evil...flows from the attempt to establish security of 
identity for any individual or group by defining the other that exposes 
sore spots in one’s identity as evil or irrational. The second problem of 
evil is structural in that is flows from defining characteristics of a 
doctrine as it unravels the import of its own conceptions of divinity, 
identity, evil and responsibility…(Connolly, 1991, p.8).   
 
This second problem is described by Connolly as a temptation rather than a necessity or 
implication. A temptation can of course, be resisted. To do so, themes that present 
themselves as indispensable must be open to interrogation,  
Every culture seems to contain some themes that are both indispensable to 
it and inherently problematic within it. The pressure of their 
indispensability works to conceal their problematic character. This 
sometimes becomes clear retrospectively after the indispensability of a 
theme has been lost or compromised then aporias within it flood into the 
open, making contemporaries wonder how their forerunners could ever 
have entertained such superstitious or absurd ideas. But this very portrayal 
of superstitions of the past increases the probability that the problematic 
character of indispensable themes in the present will not be probed 
vigorously (Connolly, 1991, p.3). 
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Colonial violence 
Franz Fanon emphasizes that we must also consider the violence within the 
writing of history or the violence within historiography. For Fanon, the colonizer/settler 
writes history in a way that boasts of his exploits, rationalizes and takes pride in civilizing 
the colonized while eliminating the history of the colonized. The colonizer/settler writes 
the history of their own nation in reference “to all she skims off, all she violates and 
starves” (Lawrence & Karim, 2007, p.24). The colonized lives in fear for his life and 
according to Fanon, envies the colonizer. These social, structural, and interpersonal 
relations are and were maintained through violence and can be undone, through violence. 
Colonial violence has been described as having four levels including: brutal 
physical violence against another person, control and containment of violence inflicted 
upon others, suicide, and the violence that occurs when writing about other people, 
including classification (Kunreuther, 2006; Achebe & Irele, c2009). 
While this thesis addresses the topic of deportation, colonial national building, 
racism and eugenics for those identified by the criminal justice, mental health and 
immigration systems, it does not cover all of the processes and technologies of 
reservation, internment, the appropriation of indigenous lands, or other technologies that 
also depend upon dehumanizing technologies discussed in this work. The processes and 
products of settler state colonialism demand focused attention in order to appreciate the 
nuances of these technologies of violence. Scholars have identified a tendency in critical 
race and postcolonial literature to operate within a backdrop that sometimes erases the 
histories of genocide, slavery and assimilation of indigenous peoples (Lawrence & Dua, 
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2005).  Sharma and Wright (2008), later clarified that when recognizing the context of 
issues for racialized people on colonized lands, we must be very careful to not then 
categorize all migrants of complex trajectories and histories (including slavery, 
indentureship, refugees, or the voluntary) as “settlers” and “colonizers” as well.  This 
would be a (re)production of the nationalist discourses that were advanced with colonial 
nation building to establish ideas of nationhood, belonging, and the Other or stranger. 
These discourses must be held to account for their violence including that of the 
reinforcement of colonial social relations that reinstitute hierarchies of who is deserving, 
of who lays claim to lands and property and the ordering of these privileges based on 
arrival (Sharma & Wright, 2008). 
Aimé Césaire’s Discourse on Colonialism describes how the violent relations of 
colonization result in the perpetuation and exacerbation of violence for the colonizer and 
the colonized. For Césaire, the colonial relationship rationalizes violence towards the 
colonized through the advancement of the practices of dehumanization and the 
provocations of images of the uncivilized and the savage (Césaire & Pinkham, 2007). At 
the same time, the colonial relationship actually recreates this violence, this imagined 
savagery and uncivility in the colonizer.  For the colonizer, 
 “colonization works to decivilize the colonizer, to brutlize him to buried 
instincts, to covetousness, violence, race hatred, and moral relativism: and 
we must show that each time a head is cut off or an eye put out in Vietnam 
and in France they accept the fact, each time a little girl is raped and in 
France they accept the fact, each time a Madagascan is tortured and in 
France they accept the fact, civilization acquires another dead  weight, a 
universal regression takes place, a gangrene sets in, a center of infection 
begins to spread; and that at the end of all these treaties that have been 
violated, all these lies that have been propogated, all these punitive 
expeditions that have been tolerated, all these prisoners who have been tied 
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up and “interrogated”, all these patriots who have been tortured, at the end 
of all the racial pride that has been encouraged, all the boastfulness that has 
been displayed, a poison has been distilled into the veins of Europe and, 
slowly but surely, the continent proceeds toward savagery. (Césaire & 
Pinkham, 2007, p.35-36). 
 
Jean-Paul Sartre’s ‘Preface’ to the Wretched of the Earth (1961) begins with a 
discussion of how the colonizers from Europe carried out their civilizing mission and 
what the (by)products of this were (Fanon, 1965). He sums up how the ‘civilized’ native, 
who had learnt to echo his master’s voice finally led to the independent individual who 
disregarded the European civilization and would not mind taking up arms, when 
necessary, against his erstwhile oppressor (Fanon, 1965). 
On the lines of Fanon, Sartre ridicules the biased Western idea of humanism which 
had denied a human status to more than half of the world’s inhabitants (Fanon, 1965). He 
uncovers the Western hypocrisy as he shows how the West, in a bid to exploit, murdered 
and meted out inhuman treatment to the natives, dehumanised them and reduced them to 
the level of “superior monkeys”; how the colonizers made a calculated attempt to wipe 
out the native culture, traditions, languages, and substitute them with that of his own 
(Fanon, 1965, p. 15). Thus attempts were made to create a root-less native who belonged 
to nowhere in particular. 
This turns the native into a creature–neither man nor animal. Under these 
circumstances where he is beaten, undernourished, ill and terrified, where he exhibits 
laziness, slyness and a propensity to steal, he can understand only the language of 
violence (Fanon, 1965). However, the colonizer, whose basic aim is exploitation, cannot 
murder the native outright as this would be against his purpose. Soon this machinery, 
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however, goes out of control and the oppressed take up violence as the only way to face 
the oppressor (Fanon, 1965). This takes place in two stages. Initially the traumatized 
native, unable to contain his terror, anger and frustrations takes up arms against his fellow 
brothers, in the absence of the real enemy. Some take recourse to religion, spiritualism 
and rites. This, as Sartre states, is merely the result of the seeds of violence sown by the 
oppressor (Fanon, 1965). This phase is soon over, after which the oppressed identifies his 
common enemy and turns against him (the European) en masse (Fanon, 1965). Their only 
duty then becomes driving out colonialism by every means at their disposal. Soon, as 
Sartre says, “his rage boils over, he rediscovers his lost innocence and he comes to know 
himself in that he himself creates his self” (Fanon, 1965, p.21). Thus a ‘man’ is born from 
the wreckage of the humbled, terrorised, effeminate native who can hold both the plough 
as well as the gun—the new man who is ready to sacrifice himself in war for the cause of 
his nation (Fanon, 1965, p. 22-23). As Sartre reminds us, “we only become what we are 
by the radical and deep-seated refusal of that which others have made of us” (Fanon, 
1965, p, 17) 
Sartre discusses the different ways in which the colonizer strengthens his hold 
over the oppressed. In certain places, the mother-country maintains some paid feudal 
lords who rule according to her wishes (Fanon, 1965). At other places she divides and 
rules and either creates a native bourgeoisie or gives rise to different factions. Or else she 
plays the double game of settlement and exploitation simultaneously (Fanon, 1965). Thus 
Europe encourages divisions and stratification of the colonised country. This is what 
compels Fanon to state that to fight the colonizer, the colonized must at first fight against 
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itself. The internal fight should be directed at uniting the different classes and groups, as 
Sartre points out: “In the heat of the battle, all internal barriers break down” (Fanon, 
1965. P.11). 
Sartre, through Fanon, speaks of the necessity for the peasant classes to hold 
power. The peasants unlike the petty bourgeoisie or the urban proletariat, suffers the most 
(Fanon, 1965). “The peasantry, when it rises, quickly stands out as the revolutionary 
class” (Fanon, 1965, p.11). This class knows the taste of naked oppression and in order 
not to die of hunger it never makes any compromise with their demands— a complete 
demolition of all existing structures is what they demand (Fanon, 1965). Sartre feels that 
“In order to triumph, the national revolution must be socialist… if the native bourgeoisie 
comes to power, the new state, in spite of its formal sovereignty, remains in the hands of 
imperialists” (Fanon, 1965, p.11). Thus a new union of the Third World is formed under 
the command of the peasant classes. 
Sartre however warns the reader of the dangers of the cult of leaders and 
personalities, the over influence of western culture and “moving back into the twilight of 
past culture” (Fanon, 1965, p. 12). The true culture for him is the culture of the 
Revolution which constantly creates and remakes a nation and prevents stagnation and 
accumulation of wealth, knowledge and power in the hands of bourgeoisie imperialists 
(Fanon, 1965). 
An Integrated theoretical perspective on violence: Slavoj Žižek 
According to Slavoj Žižek’s Violence, there are three modes of violence - the 
subjective, objective, and symbolic. Subjective violence includes the most visible forms 
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of violence including physical, verbal violence and organized violence perpetrated by 
individuals, states, groups. Objective violence contains two kinds: symbolic violence 
embodied in language and its forms, and systemic violence “the often catastrophic 
consequences of the smooth functioning of our political and economic systems” (Žižek, 
2008, p. 2). Symbolic violence “is not only at work in the obvious-and extensively 
studied-cases of incitement and of the relations of social domination reproduced in our 
habitual speech forms: there is a more fundamental form of violence still that pertains to 
language as such, to its imposition of a certain universe of meaning (Žižek, 2008p.2). 
Systemic violence is “violence inherent in a system: not only direct physical violence, but 
also the more subtle forms of coercion that sustain relations of domination and 
exploitation, including the threat of violence (Žižek, 2008, p. 9). As Žižek states, “one 
should resist the fascination of subjective violence, of violence enacted by social agents, 
evil individuals, disciplined repressive apparatuses, fanatical crowds: subjective violence 
is just the most visible of the three” (Žižek, 2008, p.11). As Žižek describes,  
the catch is that subjective and objective violence cannot be perceived 
from the same standpoint: subjective violence is experienced as such 
against the background of a non-violent zero level. It is seen as a 
perturbation of the “normal”, peaceful state of things. However, objective 
violence is precisely the violence inherent to this “normal” state of things. 
Objective violence is invisible since it sustains the very zero-level 
standard against which we perceive something as subjectively violent 
(Žižek , 2008, p.2). 
 
“A step back enables us to identify a violence that sustains our very efforts to fight 
violence” (Žižek , 2008, p. 1). Žižek’s discussion of violence exemplifies how a 
confluence of violence can be perceived from an attention to the subjective and objective 
including systemic and symbolic forms.  From Žižek, we have a framework with which 
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to organize and perceive various forms of violence while having the capacity to 
accommodate the preferences, considerations and contributions of Bordieu, Fanon, 
Sartre, Foucault, Césaire, Arendt, Connolly, Sen, Marx, Engels, MacKinnon and Gandhi 
that I have noted above. With Žižek’s framework, we can include an analysis of physical 
violence, the structural violence of economic relations, day-to-day violence (marriage and 
Rape), epistemic, cognitive and rhetorical forms of violence, as products and processes, 
as human creations, relations of power, and modes of domination, cultural and social 
factors of violence, and the dangers of violent means to achieve unpredictable ends. We 
can also recognize the violence resulting from the problem of identity requiring an Other 
or difference in order to exist. With respect to colonization, Žižek’s framework also 
accommodates a consideration of the violence in the writing of history or historiography, 
the violence reproduced from the master/slave relationship (in both the colonizer, the 
colonized, as products, practices and technologies of these relations for humankind, 
including the ongoing potential threat of violence). Implicit in this thesis is my use of 
Žižek’s conceptualization of violence while accommodating the complementary 
contributions of Bordieu, Fanon, Sartre, Foucault, Césaire, Arendt, Connolly, Sen, Marx, 
Engels, MacKinnon and Gandhi for their needed specific contributions. The attentions to 
violence within language and speech forms (symbolic) and forms of coercion that sustain 
relations of domination and exploitation (systemic) are deeply historical area for 
consideration in this thesis (Žižek, 2008, p. 9). Specifically, the use of figurative language 
and colonial trope to construct the dehumanized identities of the untreatable, 
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unrehabilitatable or undeserving alien are accommodated within my use of Žižek’s 
framework/conceptualization of violence. 
Beyond intersectionality 
Intersectional approaches are often called upon to conceptualize identities (race, 
class, gender, sexual orientation, ability, etc.) and forms of oppression/privilege (Racism, 
sexism, heteronormativity, patriarchy, mentalism etc.) as separate yet mutually 
constitutive categories. This reliance on difference exposes our ongoing propensity to 
resist a transformational analytic perspective that permits an engagement with social 
issues without a reliance on a basis of identity categories and systems that were forged 
through violent means. From this point of analysis we are often confined to weaving 
theoretical perspective together. 
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One outcome of this is often an over-attention to difference and its products, 
which (re)deploy historically established systems and technologies to securely establish 
power relations and hierarchies. Another outcome of this is our imbalanced attention to 
historiography or the writing and rewriting of history through our contemporary horizons 
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of interpretation. To track a contemporary category of difference into the past can often 
map a category of difference onto the past, thereby obscuring the project, system, 
technology, power relations, and interdependent practices that produced it while 
anachronistically placing a contemporary representation or understanding of violence or 
difference in the past. In this instance, the potentials for resistance and transformation 
become exponentially undermined.  
Immanuel Wallerstein uses the example of the idea of “India” to propose that our 
present ways of thinking determine how we think of the past and therefore our past is 
ever changing. As Wallerstein outlines, the current “India” is an invention of the modern-
world system (i.e. capitalism/colonialism/imperialism), its pre-modern history is an 
invention of modern India and our conception of this historical culture may change in the 
future from how we define it today. This change in interpretation or conception thereby 
changes it in the past. Wallerstein is certain to highlight that he is not denying the 
historical specificity  of India but rather is asserting that what is included in this 
description is “an ever-changing, very fluid phenomenon”  (Wallerstein, 1991, p 134). 
Scholars attribute the origins of the term Intersectionality to Kimberle´ Williams 
Crenshaw who published Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics 
in 1989 (Carbado, 2013, p.811; Nash, 2008). However, bell hooks articulated a similar 
analytical necessity some time earlier in her 1981 book, Ain’t I a Woman (hooks, 1981). 
In it, hooks notes that we are all socialized by sexism, racism and classism to varying 
degrees and the work to rid ourselves of these socialization must be a conscious one 
85 
 
(hooks, 1981).  It has been described as a paradigm to understand “the relationships 
among multiple dimensions and modalities of social relations and subject formations” 
(McCall, 2005. P. 1771). 
McCall suggests “that different methodologies produce different kinds of 
substantive knowledge and that a wider range of methodologies is needed to fully engage 
with the set of issues and topics falling broadly under the rubric of intersectionality” 
(McCall, 2005, p.1774). She posits (reluctantly so) that methodologies focused on 
intersectionality can broadly be looked at as anti-categorical/deconstructing, 
intercategorical (examining the relationship amoung existing categories), or 
intracategorical (“acknowledges the stable and even durable relationships that social 
categories represent at any given point in time, though it also maintains a critical stance 
toward categories” McCall, 2005, p.1774) 
Although the contribution has led to a more widespread consideration of multiple 
forms of oppression, critiques have been abundant to say the least. While I cannot attend 
to all contributors here, I have chosen some key critiques that have summarized some of 
the central concerns. 
Jennifer Nash critiques intersectionality for “the lack of a defined intersectional 
methodology; the use of black women as quintessential intersectional subjects; the vague 
definition of intersectionality; and the empirical validity of intersectionality” (Nash, 
2008, p.1). She goes on to specify that “Ultimately, my project does not seek to 
undermine intersectionality; instead, I encourage both feminist and anti-racist scholars to 
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grapple with intersectionality’s theoretical, political, and methodological murkiness to 
construct a more complex way of theorizing identity and oppression” (Nash, 2008, p.1). 
Barbara Heron has suggested that rather than identifying or reflecting on one’s 
specific identity categories via an intersectional approach to delineate a “social location”, 
the process of reflection can achieve a potential for resistance through an examination of 
power relations, of one’s subjectivity or subject position. As Heron names, “Implicit in 
this structural analysis is an intersectional model of oppression which does not assert a 
hierarchy of oppressions but rather seeks to explain that oppressions may act in concert, 
in opposition, or in other complex ways in specific contexts” (Heron, 2005, p. 343). 
Devon Carbado has attempted to addresses the following critiques of intersectionality: 
1. Intersectionality is only or largely about Black women, or only about 
race and gender. 
2. Intersectionality is an identitarian framework. 
3. Intersectionality is a static theory that does not capture the dynamic 
and contingent processes of identity formation. 
4. Intersectionality is overly invested in subjects. 
5. Intersectionality has traveled as far as it can go, or there is nothing 
more the theory can teach us. 
6. Intersectionality should be replaced by or at least applied in conjunction 
with (fill in the blank). (Carbado, 2013, p.812) 
 
In his address, Carbado fulsomely responds to number one. In his response to items 2-4, 
Carbado briefly states,  
“Intersectionality reflects a commitment neither to subjects nor to 
identities per se but, rather, to marking and mapping the production and 
contingency of both. Nor is the theory an effort to identify, in the abstract, 
an exhaustive list of intersectional social categories and to add them up to 
determine—once and for all—the different intersectional configurations 
those categories can form” (Carbado, 2013, p.815). 
 
87 
 
Carbado here also references Cranshaw’s original project of “how the law constructs (and 
describes preexisting) social categories” (Carbado, 2013, p.815). 
 Carbado’s brief response insufficiently addresses criticism 2-4. The dynamic and 
contingent processes of identify formation are not revealed by a commitment to doing so. 
Intersectionality, by way of practice does have the tendency to generate multiple 
combinations of categories that are often perceived as an effort to form an exhaustive list. 
Merely stating that its efforts are focused elsewhere is highly dismissive of the regular 
application of intersectionality in practice (in social service settings, community 
organizations, within social work practice, etc.)  
With regard to items five and six, Carbado shelves alternatives to intersectionality 
due to a “discursive limitation” whereby “all these theories seem to imagine the synthesis 
or interaction of things that are otherwise apart” (Carbado, 2013, p.816). Carbado’s 
efforts directed at salvaging intersectionality as a concept are deployed in order to 
propose his own subcategories of analysis, namely, “colourblind intersectionality” and 
“gender-blind intersectionality” (Carbado, 2013, p. 817). These two categories just 
happen to be another combination of identities (the seemingly invisible operations of 
whiteness and gender in specific instances) which are also very worthy of consideration. 
While his contribution brings attention to another intersecting area of identity/oppression, 
it fails to respond to the critiques of intersectionality while exposing that the concept of 
intersectionality and alternatives to intersectionality maintain difference and separation as 
a starting point and reproduce ideas of difference in their analyses and theorizations.  
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Other scholars have suggested that the critiques of intersectional approaches can 
be very informative. In the concluding statements Jennifer Nash’s article, Re-thinking 
Intersectionality(2008), she suggest that intersectional analyses could be enriched could 
by, 
examining how race and gender utilize differing technologies of 
categorization and control, disciplining bodies in distinctive ways, and 
coalescing (or colliding) in particular formations in certain historical, 
social, cultural, representational, legal, and technological moments. In 
analyzing race and gender both as co-constitutive processes and as 
distinctive and historically specific technologies of categorization, 
intersectionality scholars will be able to offer insights that far exceed 
imagining race and gender as inextricably bound up (Nash, 2008, p.13). 
 
Interlocking systems of oppression 
 
Other articulations or analyses of oppression/privilege and identity/difference 
include Patricia Hill Collins’ “Matrix of "domination ‘along interlocking axes of race, 
class, and gender oppression’ (Collins, 1991, p.225) among other axes such as sexual 
orientation and religion. She writes:  
The significance of seeing race, class, and gender as interlocking systems 
of oppression is that such an approach fosters paradigmatic shift of 
thinking inclusively about other oppressions, such as age, sexual 
orientation, religion, and ethnicity...opens up possibilities for...a both/and 
conceptual stance, one in which all groups possess varying amounts of 
penalty and privilege in one historically created system (Collins 1991, p. 
225, cited in Martinez, 1999).  
 
As Sherene Razack describes, “Analytical tools that consist of looking at how 
systems of oppression interlock differ in emphasis from those that stress intersectionality. 
Interlocking systems need on another, and in tracing the complex ways in which they 
help to secure one another, we learn how women are produced into positions that exist 
symbiotically but hierarchically” (Razack, 1998, p. 13). 
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From Nash, Collins, Heron and Razack, acknowledged are the necessities of our 
attention to the specific historical conditions revealing “one historically created system” 
(Collins, 1991), “historically specific technologies” (Nash, 2008), power relations and 
subject position (Heron, 2005), and the interdependency of these systems that “secure” 
them and order them “hierarchically” (Razack, 1998). What is less emphasized in these 
contributions is the paradoxically maintained reliance and reproduction of categories of 
identity/difference and systems of domination/oppression/privilege that are discursively 
and operationally delineated as separate in order to speak of them as “mutually 
constituting” interdependent or “interlocking”.  
 An ongoing problem is how can we consider the material effects of segregation, 
oppression or violence that is targeting delineated groups without requiring the 
identification of technologies of difference, or the (re)establishment of hierarchies to 
advance a position of social justice or any ethical claims for recognition, redistribution or 
reconciliation. 
To begin with an aspect of difference to trace its production, dependency, 
(co/re)produced power relations and subject positions, often disturbs the process of 
appreciating a common project that privileged “one historically created system” (Collins, 
1991), used “historically specific technologies” (Nash, 2008), and established and 
reinforced power relations and subject position (Heron, 2005) all in support of this/these 
projects. We also lose focus on the importance of the interdependency of these systems 
and an attention to the practices and processes that “secure” them and order them 
“hierarchically” (Razack, 1998). 
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While the analysis of interlocking systems of oppression are important, theorists 
who utilize the interlocking metaphor have contributed that more can be considered with 
an attention to the processes and technologies rather than beginning with analysis of 
systems interlocking such as patriarchy or racism. A study of confluence allows for a 
consideration of that which is not already established in an analytical category or 
interlocking set of analytical categories. Rather than focusing on the distinct systems of 
oppression or the identity categories of difference (whether recognized as mutually 
constitutive, present in every moment or not), we focus on the how and the why, the 
practices and technologies and the social relations, thereby revealing a project. An 
example of a project that is revealed in this study through an analysis of confluence is 
that of eugenics. The project of eugenics was identified and rendered out through the 
tracing of the processes of dehumanization that had particular benefits to colonization, 
nation building and the establishment of professional and human hierarchies and 
authorities.  It also (re)generated the products of racism, ableism, mentalism, sanism, and 
professionalism. Historically speaking, eugenics, mentalism, and sanism have been areas 
of neglect among those who rely on interlocking analyses alone. However interlocking 
analyses can make key contributions when looking at how the systems of ableism and 
patriarchy and racism interlock during specific instances or in specific spaces, i.e., 
courtrooms, etc. (Razack, 1998). 
To illustrate my insistence on what I will further elaborate on as confluence, I will 
use a short personal example. Through my example, I mean to render transparent my 
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ethical position, one that refuses violence done to me or violence done to the cases I am 
examining in this thesis.  
When I was an undergraduate and a graduate, the practice of critical reflexivity 
and critical reflection was explored/taught through an intersectional analysis. Students 
were asked to identify aspects of privilege and oppression among categories of difference 
and think about how they have experienced these privileges and oppressions or 
inherited/learned them.  I often found myself generating a list that covered the most 
identity categories and threw in the words “power and intersecting…” to fill any holes 
(this was the best analysis of course!).  
I am Ameil Joseph, a cis-gender, heterosexual male, no identified mental 
diagnosis or developmental disabilities, no acquired injuries limiting my 
ability or variation of ability that marginalizes me by virtue of my 
mobility, eyesight, hearing, social interaction, level of verbal or non-
verbal communication, a Canadian born, Guyanese of South Asian 
descent, who was raised Catholic, is university educated, speaks English, a 
person of color, et cetera, et cetera.  
 
I often chose to write about an aspect of intersectionality i.e. how my male, 
English, Canadian born, educated privilege was affected by racism. What I could never 
really capture was the story my father helped me to appreciate over time. That although 
we speak English, our English was and is never considered as the same as a white person 
who speaks English, especially if one speaks with an accent. It is their language, not 
ours. Ours may have been Hindi (we think, as my great grandmother spoke Hindi), but 
that was taken from us, beaten and erased over decades. We were punished for speaking 
it, and rewarded for speaking “the King’s English”. We were indentured laborers from 
India, brought to work their sugar plantations, to make them rich, while leaving us poor. 
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If English is a privilege, it is yours that I speak it, not mine that I can. For me, it is 
a reminder that my language was held as inferior, as savage and uncivilized. It is a 
reminder for me that your English is superior, universal, and owned by you. If it affords 
me opportunities above others in the present, it is only within a context of great suffering 
and loss where that “privilege”, when accepted as such by me, reinforces a reminder that 
my language is inferior, savage, and uncivilized and yours is superior, therefore, I am 
privileged to speak it. I always felt so sad handing in that assignment. Sad, that I couldn’t 
tell my story because it could not be depicted on the petals of a flower. I grew up 
listening to Hindi music and watching Hindi movies. My parents, family and I still enjoy 
them with unspeakable satisfaction, even though we cannot speak a word of the language.  
My father helped me to understand our missing languages in relation to a system 
of dominance, a project of colonization, of global imperialism, the establishments of 
hierarchies of language, and how difference was perpetuated between us and them, theirs 
and ours. This was always much more informative to me than an intersectional analysis 
that looked at English and Hindi as privilege and oppression, or an interlocking analysis 
directed at the power relations operating at an institutional level revealing a disparity of 
access at one given instance. In my father’s version, historiography must be appreciated 
for the historical positioning of English as dominant, universal and privileged. The 
project of colonization and technologies of subjugation are crucial to an understanding of 
this equation of English with privilege and what that does to Hindi in my situation. 
In those reflections, I also often felt pressured to accept the privilege of my 
affiliation with Catholicism. Living in a Judeo-Christian nation, I am attached among 
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those who represent the most abundant religious group, the dominant group, and the laws 
that privilege this affiliation. What I have difficulty sharing is that my mother was Hindu, 
my ancestors on my father’s side were likely Sikh. If my grandfather did not align with a 
Christian faith in Guyana (then a British colony), he would not have been able to get 
work outside of the sugar fields or send his children to school, the British system did not 
allow this. Also, marriages in the colonies were sanctified by the colonizers. If both 
parties did not assimilate to the recognized method of marriage, the marriage was not 
recognized.  
Hinduism was depicted as an ancient primitive, exotic, paranormal, fairy-tale. 
Christianity was a religion. While there are those who maintained their Hindu or Islamic 
affiliation, my family did not. To describe my affiliation with Catholicism as representing 
privileges afforded to me in the present or to my families’ past is at the very least, an 
incomplete representation. For this example, some would want me to accept that “I’m 
better off” because I am affiliated with Christianity both now (although I would resist this 
affiliation), and for my family in Guyana. This is a zero-sum game I do not enjoy playing 
or accepting. My reality is one where my affiliation with Christianity was a product of 
colonial dominance, the systemic coercion to assimilate, a denial and erasure of 
indigenous traditions and beliefs, the development of contempt for what was depicted as 
mysticism, exotic, and primitive.  
The alternative to Christian imposition was often no family (a denial of marriage), 
no education (refusal of access to education), malnutrition, poverty (resulting from lack 
of employment), shorter lives or death. For me to accept this as a privilege is to accept 
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that the benefits come with the affiliation, rather than acknowledging that these 
“benefits” arise from the violence that set Christianity as the privilege and Hinduism as 
the oppressed. It is the project of colonization that is important here, the technologies of 
assimilation and erasure, the interconnectedness of systems and establishment of  the 
institutions of education, employment, marriage (based on this violence) that provide us a 
contextual understanding of this as it was then and as it is now. What is also important is 
how the rivers of language and religion run together with the project of colonization, they 
develop and merge with race, and never can be separated and then analytically 
interlocked to achieve an analysis of indentureship realized through the practices and 
technologies of coolie labour. My examples themselves are only a bucket drawn from this 
ever flowing, dynamic and changing confluence. Only telling my portion, represented 
partially, contingently, and through my horizons of interpretation (effected by a father 
who was directly involved in Guyana’s revolution for independence, educated in the 
Soviet Union by a socialist regime encouraging liberation from capitalism colonial 
imperialism, a father who fought for separation of Church and state etc.). 
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This is my grandparent’s marriage certificate, labeled “Certificate of Registration of 
Marriage of Immigrants Contracted in the Colony”. 
 Confluence 
In this study of the practice of deportation for people identified with mental health 
issues at the confluence of criminal justice, immigration and mental health issues, 
complexity will be the primary focus. While the realities of difference are noted in the 
contemporary, difference will not be the starting point of analysis. Rather, our focus will 
be on the processes, discursive technologies, practices, historiographies, which produce 
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ordered difference, relational and professional hierarchies and relations of power and 
dominance. I substitute confluence for an interlocking or intersectional approach for these 
political ends.  
To study a confluence is to trace how more than one idea, system, factor or 
influence run or merge together at a similar point or junction, just as two or more bodies 
of water run together and affect the composition and trajectory via their contributing 
sources. The study of confluence differs from an intersectional or interlocking analysis in 
that a confluence is never static, no part is completely distinct from another, and there are 
multiple perspectives from which one can examine or trace the same idea, system, factor 
or influence. Confluence demands a historical consideration, an appreciation of the 
temporal. It must also attend to complexity by engaging with the terrain as it is, with its 
many contributors of differing composition.  Imagine that no cubes of a matrix, spheres 
of intersecting difference or systems that interlock can remain static. Imagine that their 
relations are fluid and therefore time must always be an aspect for consideration.  
Confluence has been used as a guiding concept to analyze the phenomenon of 
youth homicide through an analysis of social and economic factors in neighborhoods in 
Chicago across historical periods (Joe, 2000). Confluence has also been studied to trace 
the historical, social, scientific and political developments that have effected legislation 
regarding trauma and child sexual abuse (Rix, 2000). Other examples include the study of 
confluence with respect to “jail inmates with co-occurring mental health and substance 
use problems” (Sung, Mellow & Mahoney, 2010), the study of how the disciplines of 
sociology, statistics, and public policy are relevant to family assistance programs (i.e., 
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Food Stamps, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and Medicaid (Press 
and Tanur, 1991), how residential segregation results in racial inequality in future 
occupational outcomes (Dickerson, 2008), and how criminal justice and child welfare 
systems effect the outcomes for the children of probationers (Phillips, Leathers & 
Erkanli, 2009).  
Kenneth Hamilton has illustrated the importance of an attention to historical 
contributing social, political, and specifically colonial contexts through his analysis of the 
targeting of queer sexualities. As Kenneth Hamilton has suggested, “the legacy of 
colonization has always historically meant the targeting of queer sexualities and 
spiritualities, the crushing of fluid sexual behavior to establish a heteronorm” (Hamilton, 
2010). As Hamilton describes, the current injustice of the anti-homosexuality bill in 
Uganda (passed October 13, 2009) owes its ancestry to the criminalization of “sodomy 
and homosexual acts” that began in 1886 in a history that Christian Europe has authored 
as the “Passion of the Uganda Martyrs” (Hamilton, 2010).   
Hamilton articulates clear examples of how the formation of the heteronorm in 
Uganda owes an inheritance to the legacy and violence of colonization.  For a theory of 
violence and confluence that is able to consider contemporary Ugandan homophobic 
violence, or anti-homosexuality bills, and their resulting experiences of humiliation and 
disrespect, we must acknowledge that it is crucial to recognize the complex, specific, 
historical, political, and social conditions for any person because in the absence of this 
greater understanding, violence prevails. i.e., condemning Uganda and Ugandan’s as 
homophobic people thereby erasing global complicity in this contemporary situation. 
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While the term confluence is not original, my use of it for this new political and 
conceptual purpose is a departure from other approaches to complexity. In all of the 
above examples of the study of confluence, an appreciation of complexity directs the 
methodology, examining for continuities rather than differences.  The outcome, rather 
than it being examined for what it has left out, can be appreciated for its representations, 
and our interpretations, through the functions of discourse, that reveal the contours of a 
set of power relations,  systems, and technologies that (re)create a hierarchical structure, 
an interdependent set of hegemonic knowledge structures and practices, and governing 
processes. This understanding exposes a project, a project that can no longer be 
understood as “post” or “neo” but as colonization, as imperialism, as liberalism.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Colonial continuities & Colonial technologies of difference: 
In this chapter, specific attention is directed to colonial practices and technologies 
of violence and difference at work at the confluence of mental health, criminal justice and 
immigrations systems. Here the intricate processes required for Orientalism are 
recognized as dividing practices and gendered discourses at our confluence. Also, the 
colonial practices and violence of erasure (the elimination of voice or aspects relevant to 
any consideration of a person including their histories, and circumstances), of 
appropriation (of acts of resistance as “evidence” used for the constructing of identities 
worthy of violence, and for the rationalization of positions that legitimize violence) and 
the processes of dehumanization are explored for their use value in colonial and imperial 
projects. The establishment and implementation of professional hierarchies and 
disciplinary hegemonies at the confluence of immigration, criminal justice and mental 
health are interrogated for their imbrication with and reflection on the establishment, and 
reproduction of human hierarchies and hegemonies of knowledge and authority. These 
practices, policies and technologies are also challenged for their complicity in the 
remaking of North-South division, their participation in the reinforcement of ideas of 
nationalism and the utilization of moral and ethical arguments for the justification of 
atrocities. 
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Orientalism, Dividing practices and the White Family of Man: (re)producing the fantasy 
of difference 
When exploring the complexities of the confluence of immigration, mental health 
and criminal justice systems through the example of the practice of deportation, the 
opportunity for transformation is foreclosed without an analysis that perceives the 
multiple layers and levels of historical violence revealed through an attention to colonial 
continuities and colonial technologies of difference.  The contemporary deportation 
appeal cases alongside the archival cases reveal the continuation of practices and 
technologies that rely on historically established methods of constructing difference in 
order to rationalize (via policy and law and reference to professional expert knowledge) 
exclusion, surveillance, segregation, exploitation, or subjugation.  
Historically, the practices and technologies of Orientalism (pace Edward Said) 
and similarly, dividing practices and subjectification (pace Michel Foucault) (re)produce 
violence at the discursive level, the legislative level, within institutions and within our 
day to day practices and technologies of decision making. Our attention to these specific 
historical processes (the technologies and practices exemplified by Orientalism and 
dividing practices) extends our analysis of the multi-focal conceptualization of violence 
(qua Zizek) to permit our temporal analytical ethos (that of our conceptualization of 
confluence) to question the violence of division and subjugation at all levels 
(contemporarily and historically). In this way, any practice or technology that presents 
itself as “new”, progressive, considerate of the most recent available “evidence”, or that 
has applied the most up-to-date technologies of objectivity, in order to authorize and 
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legitimate violence is exposed for its complicity in the deployment of technologies that 
were forged through violent means. 
For Foucault, it has been said that the goal of his work has not been to analyze 
power but to “create a history of the different modes by which human being are made 
subjects” (Rabinow, 1984, p. 7). Paul Rabinow has outlined Foucault’s three modes of 
objectification of the subject to present Foucault’s main themes: 1) Dividing Practices 2) 
Scientific Classification 3) Subjectification. The most famous examples of dividing 
practices from Foucault’s work include the isolation of lepers during the Middle Ages; 
the confinements of the poor, the insane, the rise of modern psychiatry and its entry into 
the hospitals, prisons, and clinics throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; and 
the “medicalization, stigmatization, and normalization of sexual deviance in modern 
Europe” (Rabinow, 1984, p. 8).  
The subject is objectified through the processes of division either within him or 
herself or division from others. During this process, human beings are given both a social 
and a personal identity. These dividing practices are modes of manipulation that combine 
the action of science and exclusion in both spatial and social contexts (Rabinow, 1984, p. 
8). In Foucault’s discussion of dividing practices, he highlights that there has historically 
been an interconnection between dividing practices and the formation and sophistication 
of the social sciences, its modes of classification, control, and containment and their 
relationship to the humanitarian rhetoric on reform and progress. This process has also 
becomes more efficient and proficient at applying these procedures of power and 
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knowledge to dominated groups or to the groups formed and given an identity through 
dividing practices (Rabinow, 1984, p.8).  
From our analysis of the various forms of violence perpetuated within mental 
health, criminal justice and immigration systems, we have an overwhelming repository of 
historical dividing practices to which our current problems owe an inheritance.  The three 
cases and related historical legislation reviewed in the archival documents chapter as well 
as Ena Chadha’s review of the 1910 House of Commons debates reveal that early 
psychiatry propounded the belief that persons with mental disabilities were undesirable 
immigrants because they were by nature degenerates, dangerous and dishonest in 
disposition (Chadha, 2008).  
Through Foucault’s discussion of scientific classification as a mode of 
objectification he illustrates how discourses on life, labour, and language have been 
formed into disciplines that have achieved a high degree of internal autonomy and 
coherence and have changed abruptly at several junctures throughout history (Rabinow, 
1984, p. 9). Foucault highlights this discontinuity which often is viewed as progress, as a 
demonstration of how we are made subjects through relations of knowledge and power in 
psychological, pedagogical, economic, and linguistic discourses (Rabinow, 1984). 
The third of Foucault’s modes of objectification is that of subjectification or the 
ways in which human beings contribute to their own subject formation. Foucault is 
concerned here with the “processes of self-formation in which the person is active” on the 
formation of their own bodies, thoughts, and conduct. These processes involve self-
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understanding usually mediated through dominant discourses or disciplines (Rabinow, 
1984, p.11). 
These three modes of objectification involved in the formation of subjects are 
crucial components to any analysis of the violence perpetuated within mental health, 
criminal justice and immigration systems. The maintenance of the separations between 
health and mental health, between those deserving of respect and the undeserving, the 
human and the inhuman, and between the citizens and non-citizens all require dividing 
practices, scientific classification, and subjectification to rationalize violence.  
Foucault however has been criticized for his lack of direct attention to race and 
colonization often due to his reliance on a Eurocentric conceptualization of history 
(Young, 1995). Foucault’s analytical contribution however has been a frequent 
theoretical reference point for postcolonial theorist. Edward Said extended a Foucauldian 
concept of discourse to allow “the creation of a general theoretical paradigm through 
which the cultural forms of colonial imperial ideologies could be analysed” (Young, 
1995,p. 2).  As Robert C. Young clarifies, 
Said’s point was that Orientalism was a form of ideological fantasy, with 
no necessary relation to the actual cultures that it supposedly described 
and understood: the very Orient itself was an Orientalist fiction. At the 
same time Orientalism as Said defines it, was a relationship of power, of 
cultural domination, the cultural equivalent of the colonialism which it 
accompanied” (Young, 1995, p 2). 
 
Said’s contribution went beyond a Marxist economic primacy in the development of 
colonialism and imperialism to examine the cultural effects, and processes of colonialism 
and imperialism.  
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With respect to race, Young describes that Foucault’s sixth and final volume of 
the History of Sexuality (never to be released) was to have been originally titled 
“Populations and Races” (Young, 1995, p.11). In Foucault’s discussion of biopolitics, the 
“ideological term that held class, race and sexuality together was that of blood” (Young, 
1995, p.11). Racism according to Foucault was a result of the proliferation of blood-
consciousness in the second half of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century 
exercised through the devices of sexuality to protect the purity of bloodlines (a eugenic 
rationale) (Young, 1995, p.12). This is an example of a confluence where ideas of race, 
class and sexuality are emerging and co-developing interdependently through history 
through the deployment of multiple forms of violence. While confluence can help us 
trace the eugenics project with an attention to technologies and practices, an interlocking 
analysis could follow the products of racism, classism and the policing of sexual 
identities, behaviors and orientations. With these considerations, in addition to Foucault’s 
three modes of objectification we must also consider that dividing practices and the 
exclusions endemic to the development of the bourgeois subject are for racialized people, 
historically bound to the violent practices of racial slavery, indentureship, genocide, and 
colonization (and thereby endemic to the development of the fantasy of the subhuman, 
the savage, the uncivilized-deserving of violence).  
Theorists such as Edward Said and Franz Fanon, and Gayatri C. Spivak offer 
analyses that speak to the discursive violence and development of hegemonic academic 
and professional disciplines forged on a complete knowledge of the Other, predicated on 
the violence of colonization and highlight the discursive, literary and cultural practices 
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that write subaltern groups out of history through the operations of discourse aimed at 
regulating and civilizing the uncivilized Other. Here, we must also consider how ideas 
and understandings of race and culture advance dehumanizing discourses while infinite 
identities resist representations that seek to finalize and essentialize them. It is here where 
the past meets the present and the infinite humanity collides with dehumanizing 
technologies that violence prevails. 
Edward Said demonstrated in Orientalism how orientalist discourse justified and 
advanced colonial rule through Western Academic knowledge and a will-to-power to 
govern the Orient (Young, 2001). According to Said, there were a number of productive 
outcomes that have forged themselves into the practices of academic disciplines and 
claimed objectivity during colonial projects. Individuals in “the orient” were 
subordinated into a general type through orientalist discourse and posed through 
consistent binaries that set Europe apart from “the orient” geographically, racially, and 
religiously (Said, 1978). This Orientalist discursive regime also produced an ontological 
and epistemological difference between the European “us” and the Oriental “them” (Said, 
1978).  The “Orient” becomes static and unchanging, and authors on the subject draw 
clear distinctions between themselves (White, male, European etc.) and the oriental (Said, 
1978). The orientalist also produces an overarching sense of contempt for the Other, and 
becomes the expert who knows the oriental better that the oriental can know her/his self 
(Said, 1978). Orientalism structures and guides academic fields and allows for a tendency 
to define the Other in broad sweeping terms (either Orient or Occident), eliminating the 
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need to sub-define or for heterogeneity within groups (Said, 1978). Social science is an 
advanced form of this orientalizing practice. As Said describes, Orientalism is, 
A distribution of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, 
sociological, historical, and philological texts; it is an elaboration not only of a 
basic geographical distinction (the world is made up of two unequal halves, 
Orient and Occident) but also a series of “interests” which, by such means as 
scholarly discovery, philological reconstruction, psychological analysis, 
landscape and sociological description, it not only creates but also maintains; it 
is, rather than expresses, a certain will or intention to understand, in some cases 
to control, manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a manifestly different (or 
alternative and novel) world; it is, above all, a discourse that is by no means in 
direct, corresponding relationship with political power in the raw, but rather is 
produced and exists in an uneven exchange with various kinds of power, shaped 
to a degree by the exchange with political power (as with a colonial or imperial 
establishment), power intellectual (as with reigning sciences like comparative 
linguistics or anatomy, or any of the modern policy sciences), power cultural (as 
with orthodoxies and canons of taste, texts, values), power moral (as with ideas 
about what “we” do and what “they” cannot do or understand as “we” do) 
(Said, 1978, p. 12). 
 
From Said, we see how the creation of general taxonomies, the production of 
difference, the rise of expertise and professional hegemony developed during 
colonization and was inextricably linked with racial thinking, hierarchy, dominance, 
geopolitics and knowing the Other better than they know themselves. These colonial 
products continue to exist within professions such as biomedical psychiatry and social 
work and must be acknowledged for within the violent historical and political context 
from which they developed in order to appreciate their capacity for violence and 
necessity for attention in the present.  
Interrogating the application of a process like Orientalism or dividing practices is 
to question any project that requires the construction of identities of difference and to 
demand clarification as to why authority is confined to particular disciplines, professions 
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and forms of knowledge. Within our conceptualization of confluence (i.e., to trace how 
more than one idea, system, factor or influence run or merge together at a similar point or 
junction, just as two or more bodies of water run together), dividing practices, scientific 
classification, and subjectification can be understood as fluid, interdependent and with a 
trajectory toward colonization and nation building.  
Anne McClintock demonstrates in Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality 
in the Colonial Contest, that a central process to the colonization of South Africa was the 
reordering of black labor and the black family through the legitimation of discourses on 
progress, degeneration, and “the invented tradition of the white father at the head of the 
global Family of Man” (McClintock, 1995 p. 234). Through McClintock’s analysis of 
Henry Rider Haggard, a colonial administrator and author of King Solomon’s Mines 
(1885), the reinvention of patriarchy is achieved through a reliance on these discourses 
“culminating in the regeneration of the authority of the white father in the historical form 
of the English middle-class gentlemen” (McClintock, 1995, p. 234). 
Historically subjugated people are made whatever subject is necessary in the 
present in order for the fantasy to continue, whether it be an unrehabilitatable criminal, an 
untreatable biomedical anomaly, or an undeserving foreign Other. The fantasy of a 
multicultural Canadian society is upheld at the expense of the racial genocidal history of 
colonization that claimed Canadian lands. The fantasy of a society of that is fair and just 
rests on a denial of social disparity, immigration policing, mental distress, and variance in 
ability, gender, sexual orientation, language, or belief systems.  At this level of analysis, 
the project is revealed for its eugenic and racial basis, the technologies and operations or 
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power are held as suspect and we have destabilized the fantasy of the Canadian protector 
of the purity of the blood (or the idea of the innocent Canadian public) and the fantasy of 
the savage, threatening uncivilized Other, deserving of violence and the fantasy of the 
rational criminal justice system, the fair immigration system and the effective mental 
health system, thus remaking a white Family of Man. 
Erasure 
The violence within the practices and technologies of erasure and appropriation 
are exceptionally active in the contemporary deportation appeal cases as well as in the 
archival cases representing the confluence of mental health, immigration and criminal 
justice systems. Often the histories of people are reduced to their history of life with a 
biomedical diagnosis or the period of time since their first interaction with the criminal 
justice system. A majority of the 20 years of life in Canada, per person in the 10 
contemporary deportation appeal cases (on average) is then erased. For the people in 
these cases, explanations are given to them through the immigration system, the criminal 
justice system and mental health system that explain their history in terms of a period 
without treatment and after (yet always sick), a period before being convicted and after 
(yet always criminal), and a period before coming to Canada and after (yet never 
Canadian).  
Often the histories of people before they have arrived in Canada are erased. As 
detailed in Chapter 9, the historical, social and political circumstances (i.e. for convention 
refugees [Nur Mohamed Jama], persecution due to sexual orientation [Guhad Mahamoud 
Hassan], political oppression [Niranjan Sambasivam]) are completely eradicated from 
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consideration. In doing so, any historical, social or political complicity and therefore 
responsibility can also be denied through an over emphasis on the individuality of mental 
illness, criminality and immigration status.  Also, through this unique practice of 
temporal erasure hundreds and sometimes thousands of years of history is rendered 
obsolete. 
Erasure also takes place through the denial of records or record keeping. In the 
case of Audley Horace Gardiner, the police records either did not exist or did not mention 
self-defense in their reporting of his assault charges. In doing so, erased was the context 
within which Audley was homeless, in a shelter and found the need to defend himself.  In 
the archival case of the deportation of hobos the records of who was being deported was 
also erased thereby permitting the use of police to profile people on the street and deport 
them without public knowledge or inquiry. In most of the cases, the subjects are often 
rendered voiceless. Their opinions and experiences are filtered through designated 
representatives, legal counsel or as observations reported by professionals within the 
mental health system. In doing so the voices of the accused are erased.  
 The technologies and practices of erasure were key to the project of colonization, 
and to the institution of racial and eugenic hierarchies. The experiences of certain 
minority and marginalized groups including racialized minorities and those identified 
with mental health issues are often rendered invisible or irrelevant through the historical 
process of systematic oppression. This oppression has been said to occur through the 
hegemonic writings of history by social elites (Gramsci, 1971; Spivak, 1988). These 
subaltern groups, whose voices have been silenced, are then excluded through discursive 
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practices within organizations, institutions, practices, disciplines, and academic 
knowledge (Gramsci, 1971; Spivak, 1988). Hegemony according to Gramsci is the 
organization of coercion and consent by the ruling or dominant class through language, 
culture and ideology (Ives, 2004). Gramsci ties language to culture and ideology to say 
that philosophy cannot be divorced from politics and the operations of power (Ives, 
2004). Gramsci’s notion of hegemony includes the public and private relationship as well 
as institutional and social analyses of schools, churches, newspapers, publishers et cetera 
(Ives, 2004). Also according to Gramsci, subaltern groups include people who accept the 
hegemony of the ruling class that has very different interests from their own (Ives, 2004). 
Spivak extends the concept of the subaltern to include those who have been separated or 
excluded from the traditional lines of social mobility including organized resistance 
(Spivak, 2003). Both Gramsci and Spivak point out the analytical utility of language in 
determining hegemonic structures in the critique of ideology to perceive the space where 
the resistance of subaltern groups might be considered.  
Lata Mani and Gayatri Spivak both have written on the historiography of women 
in the context of colonization through the example of Hindu widow self-immolation 
(Mani, 2000; Spivak, 1988). Without attempting to track their entire arguments here, I 
name them to highlight their examples of how this specific history, in the context of 
colonization, was written by the British empire, through the privileging of the masculine 
Hindu elite and their interpretations of religious doctrine, within a Eurocentric episteme 
that has written the subaltern groups (Hindu widows) out of the history, while women 
remain the ground or terrain upon which the debates on “tradition” and histories are 
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articulated (Mani, 2000; Spivak, 1988). The concept of Sati (Hindu widow self-
immolation) is thereby forged without a woman as the subject or object in the discourse 
(Mani, 2000).  
The social and political formation of concepts such as authentic traditional 
practice, and the formation of laws to regulate Sati all have implications for a historical 
analysis that understand the rule of professional opinion (or elitist opinion). The history 
of colonization in this case discursively removed the ability for Sati to have multiple 
regulations or none, and removed (discursively) the ability for Hindu widows to 
participate in the discussions of the practice or the existence and practice of alternatives. 
To discuss the historical influences of heteropatriarchy, colonization, and “tradition” on 
contemporary issues, we must be able to consider the complex specific historical and 
political contexts for any person, subject, object, agent, terrain, or otherwise. In mental 
health, we can see similar hegemonic practices that privilege the voices of psychiatrists, 
lawyers, and expert opinion leaving the subaltern voices of racialized minorities 
diagnosed as mentally ill as the terrain upon which these issues are discussed while 
leaving little space from which this subaltern group can speak or be heard. 
While this study does not intend to reproduce a discussion of deportation in 
absence of how women are effected at the confluence of immigration, mental health and 
criminal justice systems, we must acknowledge that the targeting of men of colour occurs 
in a way that is commensurate and complicit in the processes that reproduce the “politics 
of rescue” amoung women who are identified with mental illness, involved with the 
criminal justice system and marked as Other by the immigration system (Razack, 1998, 
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p.131). The pathways for Women who may have a tendency to be forced into positions of 
multiplied vulnerability or victimization in order to appeal for consideration or 
recognition may be quite different than what happens to men at this confluence. The 
construction of the identities of the unrehabilitatable criminal, the untreatable mental ill 
person and the undeserving foreign alien also reproduce subjectivities of threat requiring 
bodies in need of protection. These constructions, authorizing and legitimizing violence 
in this study of course occur within this broader construction of the vulnerable, the 
victim, the Women in need of rescue, the male rescuer, all resting on the ideas of the 
savage, the uncivil, and mad. Sherene Razack has noted this tendency towards a gaze of 
vulnerability and victimization participating in a “politics of rescue” for Women 
identified with developmental disabilities. Razack goes further to suggest that we can 
move from the “politics of pity” to one of respect when we acknowledge the reproduction 
of hierarchies or oppression and our complicity within these systems (Razack, 1998, p. 
131-132).   
For racialized people, languages, meanings and religions have been historically 
erased and supplanted by the languages, meanings, and religions of the colonizer. This 
process of language, and cultural erasure occurred for both Diaspora and indigenous 
racialized people. As Pemina Yellow Bird states in a reflection of the Hiawatha Asylum 
in the United States of America,  
Our peoples, for centuries students and philosophers of the stars and of all 
nature, gentle, compassionate, hard-working and courageous, lived a 
completely Spirit-dominated life, with every decision made on behalf of 
the people completed in an attitude of love, prayer and humility. This was 
our life, these were the ways of our ancestors, and in a very short period 
of time our millennia-old way of life was nearly wiped out by the 
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behaviors and actions of the newcomers to our country (Yellow Bird, 
2004).  
 
Those aboriginals who did not comply with or fit in with the process of re-
educating people as English speaking Christian subjects were institutionalized as insane 
in asylums like the Hiawatha Asylum. The asylum had a history of horrifying 
maltreatment of inmates. Yellow Bird also notes that the history of the Hiawatha Asylum 
for “Insane Indians” has also been erased, the asylum was torn down and replaced by a 
golf course (Yellow Bird, 2004). The only historical marker on the golf course is a sign 
referencing that Scandinavian homesteaders had once built a ski jump on that land 
(Yellow Bird, 2004).  
For African American slaves in the United States of America, literacy was openly 
outlawed. In 1845, 12 states had passed anti-literacy statutes and educational restrictions 
were placed on slaves and free blacks (Watson, 2009).  This was 12 years after the British 
abolition of slavery act of 1833. African American’s were punished during slavery for 
using African language and names, and were forced to later acquire Anglo-European 
literacy and religion (Watson, 2009). This is a further example of a colonial technology 
whereby indigenous language is oppressed and the colonizer’s language is forced upon 
the colonized. 
Beginning in 1834, South Asians (then referred to as “Indians”) were introduced 
to British colonies in order to meet the shortage of agricultural labour resulting from the 
abolition of slavery ACT of 1833. The shortage would have threatened to destroy the 
sugar industry for Britain and involve Great Britain in the “moral disgrace of having to 
buy sugar from slave labour areas” (Cumpston, 1956). From 1838-1920 British, Danish, 
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Dutch, and French governments transported hundreds of thousands of Indentured South 
Asian labourers to Guyana, Trinidad, Suriname, Guadeloupe, Jamaica, Martinique , 
French Guiana, Grenada, Belize, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, St. Kitts, Nevis, and St. Croix 
(Roopnarine, 2009). The South Asian labourers came from a diversity of religious 
backgrounds and spoke a plethora of languages such as “Bengali, Punjabi, Hindu, Urdu, 
Oriya, Nepali, Gujarati, Telugu, Tamil, Oraons, Santals, Vanga, Radha, Varendra, 
Rajbangshi, Magahi, Maithili, Shadri, Awadhi, Bhojpuri, Eastern and Western Hindi, 
Bangaru, Ajmeri, and Tondai Nadu” (Roopnarine, 2009). Many Muslim South Asian 
Labourers in Guyana spoke Koshali, Braj—which is more than 2,000 years old—Koeli, 
Bagheli, Hundeli and Bhojpuri, the latter being the dominant language of Uttar Pradesh 
and Bihar (Khanam, & Chickrie, 2009). In 1941, Muslim leaders recognized that the 
British colonial government policies of “civilizing the natives” had all but erased these 
ancient languages from the people. They sought to pass a resolution in the British Guiana 
[sic] Education Code and nothing came of it, the ancient language of the people “suffered 
a slow death” (Khanam, & Chickrie, 2009). 
The languages and religions that were erased during colonial rule also erased long 
histories of accumulated knowledge and meaning for the racialized, colonized. The 
option was to either assimilate to British language and culture or have none at all. In 
Guyana, education in the British system was compulsory by law if there was a school 
within two miles of the child’s home (Cumpston, 1956). This meant that for the few of 
those who worked close to the plantation owners, British education was available. The 
majority of the Indians in Guyana remained illiterate (Cumpston, 1956). Some South 
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Asian Labourers were shipped back to India if they were no longer needed. The ex-
indentured labourers we treated like “tapuhas” or strange island people. As Roopnarine 
quotes from a 1931 report by Sannyasi & Chaturvedi, Mahatma Gandhi comments on the 
ex-indentured labourers : 
They all looked famished. Their lot is the lowest ebb of human misery. The 
fact that the majority of these men are Colonial born aggravates their 
misery … These men are neither Indian nor Colonial. They have no Indian 
culture in the foreign land they go to, save what they picked up from their 
uncultured half-dis-Indianised parents. They are Colonial in that they are 
debarred access to the Colonial, i.e., Western Culture. They are therefore 
out of the frying pan into the fire. There, at least they had some money and 
a kind of a home. Here they are social lepers, not even knowing the 
language of the people (Sannyasi & Chaturvedi, 1931 as quoted in 
Roopnarine, 2009). 
 
On almost every return ship from the Caribbean to India, there were paupers, 
invalids, and those labeled insane, who were rejected by the colonies for being or 
becoming unproductive (Roopnarine, 2009). This level of cultural, personal, physical and 
discursive violence could not be captured in any sort of system of concrete categorization 
for the purposes of diagnosis or to appropriate a “culturally appropriate alternative” 
treatment. From Spivak, Said and Mani, we see the deeply problematic outcomes of 
civilizing work aimed at encapsulating “tradition” and becoming experts on the Other. 
 In Sherene Razack’s  book Casting out: The eviction of muslims from western law 
and politics, the influences of race thinking about the “dangerous” Muslim, the 
“imperiled” woman, and the “civilized” Westerner are explored for their use in the 
rationalization of violence (Razack, 2008). The myth of the just and democratic Western 
nation is forged upon the advancement of ideas of a Muslim menace. Through labeling, 
stigmatization, imprisonment and war, the racialized Muslim is dehumanized, evicted 
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from Western law and politics and constitutes a body of difference whereby rights could 
be suspended at any moment (Razack, 2008). 
 Sherene Razack also demonstrated in Race, space, and the law: Unmapping a 
white settler society (2002) how spatial separation of the bougeois citizen (who has 
gained mastery “over his own body” through self-control and discipline) from 
degeneracy or abnormality developed to prevent weakening of the bougeoise citizen 
subject and the state. The technologies of regulation worked through the mechanism of 
moral regulation. This spatial separation is evident in the European national history of 
Canada, becomes “truth” in Canadian law, and denies the violence upon which spatial 
separation was both justified and implemented (Razack, 2002). The myth of European 
settlers claiming uninhabited lands places the history of aboriginal peoples at a separate 
place and time.  
People of colour are scripted as late arrivals, coming to the shores of 
North America long after much of the development has occurred. In this 
was, slavery, indentureship, and labour exploitation-for example, the 
Chinese who build the railway or the Sikhs who worked in the lumber 
industry in nineteenth-century Canada-are all handily forgotten in an 
official national story of European enterprise. (Razack, 2002, p.3).  
 
 The effect of writing people out of history and space rationalizes the view that 
people of colour are “intruders” and ignores the contributions of people of colour to 
society while denying the violence of conquest, genocide, slavery and indentureship. 
Razack describes through Dara Culhane’s example of Terra nullis (empty uninhabited 
lands) that in the case of British colonialism, already inhabited nations became legally 
defines as uninhabited “if the people were not Christian, not agricultural, not commercial, 
not ‘sufficiently evolved’ or simply in the way” (Razack, 2002, p.3). 
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Appropriation 
 The products and processes of colonization are not the only aspects that must be 
considered when acknowledging the ancestry of colonial violence within mental health, 
criminal justice and immigration systems. Particular formations have also developed 
through the dehumanizing, difference making relations of colonization and racial 
thinking. Dominance must be resistant to criticism while rationalizing to the colonized 
and the colonizer that hierarchy and oppression are necessary.  
 In Ethan Watters’ book Crazy Like Us (2010), the author questions the process of 
exporting Western concepts of mental illness and pharmaceuticals around the world. As 
Watters describes, North American concepts of biomedical knowledge are transported 
overseas with a promise of certain relief from mental health issues and stigma. Western 
concepts and treatments for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Schizophrenia, Depression, 
and Anxiety have infiltrated countries overseas at an alarming rate (Watters, 2010). 
Watters uses examples from Hong Kong, Zanzibar and Sri Lanka to highlight the 
devastating consequences of exporting Western concepts of mental illness as they clash 
with local custom and understandings and religions (Watters, 2010). This exporting and 
imposition of Western knowledge as both superior and certain has had the effect of not 
only destroying local understandings and historical traditions but changing the mental 
illnesses themselves (Watters, 2010). The so-called “identification” of PTSD and 
schizophrenia has flourished and these concepts now exist where they never did before 
(Watters, 2010). Watters suggests that a Western concepts of mental illness cannot 
simply be mapped onto other countries and cultures as a template (Watters, 2010). The 
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erasure of the diversity of understandings, history, and culture is a threat to our 
understanding of the human mind. 
 The forms of erasure mentioned in the contemporary appeals cases, the archival 
cases as well as our discussion of the practices of erasure necessary for colonization 
permit a particular writing of history. This history is forged both through erasure and 
through the appropriation of the histories of others. While the history of the fair 
immigration system, protecting criminal justice system and effective mental health 
system is written, the histories of people found at this confluence (mostly racialized 
minorities) are appropriated as evidence to support this narration of history. When social, 
political and historical circumstances are erased, their products (in these cases 
represented as individual psychopathology, criminality and foreignness) are appropriated 
as individual ills, or threats, aliens that require Western treatment, protection, or 
civilization. It is upon this writing of history that authoritative status is reproduced, while 
constructing hierarchies of identities and legitimizing violence. Exploiting the histories of 
the global South for Western advantage is a violent colonial continuity that can only be 
fully appreciated for its harm when explored with the temporal considerations provided 
by an attention to confluence and a multi-focal perspective on violence as provided by 
Žižek. 
Dehumanization 
The practices and technologies of dehumanization are revealed through the 
contemporary deportation appeals cases through their reliance on the interdependent 
construction of the identities of the untreatable biomedical anomaly, the unrehabilitatable 
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criminal and the undeserving foreign Other. These unique and very particular 
constructions have historically been mobilized to advance the rationalization of racial, 
mental and ablest hierarchies that target people of color, rationalize slavery, refuse 
support and belonging, and authorize violence. 
 The Faculty of Political Science at Columbia University edited a book as part of 
a series on “Studies in History, Economics and Public law” by Professor Howard W. 
Odum in 1910. Professor Odum served as Assistant Director of Research for President 
Herbert Hoover's Research Committee on Social Trends and was President of the 
American Sociological Association in 1930. His work had a great influence and reflected 
the research trajectories within his field. The subject of his research is described as 
having a tendency towards criminality, to addictions, to not wanting to work and “mental 
defect oftener takes the form of idiocy, and all acute psychoses like mania issue sooner in 
imbecility” (Odum, 1910, p. 169). This book is entitled “The Social and Mental Traits of 
the Negro”. 
 Ian Dowbiggin’s book Keeping America Sane: Psychiatry and Eugenics in the 
United States and Canada, 1880-1940, provides a detailed account of the history of 
Eugenic thinking and policy development within psychiatric and legal domains in Canada 
and the United States (1997). Eugenics is a term coined by a cousin of Charles Darwin, 
Francis Galton in 1883. Galton defined Eugenics as “the study of the agencies under 
social control that may improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations” 
(Francis Galton, Inquiries into Human Faculty and Its Development, 1907, p.17 cited in 
Dowbiggin, 1997). Eugenicists argue that “the sterilization and institutionalization of the 
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mentally disabled as well as laws restricting immigration and marriage would improve 
public health.” (Dowbiggin, 1997, p. vi).  
 Emil Kraepelin was a German psychiatrist during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries and is known as the “father of modern psychiatry”. At the time, it was 
believed that “specific action and life event caused specific types of insanity” (Metzl, 
2009, p.27). Kraepelin published in the sixth edition of Lehrbuch der Psychiatrie in 1899 
a classification described Dementia Praecox. Dementia Praecox was a construct that 
described those who “exhibited ‘hallucinations, delusions, incongruous emotivity, 
impairment of attention, negativism, and progressive mental dilapidation” (Metzl, 2009, 
p.29). Kraepelin had earlier discovered an organic basis for what is presently categorized 
as Alzheimer’s disease. He was determined to find a biological basis for what he 
categorized as Dementia Praecox as well. In 1911, Paul Eugen Bleuler, published that 
praecox was not a dementia or a biological disorder but a  
psychical splitting of the basic functions of personality. He thus 
maintained that the term dementia praecox should be replaced by a name 
that combined the Greek words for “split” (schizo) and ‘mind” (phrene). 
Bleuler renamed Dementai Praecox, Schizophrenia “because the splitting 
of the different psychic functions is one of its most important 
characteristics (Metzl, 2009, p.29).  
 
 Kraepelin’s terminology is no longer used regularly. However, his ideas of an 
organic or biological basis for mental disorder fit well with global colonial projects as 
well as with beliefs in the United States in the 1920s and 1930s that “negros were 
biologically unfit for freedom” (Metzl, 2009, p.29). 
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 The 1928 law based on Eugenic thinking in Alberta lead to the sterilization of 
over 2800 Albertans11 (Dowbiggin, 1997). By 1940 thirty American states had passed 
sterilization laws for the handicapped and in the early 1920 both America and Canada 
passed immigration laws to regulate “aliens” from “southern and eastern Europe”. 
Alberta and B.C. also passed sterilization laws. The most famous Eugenics law of course 
was in July 1933, when Adolph Hitler’s Nazi Germany passed legislation to involuntarily 
serialize over 400000 Germans.  
The idea that mental and physical difference is burdensome to “Canadians” is 
both a product of eugenic ideas and a contemporary outcome of a social service system 
that sees differences in race, mental fitness, and physical ability as something external to 
the “normal”, biologically determined and wasteful to address with public expenditure. 
Dr. Helen MacMurchy was Ontario’s leading public health expert in 1914 and “inspector 
of the feeble minded” from 1906-1916 (McLaren, 1990). In her role as first chief of the 
Division of Maternal and Child Welfare in 1920 she sought to effect public health needs 
in the areas of infant mortality, maternal mortality and feeblemindedness” (McLaren, 
1990, p. 30).  Her 1920 account, The Almosts: A Study of the Feeble-Minded promoted 
eugenic ideas that advocated for segregation and sterilization to eliminate the feeble-
minded, their economic costs and their criminal threat to society (McLaren, 1990). 
MacMurchy declared at a conference in 1914 that “the problem of defective children 
11 Leilani Muir sued the province of Alberta in 1996 and was awarded $750,000 in compensation. 
A class action lawsuit soon followed in 1999 that resulted in an $82 million dollar settlement for 
700 victims of this atrocious practice (Dowbiggin, 1997). 
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could only be solved if special education and medical inspection were complemented by 
restriction of immigration” (McLaren, 1990, p.46).  
 Harriet Washington documents how Psychiatric and census data was used to 
advance ideas of racial difference and to justify slavery. Dr. Peter Bryce began running 
the Alabama Insane Hospital in 1860. Bryce was respected for taking “thorough case 
histories” and observing “closely before diagnosis”.  He admitted one of his own former 
slaves in 1867, a man named John Patterson (Washington, 2006). Bryce concluded that 
Patterson experienced mania because his inadequate intelligence and judgment was 
unable to deal with freedom. Patterson’s “illness” becomes attached to his freedom 
thereby justifying the need for slaves and slavery and the need for practices that remove 
freedoms for people of colour (Washington, 2006).  Psychiatry was used as a tool both to 
advance ideas of racial difference and to justify slavery. During the 1840 census, the first 
counts of the “insane and idiots” was taken (Washington, 2006). The census provided 
“objective data” to support slavery. The data was used to support arguments such as “free 
blacks suffered far worse health, especially far worse mental health, than did enslaved 
blacks, who enjoyed low rates of disease and suffered almost no mental illness” 
(Washington, 2006, p.146). Madness became an indicator of black helplessness. The 
census data was used by politicians in powerful statistical arguments in support of slavery 
(Washington, 2006). For example, it was “found” that the North and South had 
equivalent rates “insane and idiot” whites but not of mentally defectives blacks. Only one 
out of every 1558 black in the South was an “idiot or insane”; but one out of every 144 
Northern blacks had similar mental problems (Washington, 2006, p.146). These statistics 
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were used to argue the case that slavery was better for the mental wellbeing of blacks. 
Case histories described how blacks “almost starved after spending their money on wine 
and tobacco or feel ill with Tuberculosis after buying flashy clothes that were completely 
unsuitable for northern weather” (Washington, 2006, p.147). Dr. Edward Jarvis who 
helped found the American Statistical Association in 1839 and Dr. James McCune Smith 
of Harvard University exposed the numerous methodological problems with the data. 
Some Northern towns had no black residents “but were endowed census statistics that 
said otherwise”, (i.e, in Dresden, Maine, there were only three black inhabitants but “six 
insane negros”) (Washington, 2006, p.148). In Worchester, Massachusetts there were 133 
“coloured lunatics and idiot”, but this was actually the number of white patients in 
Worchester’s State Hospital for the Insane (Washington, 2006, p.148). .  
In Jonathan Metzl’s book The Protest Psychosis: How schizophrenia became a 
black disease (2009), a detailed analysis is provided on the changes in criteria for 
schizophrenia from docility to rage beginning in the 1960s and the psychiatric and 
medical targeting of African Americans. Although Metzl recognizes the racism within 
psychiatry, he does not critique the diagnostic processes and treatments of biomedical 
psychiatry themselves or their relation to the production of difference based on racial, 
eugenic thinking and colonial projects. 
As Metzl describes, the over diagnosis of African American patients continues in 
the present. In June 28, 2005, a Washington Post study by Jon Zeber reported that 
African American patients were diagnosed with schizophrenia four times as often as 
white patients (Metzl, 2009). This occurs even though “the research team uncovered no 
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evidence that ‘black patients were any sicker than whites,’ or that patients in either group 
were more likely to suffer from drug addiction, poverty, depression, or a host of other 
variables” (Metzl, 2009, p.x). 
Metzel describes early diagnostic categories for African Americans including 
Drapetomania (the “insanity” of black slaves running away from white masters-coined 
by Samuel A. Cartwright) and described a condition called Dysaesthesia Aethiopis, a 
form of madness manifest by “rascality” and “disrespect for the master’s property” that 
was believed to be “cured” by extensive “whipping, hard labour, and, in extreme cases, 
amputation of the toes” (Metzl, 2009, p.30). Psychiatric authors combined Kreapelin’s 
ideas with Cartright’s. For example, as Metzl outlines, in 1913 a psychiatrist from the 
Government Hospital for the insane in Washington, D.C. wrote an article for the 
Psychoanalytic Review entitled “Dementia Praecox in the Coloured Race”, in which she 
described dramatic increases in the illness in ‘coloured” patients” (Metzl, 2009). The 
author linked the appearance of praecox in “negro” patients to the pressures of freedom 
for which they were “biologically unfit” (Metzl, 2009, p.31).  
In the 1960s, research articles in psychiatric journals began asserting that 
schizophrenia was a condition that afflicted “negro men” and that black forms of the 
illness included the schizophrenia of civil rights protests, “particularly those organized by 
Black Power, Black Panthers, Nation of Islam, or other activist groups” (Metzl, 2009, p. 
xiii). Rage became a diagnostic feature. The title of the book comes from a 1968 article 
from the Archives of General Psychiatry that describes schizophrenia as a “‘protest 
psychosis” that made black men develop “’hostile and aggressive feelings’ and 
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‘delusional anti-whiteness’ after listening to the words of Malcolm X, joining the Black 
Muslims, or aligning with groups that preached militant resistance to white society. 
According to the authors, the men required psychiatric treatment because their symptoms 
threatened not only their own sanity, but the social order of white America” (Metzl, 2009, 
p.xiv).  
Pharmaceutical companies advertised anti-psychotic medications for the control 
of this “primitive” and “aggressive” behaviour. 
 
 
(Metzl, 2009, p.xiv) 
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 (Metzl, 2009, p. 104)  
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The image on the left depicts fertility statues from Ghana. The advertisement states that 
the medication is “Especially useful in agitated, violent or anxious schizophrenic 
patients” (Metzl, 2009, p.105). 
Metzl explains that these racial divisions and tensions have become  
structured into clinical interactions long before doctors or patients enter 
examination rooms. To a remarkable extent, anxieties about racial difference 
shape diagnostic criteria, health-care policies, medical and popular attitudes 
about mentally ill persons, the structures of treatment facilities, and, 
ultimately, the conversations that take place there within (Metzl, 2009, p. xi). 
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This institutional racism functions above the levels of individual perceptions or 
intentions, in structures such as zoning, laws, economics, education and juridical systems 
(Metzl, 2009).  
 Althought Metzl criticizes the racism within psychiatry he denies that 
schizophrenia is a socially constituted disease (Metzl, 2009, p. xvi-xvii). Metzl (himself a 
psychiatrist) believes that institutional racism skews the diagnosis and treatment process 
thereby targeting people of colour. Metzl fails to recognize the violence within the 
diagnostic processes and treatments of biomedical psychiatry or their relation to the 
production of difference based on racial, eugenic thinking and colonial projects. Metzl’s 
work is an example of the dangers of highlighting institutionalized racism within mental 
health, legal and immigration systems without an analysis of the colonial technologies 
embedded within biomedical psychiatry or treatments. Without an analysis that reveals 
the assumptions within the technologies of biomedical psychiatry and treatment, we are 
left unable to perceive that the systems of diagnosis and treatment are completely 
imbricated with the production of difference and the violence upon which these 
technologies were forged.  
 Through Odum, Dowbiggin, Washington and Metzel, the  racist and eugenic 
practices and technologies used to rationalize slavery, immigration regulation, and 
psychiatric pathologization can be appreciated for their continuous deployment in 
contemporary circumstances at the confluence of mental health, criminal justice and 
immigration systems via the construction of the untreatable, the unrehabilitatable and the 
undeserving.  
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Professional Hierarchy & Hegemony/Human Hierarchy and Hegemony 
 
In the contemporary deportation appeals cases and within the archival cases we 
see a reliance on a particular set of professional authorities, bound to hegemonic positions 
within policy and law and whose forms of knowledge are valued as legitimate. This set of 
authorities, medical, legal and colonial (immigration) have historically worked 
interdependently for the advancement of colonial projects.  
Colonial Western psychiatry has been described as a vehicle used to advance 
colonial nation building and the very definition of “civil” society (Roman, Brown, Noble, 
Wainer, & Young, 2009). Canada’s early asylum and colonial administrators were often 
one and the same and communicated with other asylum and colonial administrators both 
at home and abroad in the United States, the United Kingdom, and other parts of Western 
Europe regularly in the effort to share information on how to run asylums efficiently as 
part of world-wide colonial projects (Roman, Brown, Noble, Wainer, & Young, 2009).  
“The Woodlands School, [formerly the Victoria Lunatic Asylum, the 
Provincial Asylum for the Insane in Victoria, BC 1859–72 and the Public 
Hospital for the Insane] closed through public protest in 1996, was one of 
British Columbia’s first segregated total residential institutions for people 
with developmental disabilities”(Roman, Brown, Noble, Wainer, & 
Young, 2009, p.19).  
 
Also, “the colonization and segregation of First Nations people in residential 
schools involved judges, doctors, and psychiatrists confining those deemed as medically 
or psychiatrically ‘unfit’ – whether First Nations or not– to asylums and hospitals” 
(Roman, Brown, Noble, Wainer, & Young, 2009, p.18). The author’s analysis of the 
Woodlands records, and history focuses “on the first colonial administrators and medical 
authorities who established Woodlands in its first iteration as an asylum after coming 
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from England” and exposes the “conjunct processes of colonialization, racial, gender, 
class, and ableist oppression as expressions of empire … part of which was the city of 
Victoria, British Columbia as part of the process of expansion.” (Roman, Brown, Noble, 
Wainer, & Young, 2009, p. 18-19). The authors note that “some of First Nations people 
in Alberta and British Columbia, as well as parts of the United States were psychiatrically 
deported to an asylum exclusively to warehouse Native Americans and First Nations at 
the Hiawatha ‘Indian’ (sic) Asylum in Canton, South Dakota” (Roman, Brown, Noble, 
Wainer, & Young, 2009, p. 22).  According to the authors, the processes of medical 
colonization involved multiple forms of colonial and medical rules articulating who was 
“medically unfit” and orchestrating their confinement on appropriated lands. The 
emergence of civil institutions such as the courts, legislation, police, prisons and asylums 
was in cooperation with modern Western psychiatry, medicine, hospitals, clinics, and 
schools. The historical development of these institutions had “rarely been analyzed as 
related” (Roman, Brown, Noble, Wainer, & Young, 2009, p. 19).  
The first Asylum in Canada was opened in St. John, New Brunswick, in 1836, in 
Nova Scotia 1859 (Dowbiggin, 1997, p, 14). In Quebec (at that time Lower Canada) the 
first asylum was opened in 1845 in Beauport. Prior to this those deemed mentally ill were 
institutionalized along with the “paupers, criminals, and alcoholics” (Dowbiggin, 1997, p, 
14). In the 1880s British psychiatrist Daniel Hack Tuke visited North American mental 
hospitals and called “what he witnessed at Beauport and Longue Point a “chamber of 
horrors” due to their deplorable conditions (Dowbiggin, 1997, p, 15). In Upper Canada, 
the Toronto Asylum was opened in 1850. The exposure of deplorable conditions 
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continued and marked the beginning of the end of psychiatrist run, state asylums, as they 
became more accountable to state politicians. “By 1881 the province of Ontario was 
responsible for the upkeep of 2652 mentally disturbed persons” (Dowbiggin, 1997, p.16). 
Psychiatrist saw the benefit of working bureaucratically with Provincial 
administrators to influence policies within the provincial mental health system. Charles 
Kirk Clarke (after which the former Clarke Institute of Psychiatry in Toronto is named) 
came from one of the “most respected political families” in Ontario and “was arguably 
the most famous psychiatrist Canada has ever produced” (Dowbiggin, 1997, p. 17).  
Clarke’s sisters both married psychiatrists- one of which was the son of Joseph 
Workman, superintendent of the Toronto Asylum. In 1874, Clarke got his first job under 
Workman, and in 1905 became superintendent. Clarke visited Emil Kreapelin’s clinic in 
Munich in 1907 and in 1908 he was appointed Dean of the Faculty of medicine and 
Professor of psychiatry at the University of Toronto. “In 1918 he became the first 
medical director of the Canadian National Committee for Mental Hygiene (CNCMH), the 
forerunner of the Canadian Mental Health Association and counterpart to the U.S. 
National Committee for Mental Hygiene (NCMH)” (Dowbiggin, 1997, p.19).  
Clarke influenced policies and laws that governed health care, education and 
immigration (Dowbiggin, 1997, p19).  C.K. Clarke “struggled mightily” to “ensure that 
mentally and physically handicapped immigrants could not enter the country and take 
undue advantage of Canada’s charitable institutions and organizations” (Dowbiggin, 
1997, p.133). As immigration increased from 1897-1918, “concern about immigration 
dovetailed with growing anxiety among native English-speaking Canadians about the 
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future of the British empire” and “Canadians’ fears about “race suicide” had escalated. 
“[T]he steady arrival of such immigrants over the years led to warnings about their low 
quality and triggered campaigns to assimilate newcomers by training them to be law-
abiding, productive, healthy, and self-reliant citizens.” (Dowbiggin, 1997, p137). 
Psychiatry “began alleging that foreign-born patients were disproportionately represented 
in public asylums and this was due principally to immigrants’ hereditary defectiveness” 
(Dowbiggin, 1997, p138). As Dowbiggin illustrates,  
except for one interlude later in his career, Clarke remained Canada’s most 
consistent medical proponent of immigration restriction until his death in 
early 1924. What initially compelled him to turn to hereditarianism and 
eugenics was a combination of his passionate identification with the 
professional fortunes of psychiatry and Canada’s late nineteenth-century 
cultural climate, which stressed race, empire, reproduction, child welfare, and 
public health reform (Dowbiggin, 1997, p.139). 
 
The terms of the 1869 immigration act contained provisions that barred the entry of 
insane, destitute and disabled immigrants. In the mid-1890s, Canadian immigration was 
still governed by this act. “From 1889 to 1902 the federal government followed a policy 
of sending back unwanted immigrants to their country of origin in what amounted to an 
informal system of deportation; yet virtually no medical inspections were performed on 
immigrants disembarking at Canadian ports or crossing the U.S,-Canadian border” 
(Dowbiggin, 1997, p.141). Clarke recommended “a far more rigid system of inspection 
than that in use at present” as well as a deportation policy for “the indigent classes of 
immigrants who show marked evidence of mental disease or defect, or criminal 
tendency” (Dowbiggin, 1997, p.142). 
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 Clarke unfortunately was not alone. Canadians called for stricter inspections of 
“aliens” and criticized officials for admitting too many uninspected aliens to settle 
Canada’s farmlands and work in Canada’s factories (Dowbiggin, 1997, p. 141). This is a 
prime example of how eugenic and racial thinking did not coincide with economic 
rationale as immigration was being advertised by Federal government from 1897-1913. 
Clarke viewed immigrant “defectives” and “degenerates” as a stark contrast to the “study 
agriculturalist of the British Isles” (Dowbiggin, 1997, p. 142). In 1903, the immigration 
branch of the Department of the interior “began medical inspections by hiring doctors on 
a fee for service basis to inspect immigrants and detain diseased newcomers either for 
deportation or further treatment and admission.” (Dowbiggin, 1997, p.145). In 1906, “the 
Canadian government had made deportations legal for the first time. Immigrants who 
within two years of their arrival in Canada ended up in a publicly funded charitable 
institution-such as an insane asylum-were eligible for deportation” Clarke wanted this to 
be extended. S.A. Armstrong (Ontario’s inspector of prisons and public charities) and 
Clarke “continually petitioned the Immigration branch to deport foreign-born patients in 
Ontario asylums” (Dowbiggin, 1997, p.150). Clarke, in 1907-08 was relentless in his 
pursuit of deportations for immigrants. He submitted ongoing complaints to the 
immigration branch and published numerous articles on immigration. In 1910, the law 
was amended from 2 years to 5 years with the help of Clarke’s advocacy. To this day, 
immigrants are ineligible for social assistance (including disability support program) 
income for the duration of their sponsorship which can be up to 10 years.  
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Clarence Hincks 1885-1964 (after which the Toronto Hincks-Dellcrest Institute was 
named) was a clinical assistant to Clarke. Hincks promoted the development and use of 
diagnostic testing, examinations and surveys to scan for hereditary weaknesses in the aim 
of achieving mental hygiene. As Dowbiggin confirms, “the data from their school 
surveys, completed in the postwar period, appear to confirm their allegations. All too 
often, they complained, they discovered a high percentage of immigrant children among 
the youngsters they diagnosed as delinquent, immoral, or subnormal” (Dowbiggin, 1997, 
171). 
In 1919, Clarke circulated an unpublished book entitled “The Amiable Morons” to 
“demonstrate the tie between immigration and criminality”. Clarke linked bolshevism to 
mental defectiveness and makes his intentions of influencing public policy known. Also 
in 1919, Canadian Parliament passed amendments to the Criminal Code and the 
Immigration Act to refuse to admit or deport newcomers for political reasons, 
newcomers who could be shown to have an interest in overthrowing 
government, destroying property, or promoting riots or other public 
disorders. As well a literacy test for immigrants over the age of fifteen was 
approved, and the list of “undesirables” was lengthened to include conditions 
such as “constitutional psychopathic inferiority,” a favorite label for the 
feebleminded (Dowbiggin, 1997, p.174). 
 
The story of C.K. Clarke and the influence of eugenic and racial thinking in Canada 
demonstrates the power of psychiatry to influence criminal law, immigration law, and 
social policy. Evident in C.K. Clarke’s work is the dehumanizing discourse based on 
racial and eugenic thinking that is now institutionalized in currently existing systems and 
policies. Policies, laws and practices based on this thinking cannot produce outcomes that 
are beneficial to newcomers or anyone’s wellbeing as they are based on the assumption 
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that newcomers and those labeled with any disability or mental illness are a threat to the 
“Canadian” and the “sturdy industrialist of the British Isles”, as they might “take undue 
advantage of Canada’s charitable institutions and organizations” and contaminate the race 
of “Canadians”. The rationale for these policies that continue to exist include the belief 
that newcomers carry some sort of “defectiveness” that is both a burden to society and a 
threat to the purity of the “Canadian” race.  
The Centre for Addiction and Mental Health in Toronto’s College Street location 
has recently undergone renovations. This was formerly the site of the Clarke Institute of 
Psychiatry. In the opening foyer sits this plaque “in honour of Dr. C.K. Clarke”: 
 
(Photo taken June 13, 2011) 
An ever present reminder of Clarke’s contribution to psychiatry and a “not welcome” mat 
for newcomers and those deemed mentally ill. 
 The examples of the Woodlands school, C.K. Clarke and Clarence Hincks 
demonstrate the rise of psychiatric professional authority that is historically bound to the 
regulation of those historically deemed/constructed as undesirables. The confluence of 
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mental health, immigration and criminal justice systems gained momentum via the 
practices of judges, doctors and colonial administrators through the courts, asylums, 
police, and legislation to advance colonial nation building. These systems are both a 
product of and reliant on the violent practices and technologies of racial and eugenic 
differentiation. In the contemporary deportation appeals cases, these practices, 
technologies, and authorities are accepted as such without interrogation and thereby 
reproduce colonial relations of racialized and eugenic violence. The current laws, the 
professions that hold hegemonic positions of authority within them, and the practices that 
result from them that limit the rights of people identified as biologically different, 
inherently bad/savage/uncivilized, or as foreign aliens, are through their delineations and 
demarcations discriminatory, racist, and eugenic. The Canadian mental health system, 
immigration system and criminal justice system must acknowledge its ancestry and 
complicity in order for any transformative change to occur.  
Remaking North-South divisions-the reinforcement of nationalism 
 The analysis of the contemporary deportation appeals cases as well as the archival 
cases revealed the historical and contemporary practice of reinforcing national boundaries 
through criminal justice, immigration and mental health systems. In the selective and 
partial weighting of the Ribic factors, the idea of the “Canadian public” was often 
referenced as the most valuable of all factors. In the historical cases, this was also an idea 
that permeated decisions. Notions of what was historically considered desirable required 
undesirability to be defined (exemplified in the list of “prohibited classes”. In the 
contemporary cases, notions of who belonged to the Canadian public required a 
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conceptualization of who does not belong to this group. Throughout the decision making 
process, the period of time a person had been in Canada did not appear to have an 
influence on their inclusion into this conceptualization of the Canadian Public. The 
existence of family members or supports, having a sponsor or being a convention refugee 
in Canada also did not have substantial effect on a person’s inclusion into the Canadian 
public.  
Through the designation of people as not a part of the Canadian public and the 
defining of criminality, psychopathology or foreignness as individual, anomalous 
attributes, violence is attached to the constructed identities of the criminal, the mentally 
ill, or the uncivilized alien who does not belong. Through this mechanism the fantasy of 
the civilized, objective, protecting, genetically and racially pure Canadian public is 
perpetuated. Responsibility or care for these individualities is then reserved to some other 
public.  The violence of the totalization of a person as dehumanized, or the violence of 
surveillance, forced treatment, confinement, or deportation, via Orientalism, dividing 
practices, erasure etc. is legitimated as necessary in order to uphold these boundaries. 
 The peculiarity of this trend was the kind of national boundaries being forged and 
protected. As our descriptive statistical representation depicted, the overwhelming 
majority of countries that people were being deported to were in South Asia, East Asia, 
Africa, South East Asia, West Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean.  
According to Immanuel Wallerstein, “(c)ore-periphery refers to spatial 
concentrations of economic activities to be found within the capitalist world economy” 
(Wallerstein, 1991, p.143). This core-periphery structure can refer to zones such as 
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North-South which is in structural space and long-term. In the world-systems model the 
core-periphery structure is that of the capitalist/colonialist/imperialist world economy, 
reinforced within discourses of North-South. Over time, spatial locations in geopolitical 
space can change their ideological space and maintain the overall core-periphery 
structure of the capitalist world economy. The example Wallerstein provides is that of 
Japan, “(y)esterday, Japan was a locus of cheap labor. Today it is a so-called core state. 
Tomorrow, it may be the hegemonic world power” (Wallerstein, 1991, p.143). In this 
way a member of the “periphery” can become a member of the “core” without disrupting 
the structure of the capitalist/colonialist/imperialist world economy. Wallerstein also 
notes that there are other possible concepts beyond “core” and “periphery” such as 
“semiperiphery”, and “external arena” (a spatial concept linked to the process of 
incorporation) (Wallerstein, 1991). 
 The global proliferation of Western models of immigration regulation, criminal 
justice, psychotropic medications, treatments and perspectives on mental illness has 
penetrated the globe. They carry with them, the legacy of eugenic and racial thinking and 
perpetuate colonial forms of violence. Colonial technologies  are of course dependent on 
the global and individual divisions based on eugenic and racial thinking for the regulating 
and civilizing project that produces the respectable, moral, able, bourgeois/civilized 
subject. The contemporary decisions at the confluence of mental health, criminal justice 
and immigration systems participate in the perpetuation of global North-South divisions. 
These divisions have historically reflected the racial lines upon which slavery, and 
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indentureship were established, and how contemporary forms of international 
exploitation occur.  
 From our analysis thus far, within mental health, criminal justice, and 
immigration systems and practices, we can now see how the technologies of Orientalism, 
dividing practices, erasure, appropriation, dehumanization, the formation and hegemony 
of professions and disciplines, and the remaking of North-South divisions act to regulate 
subjects. 
Moral and ethical arguments to justify atrocities 
The moral and ethical arguments advanced to legitimate the practice of 
deportation for people identified with mental health issues and by the criminal justice 
system are clearly problematic. The positions of authority, knowledge bases relied upon 
for legitimacy and the practices of professionals in the construction of dehumanized 
identities are all imbricated with historical and contemporary forms of racial and eugenic 
colonial violence as they proclaim to protect people or act fairly in their decision making 
processes.  
The importance of understanding the permeability and responsiveness of our 
knowledge bases, laws, professions, and practices to social and historical influences 
(including prejudice and discrimination) is often underappreciated. The attention to the 
idea of confluence sanctions the ability to question the capacity of our contemporary laws 
to represent the knowledge and lessons that have been accumulated throughout human 
history. It is often accepted that our laws reference the most recent and therefore the most 
valid decisions. It is also assumed that by virtue of our aggregate allegiance to positivism 
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and scientific supremacy that these decisions will include the most up-to-date knowledge 
and research as contributed by expert witnesses, professionals, and knowledge brokers.  
This is all very inaccurate. The appearance of progressive decision making relying on 
valid, reliable and rational forms of knowledge is merely a fantasy. The contemporary 
outcomes of the moral and ethical arguments wielded in the deportation appeal decisions 
at the confluence of criminal justice mental health and immigration systems are marked 
with violence and collectively amount to atrocities. 
 The use of moral and ethical arguments to justify atrocities is also not only a 
problem of our contemporary world. Thomas Malthus wrote his highly influential piece 
entitled, An Essay of the Principle of Population in 1798.  In his famous work based on 
statistics and mathematics, he argued that population growth will eventually be regulated 
by the supply of food. Presented as unbiased and with rigorous objectivity, Mathus’ 
argued against the poor laws, or any public provision of relief for the poor (Malthus, 
1798, p.39-45). Malthus’s arguments were intended for the future improvements of 
society. By taking the people out of his work, he allowed for an erasure of the hunger and 
death that would afflict the poorest in society based on his recommendations. The 
scarcity of supply of food (resources) became the rationale for his authorization of 
violence. In doing so, Malthus erased the tendencies toward monopoly in capitalism (as 
well as the corresponding concentration of wealth and resources into the hands of a few).  
Malthus had other opinions as well. Malthus articulated his racial and eugenic beliefs by 
asserting that by “an attention to breed, a certain degree of improvement, similar to that 
among animals, might take place among men” (Malthus, 1798, p.72).  Malthus was not 
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without a human, social and political context himself. His position beginning in 1805 was 
as Professor of History and Political Economy at the East India Company College, the 
school that trained officers to work in India for the East India Company whose armies 
enforced the ongoing colonial exploitation of India. Malthusian rationale is relied upon 
readily today to argue for the dissolution of public supports and services supplying that 
private charity would tend to those in need (or rather that poverty, hunger and disease 
would account for those left at the margins of capitalism, colonialism and imperialism).  
Emmanual Levinas (a holocaust survivor and ethical philosopher) studied under 
Martin Heidegger at the University of Freiburg in 1928. Levinas critiques Heidegger’s 
rationalization and justification for Nazism revealing how “’ethical’ categories can too 
easily be invoked as a moral justification for atrocities” (Murray, 2003, p.27). 
Henry Friedlander has described how moral and ethical arguments were used in 
Nazi Germany to rationalize eugenic and racial violence. Through the development of the 
science and technology of eugenic and racial control (researched and advocated well in 
advance of World War 1 and centered in America and Britain), the Germans 
implemented government policy and the operationalization of its desired outcomes via 
sterilization, euthanasia, and eventually mass extermination. The arguments held that the 
human race would be better through exclusion (the policy was actually named  Aufartung 
durch Ausmerzung –translated as “improvement through exclusion”) and that compassion 
was the motivation for the “destruction of life unworthy of life” (Friedlander, 2001, 
p.150).   
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After World War 1 the children of soldiers from North Africa and German 
mothers were rejected by Germany because they were coloured. They were referred to as 
the Rhineland bastards and were sterilized against their will. During the development of 
the scientific knowledge of division, the Germans paralleled the work of the United 
States dividing population into hierarchies, “they hoped to safeguard the nation’s ‘genetic 
heritage’ (Erbgut) and viewed degeneration (Entartung) as a threat” (Friedlander, 2001, 
p. 146). The sterilization laws directed their aim at those identified as disabled, carrying 
hereditary diseases or perceived hereditary diseases such as schizophrenia. The courts 
adjudicated the cases, physicians weighed in as expert knowledge brokers, and names 
were forwarded through identification processes and practices of public health services, 
hospitals, clinics, teacher, and social workers of the welfare system (Friedlander, 2001, 
p.148). The killing of the disabled began with infants and children using overdoses of 
medications (sedatives, barbiturates, sleeping pills) and starvation (Friedlander, 2001). 
When the killing expanded to include disabled adults, they required a more efficient 
process. The gas chambers were designed for this reason and later used for the mass 
extermination of Jews and others identified as threats of enemies. 
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Chapter 6 
Method: A post-colonial document analysis of confluence 
 
In this chapter, I describe the methods used in this study and argue for the 
necessity of a post-colonial analysis of confluence. I also outline this study’s focus on 
historical continuities by attending to the temporal (that which is dynamic and changing 
and that which is continuous yet carried through time). I outline what is drawn on 
(partially) from Foucaudian genealogical analysis and how this method departs from this. 
I also illustrate how the method used in this study attend to material continuities (how 
projects of nation building relied/rely on eugenic and racial knowledge formations and 
disciplinary processes and laws) through an attention to processes that discursively frame 
people to construct, legitimize and authorize violence. By acknowledging that all our 
interpretive and discursive structures are subject to historical influence, it is also pertinent 
that we also disclose the horizon of these interpretations. As Hans-Georg Gadamer made 
very clear in his magnum opus, Truth and Method, every person has a historically 
effected consciousness, making claims to objective knowledge impossible. Through our 
concurrence with this position, we can appreciate that all vantage points are partial, 
contingent, and subject to representation and interpretation. The horizon of interpretation 
in this study is committedly focused with an attention to the levels of analyses and 
contribution provided post-colonial theory. 
The method of a post-colonial analysis of confluence is described in application to 
the contemporary decision documents of the appeals division of the Immigration and 
Refugee Board of Canada, both contemporary and archival policies and laws, as well as 
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archival correspondence relating to mental health, criminal justice and immigration 
practices that support deportation for those identified with mental health issues, non-
Canadian citizens and involved with the criminal justice systems.  
Attending to the temporal: Genealogy, questioning “progress”, discursive framing, and 
material continuities 
 
Foucauldian genealogy provides some unique methodological insights that 
support an analysis of confluence. Genealogy has been defined as “the union of erudite 
knowledge and local memories which allow us to establish a historical knowledge of 
struggles and to make use of knowledge tactically today” (Foucault, 1980). Genealogy 
reveals power and knowledge networks through analysis of discourse (Carabine, 2001). 
Some things come to be known as truths and others do not; there are many particular 
forces and power relations that produce what these truths are. Genealogy reveals the 
history of how things become truths, problems, valued or dismissed. Foucault developed 
his conception of genealogy in Discipline and Punish and in The History of Sexuality by 
studying various cultural institutions and their historical development to posit them as 
locations of social control (Prado, 1995).  Foucault’s concept of genealogy expanded on 
Nietzche’s idea that history is misconceived as an attempt to capture the exact essence of 
things and that history is flawed if it is conducted as a search for objective truths (Prado, 
1995). The genealogical concept holds that there are no essences to be discerned behind 
historical developments and none that explain why things are as they are. History is not a 
story with a beginning, middle, and an end. Rather, history is less contiguous; its essences 
and origins presented are fabricated for varying purposes and only indicate disparity. As 
one author describes, “Genealogy does not claim to mine a contiguous vein in which 
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determinants of later events can be found if only our research is good enough... [it] finds 
the antithesis of essence...accidents and coincidences united by interpretation” (Prado, 
1995).  
Foucault also draws upon Nietzche’s use of the concept of descent (Herkunft) or 
lineage to capture likenesses and differences in any continuous portrayal of history so as 
to reveal the discontinuous nature of beginnings (Prado, 1995). In contrast to readings of 
historical data that search for grand designs, genealogy attempts to identify the accident, 
minute deviations, the reversals, the errors that give birth to the things that have value for 
us (Prado, 1995). Genealogy examines particular historical moments (often ones that 
contradict contemporary representations of history) through “non-linear, layered, critical 
historical enquiry and reflection (Rabinow, 1984)—to create a history of the present” 
(Schmid, 2010, p. 2104). The goal is to present how truth is maintained in the present 
while problematizing it in relation to the past through an analysis of the operations of 
discourse to reveal the relations of power (Schmid, 2010). 
Thus informed and cautioned by Foucauldian genealogy, the historical 
consideration in this study explores for contingencies (rather than causes or origins) as 
genealogy does, while it also follows the strands of common projects. The common 
projects of colonization and imperialism and the use of identification, segregation, 
dehumanization, confinement, and deportation based on perceived differences are 
necessary points for attention in this study via my horizon of interpretation: postcolonial 
theory.  This historical consideration of confluence also departs from a Foucauldian 
genealogy in that it does not look to outline a history of the present (as the accident of 
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history) by attending to discontinuities and differences per se but rather to engage with 
the forces of colonization and imperialism at work for their contributions to power-
knowledge, to bodies, to practices, policies and laws as they cohere and diverge in ways 
that are very meaningful and truthful to those they act from and upon. The multifocal 
methodological process in this study looks at both the functions of discourse including 
the productions of truth and meaning and the material and symbolic effects of truth and 
meaning. As I pointed to above, via Foucault, it is interpretation that unites the “accidents 
and coincidences” of history in the present. Simply put, this study will attend to 
continuing pieces of history through an attention to purposes and projects that supported 
colonization by drawing on theoretical and methodological contributions that permit an 
analysis of confluence through the work of discourse and its material effects on people.   
Specifically, I will draw on techniques that other researchers and scholars have 
developed to analyze the work of discourse and its effects. In Social Work, Carolyn 
Taylor has demonstrated how the reflective study of writing practices such as reports and 
case notes can reveal the embedded persuasive technologies and claims to truth that result 
in the categorization of both professionals and services users (Taylor, 2008; Taylor & 
White, 2000).  
Debjani Ganguly has employed a deeply historical postcolonial analysis of caste 
to map and critique how technologies of colonization (i.e., the cataloguing of 
essentialized categories of caste through the British gaze) including social scientific 
“representations of caste have rendered normative a vision of modernity and a template 
of modernization that cannot but display caste in a retrogressive light” (Ganguly, 2005, 
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p.xi). Ganguly’s purpose is to see caste as a continuation of a “life-form” that over a 
hundred and fifty years of colonial rule and the forces of global capitalism have failed to 
eradicate while refusing to articulate an idea of caste as a form of cultural autonomy to 
hold onto. Ganguly’s method allows for us to consider “what kinds of modernities are we 
living with” (Ganguly, 2005, p. 3).  It allows for us to consider the hegemonic 
knowledge-formations that frame our outlook on the world and constantly remind people 
that caste is too outdated for modernity; to speak of caste is to move in the opposite 
direction of “progress” (Ganguly, 2005). These technologies of colonization frame the 
way we view ourselves through the lens of Western social scientific knowledge while 
confining Others to the past and denying heterogeneity, and indigenous knowledge. 
Matthew Dorrell’s analysis of the Canadian Government’s apologies for the 
residential school system provides another example of how acts of narrative (in his case 
apology) are defined and used in the present context to imply progress and change. This 
use of narrative and its interpretations “confines the abuses of the residential schools to 
the past while removing contextual information needed to understand the schools system 
as a critical component of a larger and continuing colonial project” (Dorrell, 2009, p.29-
30). 
Also, Sunera Thobani has demonstrated through an examination of white/Western 
feminists' responses to the post-9/11 state of affairs, that through discursive framing, 
Western feminists have theorized the War on Terror in relation to gender in ways that 
continue to position the West as the civilized and the Islamic Other in need of civilizing- 
a colonial relationship. Regardless of the differences in political responses to the War on 
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Terror, the foundational assumptions of many Western feminists “have constituted their 
subject positions as endangered by Islamic terror, violence, and misogyny. In the process, 
they have helped revitalize “Western” feminism through a focus on the global that 
constitutes the West’s gendered subject as the mark of the “universal”, and the world of 
the Muslim gendered subject as that of death, violence, and misogyny” (Thobani, 2010, 
p.129). 
Debjani Ganguly, Matthew Dorrell and Sunera Thobani contribute to our project 
the methodological tools to question the “modernities we are living with”, how the 
implication of progress and change is achieved through Government narratives, and how 
discursive framing can be interrogated for its practical usage in the constructing of 
identities worthy of the violence of deportation. 
Horizon of interpretation: Post-colonial Analysis 
The post-colonial theoretical necessity in my work is one that is deeply concerned 
with the operations and effects of power. Its unique contribution is that post-colonial 
theorists have been able to highlight the operations of colonial power and domination 
(through discourse analysis and deconstruction pace Said and Spivak respectively) that, 
as Midgley describes, “expose the imperialist attitudes inherent in the contemporary 
European cultural repertoire” while accommodating the need to present a critique of the 
narratives of oppression (i.e., Fanon, Césaire ) (Césaire & Pinkham, 2007; Fanon, 1965; 
Midgley, 1998. p.33; Said, 1978; Spivak, 1988). 
To study a confluence through these complementary theoretical lenses, including 
post-colonial theory, presents the possibility of acknowledging (for example) when and 
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where enlightenment-based assumptions are relied upon in order to deconstruct or 
interrogate these very assumptions (i.e., relying on ideas of objectivity, progressivity, 
universalism and the technologies of colonization within one’s interpretations or 
analysis). I credit the contributions of post-colonial theory for highlighting for me the 
importance of this necessary task (Spivak, 1988; Ganguly, 2012; Muldoon, 2001). In 
order to study a confluence while attending to relations of power through discourse 
analysis and the advancement and effects of enlightenment-based and colonial 
interpretations, one must be able to analyze across knowledge regimes to engage with all 
of the levels of what is transpiring.  
Post-colonial theory repudiates the objectivity, progressivity and universalism of 
modern science as post-modernism and post-structuralism do. It uniquely contributes that 
there is an irreconcilable and incommensurable difference in rationalities between 
modern Western science and Western based philosophy on the one hand, or the 
rationalities of ‘other’ groups occupying different cultural spaces (i.e., class, gender, 
ability, race, etc.) in the same culture (Gandhi, 1998; Loomba, 1998; Nanda, 2001; 
Young, 2001). It rejects the fundamental enlightenment and ancient Western 
philosophical impulse to interrogate inherited religion, cosmologies, norms, and tradition-
sanctified knowledge, with the tools of modern science (Nanda, 2001). “If it is power that 
constructs knowledge, then a challenge to Western power demands that we challenge 
Western knowledge. Thus post-colonial theorists insist upon, in the name of genuine 
openness and radical democracy, the right of the pre-scientific traditions to question 
scientifically established knowledge” (Nanda, 2001). Post-colonial theory contributes to 
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this project by examining how colonialism becomes reconfigured after so-called 
decolonization and is committed to how colonial relations are maintained (discursive or 
material) as relations of antagonism and resistance (Ahmed, 1996; Gandhi, 1998; 
Loomba, 1998; Nanda, 2001; Young, 2001). 
Pace Gyan Prakash and Partha Chatterjee, this postcolonial analysis 
acknowledges the epistemic violence within the enlightenment based colonial project of 
“using science as a paradigm of rational knowledge and bringing other knowledges under 
its purview” (Chatterjee, 1986, p. 11, cited in Nanda, 2001). Via Said and other post-
colonial theorists, I am reading for colonial processes that “Orientalize” the Other 
through a wide range of practices that involve forming national ideas of community12 
while un-forming or re-forming existing communities in lands new to the colonizers.  
According to Said, individuals in the Orient were subordinated into a general type 
through Orientalist discourse and positioned through consistent binaries that set Europe 
apart from “the Orient” geographically, racially, and religiously (Said, 1978). This 
Orientalist discursive regime also produced an ontological and epistemological difference 
between the European “us” and the Oriental “them” (Said, 1978).  The “Orient” becomes 
static and unchanging, and authors on the subject draw clear distinctions between 
12 “In a seminal book, Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson (1991) states: 
‘Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in 
which they are imagined’ (p.6.). The creation of communities with meaning for the 
people who are involved may have little to do with geographical contiguity of residence 
or even actual person-to-person contact. Yet, once someone identifies as belonging to a 
community – for example, a nation – there is an almost irrational attachment ‘for the 
inventions of their imagination’ (p.41). So it is important to be careful in designating the 
term ‘community’ in any given instance.” (Fernando, 2010, p.20). 
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themselves (White, male, European etc.) and the Oriental (Said, 1978). The Orientalist 
also produces an overarching sense of contempt for the Other, and becomes the expert 
who knows the Oriental better that the Oriental can know her/him self (Said, 1978). 
Orientalism structures and guides academic fields and allows for a tendency to define the 
Other in broad sweeping terms (either Orient or Occident), eliminating the need to for 
heterogeneity within groups (Said, 1978).  
The colonial practices of “trade, plunder, negotiation, warfare, genocide, 
enslavement and rebellions…were shaped by a variety of writing: public and private 
records, letter, trade documents, government papers, fiction and scientific literature. 
These practices and writings are what contemporary studies of colonialism and 
postcolonialism try to make sense of” (Loomba, 2005, p.8).    
This postcolonial multifocal analysis of the processes of colonization while 
attending to their larger project and its outcomes is crucial to my approach. In this study, 
I will engage in an analysis of deportation cases via the discursive frames deployed at the 
confluence of mental health, criminal justice and immigration systems. The horizon of 
interpretation of such frames is informed by post-colonial theory. Hans-Georg Gadamer 
insists that people always have a "historically effected consciousness" 
(wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein) (Gadamer, 1997). We are the result of our histories 
and always have biases and prejudices. Gadamer acknowledges that objective knowledge 
about an Other cannot exist through a denial of the self, a forgetting or setting aside of the 
self (Gadamer, 1997). Also, there exists no absolute knowledge or universal history that 
can be represented through a single horizon as there is always a representation and 
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interpretation. Therefore, understanding must involve the fusion of one’s horizon with an 
Other’s while acknowledging that horizons are neither closed nor unique (Gadamer, 
1997). This dialectical process during interpretation involves an acknowledgment of the 
self and the Other in dialogue, effected by history, and always relevant to a vantage point 
or horizon. 
Gadamer defines Horizon as: 
 Every finite present has its limitations. We define the concept of 
“situation” by saying that it represents a standpoint that limits the 
possibility of vision. Hence essential part of the concept of situation is the 
concept of “horizon.” The horizon is the range of vision that includes 
everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point... A person 
who has no horizon is a man who does not see far enough and hence 
overvalues what is nearest to him. On the other hand, "to have an horizon" 
means not being limited to what is nearby, but to being able to see beyond 
it...[W]orking out of the hermeneutical situation means the 
achievement of the right horizon of inquiry for the questions evoked 
by the encounter with tradition (emphasis added). 
 
(Gadamer, 1997, p.302) 
A Postcolonial Document Analysis of Confluence 
As mentioned above, my research process has started by examining the decision 
documents from the Immigration and Refugee Board’s Appeal division to answer my 
research question- How does an understanding of confluence at the site of criminal 
justice, immigration and mental health systems illuminate the construction, authorization 
and legitimization of mechanisms of state violence through the example of deportation? 
In order to explore the multiple levels of violence at the confluence of mental health, 
criminal justice and immigration systems, and violence must be examined for its 
symbolic, subjective and objective forms.  
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This research will examine subjective violence by examining deportation as a 
mechanism of state violence (including the use of brutal physical violence, i.e 
containment, incarceration and removal). It will highlight the symbolic violence within 
discourses of professions and disciplines (including the colonial forms of violence that 
occur when writing about other people, including classification). It will also focus on the 
systemic violence resulting from policies, laws, and practices embedded in institutions 
(including the colonial forms of control and containment of violence inflicted upon 
others). 
 I reviewed each document closely for discourse (including professional talk and 
references texts, policies and laws) and Discourse (ways of thinking about race, mental 
health, and criminality and how these affect particular historical and moral positions) to 
examine for how identities and rationales for deportation are constructed (examining the 
deployment of biomedical discourse, perceived genetic variation, nationalism as 
subjective violence), how violence (qua Žižek) is authorized (examining the preference 
of hegemonic knowledge regimes, eugenic rationale as symbolic violence) and how 
violence is legitimated (examining the effects of polices and the law as systemic 
violence) (Žižek, 2008; Taylor & White, 2000). 
Specifically I am reading the documents to pull out this information and to answer these 
questions during the first readings of cases individually: 
 
1. How is “mental illness or mental health” represented for this person? What 
interpretations, Discourses and discourses are at work? 
2. How is “criminality” represented for this person? What interpretations, 
Discourses and discourses are at work? 
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3. How is national identity, ethnic origin, or belonging established? What 
interpretations, Discourses and discourses are at work? 
4. Upon what historical premise or precedents do these invocations or Discourses 
operate, and for what purposes?  
5. How are identities being discursively framed for or positioned? 
 
For question 4, I have also reviewed historical materials through archival research 
at the Archives of Ontario, examining past Immigration and Refugee Protection Acts 
(and its pre-existing form i.e. the Immigration Act), the Criminal Code of Canada (and its 
pre-existing forms specific to the sections on “mental illness”), and the Mental Health 
Act (and its pre-existing form including the Mental Hospitals Act).  
I also reviewed relevant correspondence for changes to these acts. Through this 
work, I have been drawn to the common use of criminal justice and mental health 
systems for “immigrants” and found that mental hospitals have historically been used and 
officially designated as immigration stations. Prisons have historically been used for the 
containment of immigrants and those identified as mentally different. Also, the 
deportation of “undesirables” was orchestrated by the Department of Immigration and 
Colonization to keep track of people by racial origin, and by using incarceration, 
deportation, and representations of people as limited in terms of their perceived “genetic” 
make-up. These decisions were also appealed historically and I have found cases that 
represent historical appeals for people identified as “undesirable”, “mentally ill”, or 
burdensome due to their “criminality”, thereby unworthy of citizenship or support from 
Canada. This component of my methodology is not in search of origins but rather looks 
to the continuation of colonial practices, their purpose and outcomes by examining the 
discursive framing of criminality, of Otherness, and of mental illness. These historical 
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documents, ideas, discourses and interpretations demonstrate key components of the 
confluence while contributing to the overall accretion of laws, policies, practices and 
disciplines as they delineate their object. The process involved requesting and reviewing 
line-by-line, dozens of boxes of policy, laws and correspondence documents relevant to 
the confluence of mental health, immigration, colonization and criminal justice practices 
in Canada from 190613 to the present. 
The questions outlined above for the first reading are designed to expose what I 
will suggest are the dominance of biomedical discourses (“the untreatable”), discourses 
of inherent criminality (“the unrehabilitatable”), and the discourses of the non-ideal 
citizen who does not belong within the construction of national identities (“the alien/ the 
undeserving”). As I will demonstrate, these ideas are advanced through the workings of 
interpretations that rely on an acceptance of racial and eugenic ideas and the processes of 
identification and dehumanization necessary for colonization. 
Crucial to this analysis is asking the question of how what is present (in the text 
and discourse) also produces what is not there i.e., How do biomedical discourses, and 
discourses of criminality (as inherent or permanent) (re)produce a sole focus on 
individuals, a direction for blame (i.e. “non-compliance with medication”), while 
advancing notions of an ideal citizen (through establishing what an ideal citizen is not) 
and maintaining the constitution of the savage, mad, primitive Other? What conclusion is 
13 The 1906 revision of the immigration act expanded the scope of its exclusionary measures to the “feeble-minded, 
idiot, epileptic, or who is insane or has had an attack of insanity within five years; deaf and dumb, or dumb, blind or 
infirm” (Chadha, 2008). It was also the earliest period whereby Psychiatrists collaborated with immigration and 
government officials to include provisions in law to systematically deport people in insane asylums in Canada. 
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this document being written for us to draw? How are truth claims being made and how 
are actors laying claim to truth as self-evident through their case-construction? How are 
expertise and authority assumed in the text? 
Specifically I am reading the documents to pull out this information and to answer these 
questions during the subsequent readings of cases individually and together:  
I chose to analyze contemporary cases and decisions from the only known public 
records on deportation in Canada including the reflex database of the Immigration and 
Refugee Board14 and the cases that go onto the Federal Court of Canada (Chan, 2005). 
The complete decision documents from the Immigration and Refugee Board are 
accessible through the Canadian Legal Information Institute (CANLII) database from 
1996-2012. Complete decision documents from the Federal Courts are accessible from 
the Federal Court decision database from 1990-2012. The reports for these decisions of 
the Federal Court are also accessible through the Office of the Commissioner for Federal 
Judicial Affairs Canada, Federal Court reports database. 
Purposive Sampling:  
 
I specifically chose to analyze decisions from the Immigration and Refugee 
Board’s Appeals Division.  These cases represent acts of resistance to systems of 
identification, incarceration and removal in Canada. These cases also arrive at the 
confluence of the mental health, criminal justice and immigration systems in Canada. 
14 As of July 2013, the Reflex database on the Citizenship and Immigration Canada website is no longer publishing 
decision documents stating, “The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB) is currently reviewing the manner 
in which its tribunal decisions are made available to the public.”  
Retrieved December 11, 2013 from http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/Eng/NewsNouv/NewNou/Pages/reflex.aspx 
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Search Criteria: 
 
In the CANLII database I used the search criteria: "mental health" or "mental 
illness" and "removal order" or "deportation". I selected the most recent complete 10 
years for my analysis at the time of commencement of my study. The dates included: 
January 1, 2001- December 31, 2011. This search generated 93 results. I combined 
documents that referred to the same person and eliminated a few documents that did not 
correspond to the topic of my research (i.e. where the words “mental” and “illness” are 
mentioned but not relevant to the case or the person to be deported). This left me with 75 
results. 
My approach to this study acknowledges that research and methods are 
themselves political acts (Gitlin, 1994). My approach also acknowledges the potential for 
resistance to relations of domination and subordination within research from the margins, 
i.e, “research by, for, and with them/us. It is research that takes seriously and seeks to 
trouble the connections between how knowledge is created, what knowledge is produced, 
and who is entitled to engage in these processes. It seeks to reclaim and incorporate the 
personal and political contexts of knowledge construction” (Brown & Strega, 2005, p.7). 
I have chosen to use cases from the Appeals Division of the Immigration and 
Refugee Board.  I believe these cases provide me with ample material to begin to study 
the confluence of systems of immigration, criminal justice and mental health while 
acknowledging and respecting the resiliency, resistance, and agency of those who find 
themselves at the convergence of this confluence. The dates I have selected are from 
January 1, 2001-December 31, 2011, allowing me to gather a generous cross section of 
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cases over a decade, while limiting the unit of analysis to an amount that permits for the 
depth and breadth of analysis necessary for this work.  I have queried the appeals 
database for "mental health" or "mental illness" and "removal order" or "deportation", 
resulting in matches corresponding to 75 people.  This period also allows for an analysis 
of the most complete years of the “contemporary effects” of what I will argue in this 
thesis are discourses that have historically advanced racial, eugenic, and colonial ideas to 
constitute subjectivities and identities of difference and human limitation to justify and 
authorize violence (including the deportation of people and their confinement and 
totalization to the “unstatusworthy, unrehabilitatable, or untreatable” castes.  
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Chapter 7 
 
Historical case data-archival artifacts: 
 
Regulating Undesirables 
 
When considering the contemporary construction, authorization and 
legitimization of deportation for people identified with mental health issues, we must 
attend to the historical, political and social contexts that have shaped the policies and 
practices that govern our current realities. The notions that criminal matters are separate 
from mental health matters and also separate from immigration matters, ignores the 
common projects of colonization and nation building that depended upon the subjugation 
and elimination of those considered undesirable.     
In order to appreciate the historical contributions to the fabrication of hierarchies 
of biology, race, nationalism and the importance of portraying an image of moral 
authority in the justification of violence, it is important to examine the workings of this 
confluence at earlier stages of its project. Through a historical examination/reflection of 
similar outcomes (the construction of subordinate identities, the selective provision of 
authority and the unjust practices of legitimization) at the confluence of immigration, 
criminal justice and mental health systems, exposed are the projects of nation building 
and colonial violence upon which these technologies and practices gained momentum 
and became convention. 
 In the following chapter, I overview the relevant historical legal and political 
context for tracing the colonial project at the confluence of immigration, criminal justice 
and mental health systems and then through three exemplary cases provide a 
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demonstration of the achievements of the outcomes of colonial nation building through 
the practices and technologies that are relied upon in contemporary deportation decisions, 
dependent on racial and eugenic rationale. Also exposed is the practice of delineating an 
idea of a Canadian identity, one forged upon a devaluation of those whose characteristics 
are encapsulated as inferior, costly, threatening, or undeserving.  
These three cases focus on the practices of professionals and authorities in the 
control of undesirables.  In the case of the Historical use gaols of the criminal justice 
system for detention of undesirables by the Department of Immigration and Colonization 
(circa 191915), the interdependence of the criminal justice and immigration systems to 
control undesirables (including those identified with mental illness) is revealed as well as 
their dependence on the application of a eugenic rationale, the utilization of racial 
hierarchy, the abuse of discretionary powers to commit violence and the projection of an 
image of authority and legitimization through the selective referencing of authoritative 
texts.  
In the case of the Deportation of Hobos, tramps, undesirable aliens (circa, 
1915)16, we see the practice of the criminal justice system working outside of the 
provisions of the law with the immigration department “for the protection of the 
15 W.W. Dunlap, Inspector of Prisons, Toronto: Query re: authority of Department of 
Immigration to use gaols for detention of undesirable immigrants. Also concerns the 
specific case of Elsie Saborowiski, who associated with known revolutionaries, 1919, RG 
4-32, Archives of Ontario. 
 
16 W.D. Scott, Department of Immigration, Ottawa: Request for information on the 
deportation of Hobos from Ontario, 1915, RG 4-32, Archives of Ontario. 
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province” to remove those deemed undesirable. This case example demonstrates the 
manipulation of records (or lack of record keeping) to deny inquiry (i.e., as is also 
exemplified in the lack of police records maintained in the Audley Horace Gardiner case 
to deny a self-defense claim or details in the case of Niranjan Sambasivam detailed in 
Chapter 9). Also transparent is the denial of the process of racial profiling through police 
surveillance (contemporarily conducted by the CBSA) and the use of a eugenic rationale 
permitting the continuation of the violent practices of colonial Nation-building while 
perceptively representing a fair and just process to any who would inquire.  
In the case of The Department of Immigration’s designation of Ontario Hospitals 
for the Insane as Immigrant stations (circa 192717), we see yet another example of the 
interdependence of immigration and mental health systems as well as the deployment of 
eugenic and racial rationales through the seemingly peculiar designation of hospitals for 
the insane as immigration stations (contemporarily exemplified in the deportation cases 
where psychiatric institutions are relied upon to confine or control non-citizens). 
While these archival examples provide a unique perspective at this confluence, 
they also provide an opportunity for inquiry into the practices of figures of authority, a 
perspective focused on the violence of professionals, organizations, and governmental 
structures. While individually they contribute an analysis of individual actors and 
decision makers, together they demonstrate the cooperation and interplay of criminal 
17 H.M. Robbins, Dept. Prov. Sec.: Request for opinion re power of Immigration Dept. to 
designate Ontario Hospitals for the insane as immigrant stations, 1927, RG 4-32, 
Archives of Ontario. 
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justice, immigration and mental health systems for common imperial and colonial 
projects. The technologies revealed at this level of analysis are crucial to an analysis of 
contemporary rationalizations of violence, including the practice of deportation for those 
identified with mental health issues and involved with the criminal justice system.  
Canada's immigration laws have produced and reinforced a long legacy of social 
prejudice against persons with mental disabilities (Chadha, 2008). In 1886, the first truly 
comprehensive immigration act was enacted in Canada. It required any vessel arriving at 
a Canadian port to report any “lunatic, idiotic, deaf and dumb, blind or infirm person” on 
their ship, failure to do so would cost the Master of the ship a $20-$100 fine (Chadha, 
2008). This structure allowed the immigration system to encourage vessel Masters to not 
take any “lunatic, idiotic, deaf and dumb, blind or infirm person” on their ship and the 
ability to identify and deport any that were reported. 
The 1906 revision of the immigration act expanded the scope of its exclusionary 
measures to the “feeble-minded, idiot, epileptic, or who is insane or has had an attack of 
insanity within five years; deaf and dumb, or dumb, blind or infirm” (Chadha, 2008).  If a 
person belonged to a family and could prove to the minister that he or she would not be a 
burden on society, they would be considered for landing status. In 1910, the House of 
Commons debates revealed that early 20th century psychiatry propounded the belief that 
persons with mental disabilities were undesirable immigrants because they were by 
nature degenerates, dangerous and dishonest in disposition (Chadha, 2008). 
The Department of Immigration and Colonization was established in 1917. Before 
then, immigration was a responsibility of the Department of Agriculture and then the 
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Department of the Interior (Library and Archives Canada, 2010).  From 1936-1949, 
immigration became the responsibility of the Department of Mines and Resources 
(Library and Archives Canada, 2010). After 1950 until 1966, immigration was the 
responsibility of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration (as independent 
Canadian Citizenship was only available after 1947) (Kary, 2013). From 1966 until 1977, 
immigration became the responsibility of the Department of Manpower and Immigration 
under the Department of State for Citizenship (Kary, 2013). From 1977-1991 
immigration was a responsibility of the Department for Employment and Immigration 
and ever since has been known as Citizenship and Immigration Canada (Kary, 2013).  
This timeline is crucial to an understanding of the history of immigration in Canada.  
From 1891 to 1914, over three million people came to Canada after the 
construction of the newly constructed railway and an increase in the mining operations in 
the Klondike and the Canadian Shield (Brown & Cook; 1974; Creighton, 1979). The War 
Measures Act was passed in 1917, disenfranchising certain immigrants as “enemy aliens” 
(Canadian Council for Refugees, 2000). As immigration increased from 1897-1918, 
“concern about immigration dovetailed with growing anxiety among native English-
speaking Canadians about the future of the British empire” and “Canadians’ fears about 
“race suicide” had escalated (Dowbiggin, 1997, p.137). “The steady arrival of such 
immigrants over the years led to warnings about their low quality and triggered 
campaigns to assimilate newcomers by training them to be law-abiding, productive, 
healthy, and self-reliant citizens” (Dowbiggin, 1997, p.137). 
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The Department of Immigration and Colonization was established to ensure that 
Canada’s colonial project was able to continue to monitor its regulation of immigrants 
and the colonization Canada so that its racial composition and employment composition 
privileged British Canadians and restricted those who were identified as undesirable, of 
an inferior race, or an “enemy”.  
 The Department of Immigration and Colonization kept meticulous reports on their 
efforts to control the Canadian population. 
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(Report of the Department of Immigration & Colonization, 1928, RG 7-12-0-112, Archives of 
Ontario)
   
 
Annual reports documented immigration statistics tracing occupations, destinations, and 
reported on initiatives in place to regulate specific populations of undesirables. 
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 (Report of the Department of Immigration & Colonization, 1928, RG 7-12-0-112, p.20, 
Archives of Ontario) 
Statistics were categorized by “racial origin” sometimes alluding to the country of 
origin, but the use of the term “negro” for example, clearly denotes a racial category. 
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(Report of the Department of Immigration & Colonization, 1928, RG 7-12-0-112, 
p. 51, Archives of Ontario) 
Although the head-tax on Chinese immigrants was abolished in 1923, the 
department of Immigration and Colonization continued to provide surveillance on 
Chinese Canadians by reporting on them specifically in the annual reports as well as 
documenting how many have been registered. 
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 (Report of the Department of Immigration & Colonization, 1928, RG 7-12-0-112, p.100-
101, Archives of Ontario) 
The ongoing surveillance of Chinese immigrants included continuing investigations 
including the “systematic searching of transpacific vessels” inspection of vessels entering 
Canadian ports, deporting Chinese immigrants who were found to be “illegal”, the 
numbers deported and travel statistics. 
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 Records of deportations often reported by cause including “accompanying, criminality, 
drug addicts, insanity, etc.  
(Report of the Department of Immigration & Colonization, 1928, RG 7-12-0-112, p.99, 
Archives of Ontario) 
Historical use gaols of the criminal justice system for detention of undesirables by the 
Department of Immigration and Colonization 
The Canadian criminal justice system has historically worked in cooperation with 
the Canadian Immigration and Colonization Department to stretch the interpretation of 
law to allow for the imprisonment of people deemed undesirable. Archival 
correspondence from the Ontario Department of the Attorney General reveals that in 
1919, official permission was requested from the Attorney General by the Immigration 
and Colonization Department to use goals in the province for the detention of 
undesirables.   A reply to the request from the Inspector of prisons and public charities, 
one, W.W. Dunlop includes the explanation, addressed to a Mr. Edward Bayly that, 
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 “it would appear from the Immigration Act that undesirables, alien enemies, 
idiots, imbeciles, feeble-minded, epileptics and other classes of persons may be 
arrested and detained in custody (see section 11 of the Immigration Act: 
subsection 7 of section 33; subsection 4 of section 42: section 3, “Prohibited 
Classes”. You might also refer to the Orders under P.C. 23 and P.E 924” 
(December 23, 1919), 
 
Here it is important to review the specific cited pieces of legislation provided as authority 
by Mr. Dunlop. The Immigration Act of 1910 section 11 permits any officer to arrest, 
detain or deport “any immigrant, alien, or other person” if there is a written order from a 
Minister or officer under the Immigration Act.  
 
Section 11:  
 
 
 
(An Act Respecting Immigration, 1910). 
 
 
Subsection 7 of section 33 of the Immigration Act allows for “all constables and other 
peace officers” to detain, deport or fine (up to 100$) people who elude examination at a 
point of entry, or escape from detention.  
Subsection 7 of section 33: 
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(An Act Respecting Immigration, 1910). 
 
Subsection 4 of Subsection 42 considers it a crime if someone is ordered deported and 
refuses to leave. Upon conviction of this crime, a person could be imprisoned or 
deported.  
Subsection 4 of section 42: 
 
 
 
(An Act Respecting Immigration, 1910). 
 
Under the section 3 of the Immigration Act of 1910, the “prohibited classes” are 
identified in the following order: “Persons mentally defective”, “Diseased persons”, 
“Persons physically defective”, “Criminals”, “Prostitutes or pimps”, “Procurers”(see 
below), “Beggars and vagrants”, “Charity immigrants” and “Persons not complying with 
regulations”. 
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(An Act Respecting Immigration, 1910). 
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P.C. 23 is a Privy Council order that specifies that a person can only enter Canada by 
“continuous journey” from the country of which they are a “native or naturalized citizen”. 
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With P.C.924, the Immigration Act was amended to include provisions that 
required immigrants to come to Canada “unless he or she have in actual and personal 
possession at the time of arrival, money, belongings absolutely to such immigrant to the 
amount of at least $25.00 in addition to a ticket or such sum of money as will purchase a 
ticket or transport for such immigrant to his or her destination in Canada.”. The 
amendment order specifies $12.50 for each additional family member aged 5-18, that 
men are required to have farm employment, women to do domestic work, or men or 
women must either be visiting a husband, wife, be a child going to a parent, a brother or 
sister visiting a brother or sister, a minor going to visit a sister or a parent going to visit a 
son or daughter.  The amendment ended with the following specificity, “These 
regulations shall not apply to immigrants belonging to any Asiatic race”. A postulate that 
reminds the reader that those of any Asiatic race (any non-European country of origin 
specifically referring to people that would be today described as of Asian race) are 
unwelcome to any rights and privileges granted to white people in Canada. 
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 In all of these references to the legislation provided as permission by W.W. Dunlop 
to use gaols for the detention of “undesirables, alien enemies, idiots, imbeciles, feeble-
minded, epileptics and other classes of persons”, there is no reference to an ability, reason 
or rationale to detain people in prison gaols for merely being “undesireable”. According 
to the referenced legislation, a person must have a written order from the Minister, have 
eluded inspection, been convicted of a crime, been found to have come by way of a non-
continuous journey, or not have enough money, work or family. W.W. Dunlop grants 
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authority to the Department of Immigration and Colonization to use the prison gaols by 
selectively weaving together pieces of the legislation that reference powers for police 
officers, authorities to detain, and prohibited classes within the Immigration Act, but is 
unable to produce the legislative support for what is being requested. The blending 
together of these references allows Dunlop to convey authority, reference authoritative 
text (legislation), and at the same time bestows a power to Immigration and Colonization 
Department officials to imprison anyone who may belong to a prohibited class. Through 
this action, the dehumanizing, hierarchical systems of exclusion for those encapsulated 
under prohibited classes, are granted an opportunity to permissively and discretionally 
deploy violence. Justice and due process are denied for anyone recognized as belonging 
to a prohibited class and a precedent is set for an unjust practice to continue with 
approval that represents itself as legitimate. 
In Mr. Bayly’s memo to the Attorney General approximately 1 month after W.W. 
Dunlop’s  memo, (Mr. Edward Bayly was delegated the responsibility of advising the 
Attorney General on the use of the prison gaols by the Immigration and Colonizaiton 
Department for the custody of undesirables) he reported that he had reviewed the 
referenced legislation provided by W.W. Dunlop and clearly stated in his memo “There is 
no specific provision in any of these sections or in either of the Orders in Council which 
covers the point”.  He goes on to say that although Mr. Dunlop and Immigration 
authorities have held that it was covered under the legislation, “In this they appear to be 
mistaken”. Also, Mr. Bayly confers, “I must say however that if there is room in a prison 
and a request is made by the Dominion authorities for the use of the prison and they pay 
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reasonable expenses it would be very unusual and at times very inconvenient if the 
accommodation were refused to them. My suggestion would be a letter of protest rather 
than a refusal to permit the gaol to be used”. Here, Mr. Bayly recognizes that the practice 
of using prison gaols by the Immigration and Colonization Department for the detention 
of undesirables is not provided for within the law. Mr. Bayly also confirms that Mr. 
Dunlop and Immigration authorities’ interpretation of the law and current practices are 
“mistaken” (or in other words illegal). Mr. Bayle then takes the opportunity to provide 
permission for the Immigration Department to not be refused the use of the prison gaols 
(he suggests a letter of protest), “if there is room…a request is made…and they pay 
reasonable expenses”, so as not to be perceived as unusual or inconvenient by the 
Immigration and Colonization Department.  Both administrators sought to forego 
adherence to the provisions of the law to support or permit an outcome whereby anyone 
in this growing list can be detained by the Immigration and Colonization Department in 
prisons: 
• “undesirables,  
• alien enemies,  
• idiots,  
• imbeciles,  
• feeble-minded,  
• epileptics”,  
• “Persons mentally defective”,  
• “Diseased persons”,  
• “Persons physically defective”,  
• “Criminals”,  
• “Prostitutes or pimps”, 
• “Procurers”,  
• “Beggars and vagrants”, 
• “Charity immigrants”  
• “Persons not complying with 
regulations”. 
• “immigrants belonging to any 
Asiatic race
 
The work of Mr. Dunlop and Mr. Bayly enables the ongoing project of exclusion 
and colonial nation building to continue uninterrupted through the deployment and 
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rationalization of violence. Concurrently, the legislation itself continues to be read as 
though even prohibited classes have the right to due process and fair proceedings. Mr. 
Bayly’s calculations erase any consideration of what might be “unusual” or 
“inconvenient” for a person imprisoned in a provincial jail of the criminal justice system 
for being someone who does not represent the body, mind, race, gender, employment 
status, or class of what is desired by the authorities in Canada. The rationalizations and 
practices exemplified in this case demonstrate the powers of the criminal justice system 
to work alongside the immigration system for the orchestration of population control for 
people identified as undeserving of protection under the law or unworthy of consideration 
in comparison to monetary expenses, availability of space, convenience, or the regular 
practice of immigration officials.  
In order for the actors in this case to achieve their outcome they required the 
application of a eugenic rationale (to assume that being a member of a prohibited class 
must also sanction unlawful imprisonment), the utilization of racial hierarchy (to exclude 
those of any Asiatic race from any protection under the law), the abuse of discretionary 
powers to commit violence (making an authorization without legal authority to do so or 
consultation of the public), and the projection of an image of authority and legitimization 
through the selective referencing of authoritative texts (referencing legislation, 
selectively, partially and inaccurately to achieve a desired outcome). These practices and 
technologies of colonial nation building have a legacy within current policy and practice 
regarding people identified in the contemporary versions of the terms: undesirable, 
belonging to a prohibited class, or of an unwanted race. 
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Deportation of Hobos, tramps, undesirable aliens  
 
It has also been a historical practice in Canada to deport undesirables under the 
enforcement of the criminal justice system without any record keeping for such actions 
on either the part of the Immigration Department or the criminal justice system. 
Deportations, being a matter for the Immigration Department must occur through a 
process in accordance with the Immigration Act. The use of police to deport undesirables 
would be an abuse of authority, and a violation of those deported and denied justice 
without due process.  
Archival correspondence from 1915 from the office of the Attorney General of 
Ontario revealed that an inquiry was initiated by a W.D. Scott, Esq. (The Superintendent 
of Immigration at the time) to query the deportation of 1135 “Hobos, tramps, undesirable 
aliens” from November 1913-October 1914 by provincial police. The statistic reported in 
the Provincial Police Annual Report and was inquired about by the Department of 
Immigration due to the large numbers of “Hobos, tramps, undesirable aliens” that were 
breaching the borders. The Superintendent was concerned with the permeability of the 
Canadian border and any “remissness on the part of the Immigration Officials”. The 
responses to the superintendent’s inquiry from Sarnia, Ottawa, Windsor, Bridgeburg, and 
Niagara Falls denied “any records” of handing over people to the police for deportation.  
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 The Superintendent of the provincial police was able to report on the totals for most ports 
but does not furnish any details as to why police were deporting so many people.  
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 The Superintendent of provincial police also reports that there is no remissness on 
the part of the Immigration Officials (which was W.D. Scott’s original concern) and 
explains that the police have been cooperating with Immigration Officials in preventing 
tramps from entering the province who are “largely American hoboes, the proportion of 
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Europeans being small…on freight trains at night, in small boats, and through the bush”. 
In this letter we have an example of the provincial police “cooperating” with Immigration 
Official to profile people appearing to be “tramps or hoboes” at the borders and railway 
yards without having the responsibility to do so. The superintendent describes this as 
“being able to render the assistance mentioned”.  Without records of who was deported 
and for what purpose, we have little information for why the police would take on this 
added responsibility to support population control. 
The term “hoboe” was used to describe migrant workers, and the word “tramp” 
was a term used to describe a ranking beneath hoboe for someone who “worked only 
when made to”(Liberman, 2008).  It may be important to note that the first great 
migration (a movement of millions of African American’s to the North after the 
emancipation proclamation) in the United Stated began in 1910 and between 1910 and 
1930 the “African-American population increased by about 40% in the Northern states” 
including the cities of “Detroit, Chicago, Cleveland and New York City” seeking 
employment and safety (Penny Liberty, 2012).  
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W.D. Scott replies to the Superintendent of provincial police, unsatisfied with his 
response and noting that “Our inspectors at 2 or 3 of the most important points have 
written me unsolicited explaining that they have no record of the Provincial police having 
handed over people for deportation”. Mr. Scott insists on more information so as to 
investigate how those being deported breached the border without remissness on the part 
of Immigration Officials.  
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 After W.D. Scott’s persistence, the Superintendent of Police shares with him an 
explanation stating that Police have long been rounding up and deporting undesirables 
until U.S. ports began refusing to take undesirables back in ports other than Niagara falls. 
The superintendent explains that “Inspector Mains came to the conclusion that is was no 
use filling the country gaols with these men, and putting the Province to the cost of their 
maintenance. For the protection of the Province, Inspector Mains devised a scheme to rid 
of this element”.  The plan involved finding and handing over undesirables to 
immigration officials for deportation that “escape the attention of immigration officials” 
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at the bridge (where there are immigration officials) and railway yards (where no 
immigration officials patrol).  
With the Superintendent of the Provincial Police’s explanation, we see the 
practice of the criminal justice system “devising a scheme” outside of the provisions of 
the law “for the protection of the province” to control for undesirable (an Immigration 
Department responsibility) at their own discretion. A lack of record keeping and 
documentation enabled this practice to continue without inquiry into why and how people 
were being identified and deported by police. The methods of surveillance and 
identification are erased from this practice while authorities make room for the practice to 
continue outside of the provision of law. Simultaneously, the identities, voices, faces, 
protections or considerations for wellbeing for those described as hoboes, tramps, or 
undesirables are eliminated from consideration. 
 The conversation is confined to possible gaps in border surveillance on behalf of 
the immigration officials and record keeping on behalf of the police. This case example 
demonstrates the use of record keeping to deny responsibility, the unchecked surveillance 
of difference by criminal justice officers as well as another example of the confluence of 
power within immigration and criminal justice systems to regulate for types of people, 
ensuring that Canada remains composed of people most resembling a white, able (in body 
and mind), English speaking British Canadian settler/worker. The denial of the process of 
racial profiling and the use of eugenic rationale permits the continuation of the violent 
practices of colonial, nation-building while perceptively representing a fair and just 
process to any who would inquire.  
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The Department of Immigration’s designation of Ontario Hospitals for the Insane as 
Immigrant stations 
Correspondence between the Ontario Deputy Provincial Secretary (H.M. 
Robbins), the Deputy Attorney General (Mr. E. Bayly), as well as Immigration and 
Colonization Department and Ontario hospital officials revealed that in 1927 the practice 
of assigning hospitals for the insane as immigrant stations was well underway. Here the 
notion of undesirability becomes even more pronounced.  The practice includes, when 
required, the rationalization of violence through the manipulation of the interpretation of 
authoritative texts and laws interchangeably for immigrants, and the mentally ill.  
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H.M. Robbins inquires to the Deputy Attorney General as to whether the 1921 
designation of the Ontario Hospital for the Insane at 999 Queen st. W. in Toronto 
(presently the Centre for Addiciton and Mental Health) as an “Immigration Station for 
the examination, Inspection, treatment or detention of immigrants, passengers or other 
person for any purpose under the Immigration Act” takes precedence over the BNA Act 
or the Hospital for the Insane Act, chapter 295, R.S.O. 1914.   
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Mr. Bayly’s response to H.M. Robbins is that “The present provisions of the 
Immigration Act, however, no not go that far “indicating that the practice of designating a 
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hospital for the insane as an immigration station is not allowed for in law and is illegal to 
be practiced lest there be a specific piece of legislation allowing this. Some nine months 
after this February correspondence, H.M. Robbins provides letters from October 12, 1927 
and November 23, 1927 that indicate that the Brockville hospital for the insane has been 
designated as an Immigration station under the same rationale as was 999 Queen st. W.  
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(An Act Respecting Immigration, 1910) 
The Immigration Act of 1910 specified that “ ‘immigration station’ means any 
place at which immigrants or passengers are examined, inspected, treated or detained by 
an officer for any purpose under this Act, and includes hospitals maintained for the 
purposes of this Act ” (An Act Respecting Immigration, 1910).  H.M. Robbins original 
question was, “Does this mean that the Immigration Authorities have the right to dump in 
and hold at our institutions any immigrants who for any reason they may wish to detain 
for a time”?  The final response from the Deputy Attorney General E. Bayly is dated 
December 4, 1927 and states that “You wrote to me about this matter on Feb. 4th, 1927, 
and I replied on Feb’y 8th. If you desire a copy of my letter I shall be glad to send it to 
you”.  Here Bayly makes his point clear that “The present provisions of the Immigration 
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Act, however, does not go that far” so as to allow immigration official to deem any 
hospital including a hospital for the insane as an immigration station.  Beyond a letter 
dated December 6th 1927 where H.M. Robbins requests copies of the February 8th letter, 
the correspondence on this matter ceases. The question as to whether a hospital for the 
insane should be designated as an immigration station is suspended. The practice of 
medical inspection for communicable disease that is provided for within the Immigration 
Act, is from then onward, wielded to authorize the confinement of immigrants to 
hospitals for the insane.  
In 1919, the Immigration Act was amended “adding new grounds for denying 
entry and deportation (e.g. constitutional psychopathic inferiority, chronic alcoholism and 
illiteracy)” (Canadian Council for Refugees, 2000). The spirit of eugenics and racial 
exclusion is captured in this example of an inquiry into a seemingly peculiar designation 
of hospitals for the insane as immigration stations. In the context of colonial nation 
building and identity formation in Canada, we can perceive how the authorization of 
violence is validated upon the construction of an identity delineated upon their common 
undesirability.  
This example alongside the example of the correspondence related to the 
“deportation of hoboes”, and the example of the correspondence surrounding the use of 
prison “gaols for the detention of undesireable” (including those deemed undesirables, 
alien enemies, idiots, imbeciles, feeble-minded, epileptics, Persons mentally defective, 
Diseased persons, Persons physically defective, criminals, Prostitutes or pimps, 
Procurers, Beggars and vagrants, Charity immigrants and Persons not complying with 
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regulations, and persons of any Asiatic race) begins to illustrate the not-so peculiar 
practices at the confluence of immigration, mental health, and criminal justice systems 
that permit the use of violence through the selective referencing of law and authoritative 
texts, the exclusion and denial of racial and eugenic rationale (when not provide for in 
law), and the portrayal of abuses of power and authority as provided for within the 
discretionary authoritative powers of the state. Also exposed is the practice of delineating 
an idea of a Canadian identity, one forged upon a devaluation of those whose 
characteristics are encapsulated as inferior, costly, threatening, or undeserving.  
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Chapter 8 
 
Case studies-the Appeals division of the IRB:  stories of resistance 
In this chapter we detail an overview of the cases and case data from the appeals 
division of the Immigration and Refugee board as well as cases that go on to the Federal 
Court of Canada analyzed in this study. These documents are the only known public 
records on deportation and were retrieved from the Canadian Legal Information Institute 
database and the Federal Court decision database. These cases provide both a 
representation of the technologies, practices and laws at work at the confluence of mental 
health, immigration and criminal justice systems specific to deportation in Canada while 
also depicting unique and powerful act of resistance to systems of dehumanization, 
identification, incarceration and removal in Canada. The analysis of the descriptive data 
for the 75 cases matching the criteria (those appeal cases for deportation for those 
identified with mental health issues) from 2001-2011 (the most complete and recent years 
for analysis at the commencement of this study), reveals the overwhelming prioritization 
of racialized countries for deportation. The idea of fair procedures or due process are also 
held suspect when we see that an overwhelming majority of cases result in decisions for 
either deportation or the imposition of heavy restrictions, confinement, forced treatment 
and reporting requirements. In order to facilitate the reading of these complex cases, I 
provide in this chapter an overview of the Immigration and Refugee Board and the 
Appeals Division with respect to deportation decisions.  
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A description of the deportation appeals decisions data from the Immigration and 
Refugee Board for people diagnosed with mental illness in Canada from January 1, 
2001- December 31, 2011: 
 
Secondary Data Analysis: 
• The average age of the people up for deportation was approximately 37 years. 
• The average amount of time people up for deportation had lived in Canada was 
approximately 20 years. 
• Of the 29 countries of origin, 13.3 % of the people identified for deportation (10) 
were from the 7 countries of Croatia (1), Holland (1), Italy (2), Portugal (1), 
Romania (1), Russia (1), and the U.K (3).  
• 57% (43) of the people up for deportation were from these countries representing 
the top 5 countries for deportation:  
Jamaica (25), Guyana (4), Sri Lanka (4), Somalia (4), Trinidad and Tobago (3), 
China (3) (tied for 5th ). 
• The other 22 (29 % of people up for deportation) were from:  
Ecuador (1), El Salvador (2), Ethiopia (2), Guinea (1), Haiti (2), Israel (1), India 
(1), Iran (1), Morocco (1), Pakistan (1), Panama (1), Philippines (2), South Korea 
(1), St. Lucia (1), Sudan (2), Vietnam (1), Yemen (1).  
• 86 % being from racialized countries from: South Asia, East Asia, Africa, South 
East Asia, West Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean.  
• 55 % or 36 out of 66 people had been diagnosed by a Medical Professional and 
had access to Psychiatric treatment for 5 year or longer. 
208 
 
 Access to psychiatric treatment was not an issue. People had been diagnosed and 
offered psychiatric treatment for an average of 8.8 years. 63% of these people had access 
to treatment for 3 years or longer (ranging all the way to 39 years since diagnosis). In 
fact, the people up for deportation were often held responsible when the treatments were 
ineffective or when medication was discontinued. Disparities in access to treatment are 
often used as explanations for disproportionate representations of racialized people with 
mental health issues in the criminal justice system or over representations of racialized 
people in the forensic system. 
When the above description is compared to Canadian Census Data 2001-2006: 
Jamaica is ranked 25th as the place of birth for immigrants coming to Canada, Guyana, 
28th, Sri Lanka 11th, Somalia 40th, Trinidad and Tobago 39th (Statistics Canada, 2009). 
China, the US, and the UK are in the top 10 (Statistics Canada, 2009). From this 
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comparison, apparent is the disproportionate selection of people from Caribbean, African 
and Asian countries for deportation. 
Appeals were allowed in only 12% of cases. 38.7% of people were eventually 
deported. The remaining 49.3% of cases were granted a stay of the deportation order with 
strict conditions stated as commands without a detailed plan for how the person it to 
adhere to the conditions and often demanding that individuals take complete ownership 
of meeting these conditions. 
 
Example excerpt of conditions: 
 
CONDITIONS OF STAY OF REMOVAL ORDER 
The removal order in this appeal is stayed. This stay is made on the following conditions 
–the appellant must: 
[1] Inform the Canada Border Services Agency (the “Department”) and the Immigration 
Appeal Division in writing in advance of any change in your address. 
The address of the Department is: 
Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), The Greater Toronto Enforcement 
Centre,  
6900 Airport Road, P.O. Box 290,  
Mississauga, Ontario, L4V 1E8. 
The address of the Immigration Appeal Division is: 
74 Victoria Street, Suite 400, Toronto, Ontario, M5C 3C7. 
[2] Provide a copy of your passport or travel document to the Department or, if you do 
not have a passport or travel document, complete an application for a passport or 
a travel document and to provide the application to the Department. 
[3] Apply for an extension of the validity period of any passport or travel document 
before it expires, and provide a copy of the extended passport or document to the 
Department. 
[4] Not commit any criminal offences. 
[5] If charged with a criminal offence, immediately report that fact in writing to the 
Department. 
[6] If convicted of a criminal offence, immediately report that fact in writing to the 
Department and the Immigration Appeal Division. 
[7] Provide all information, notices and documents (the “documents”) required by the 
conditions of the stay by hand; by regular or registered mail; by courier or priority 
post to the Canada Border Services Agency, 6900 Airport Road, P.O. Box 290, 
Mississauga, Ontario, L4V 1E8. It is the responsibility of the appellant that the 
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documents are received by the Department within any time period required by a 
condition of the stay. 
[8] Provide all information, notices and documents (the “documents”) required by the 
conditions of the stay by hand; by regular or registered mail; by courier or priority 
post; or by fax to the Immigration Appeal Division at 416-954-1165. Include 
your IAD file number. It is the responsibility of the appellant that the documents 
are received by the Immigration Appeal Division within any time period required 
by a condition of the stay. 
[9] If granted a conditional or absolute discharge by the Ontario Review Board (ORB), 
report within ten days to the Department in person at The Greater Toronto 
Enforcement Centre, 6900 Airport Road, Entrance 2B, Mississauga, Ontario, L4V 
1E8 between 07:30 a.m. to 15:00 p.m. and every six months thereafter. 
The reports are to contain details of the appellant’s: 
- employment or efforts to obtain employment if unemployed; 
- current living arrangements; 
- marital status including common-law relationships; 
- attendance at any educational institution and any change in that attendance;  
- participation in psychotherapy or counselling (please specify type); 
- meetings with parole officer, including details of any violations of the conditions 
of parole; 
- other relevant changes of personal circumstances. 
[10] Make reasonable efforts to seek and maintain full time employment and 
IMMEDIATELY report any change in employment to the Department unless on 
Ontario Disability Support Program (ODSP).  
[11] Continue psychotherapy with any qualified psychiatrist as required. (Note: If you 
withdraw your consent to the foregoing condition, you must bring an 
application to the Appeal Division forthwith to have this condition removed.) 
[12] Make reasonable efforts to maintain yourself in such condition that: 
a) your chronic schizophrenia and/or substance abuse will not cause you to 
conduct yourself in a manner dangerous to yourself or anyone else; and, 
b) it is not likely you will commit further offences. 
[13] Not knowingly associate with individuals who have a criminal record or who are engaged 
in criminal activity, except contact that might result while attending meetings of 
Alcoholics Anonymous, or any other drug or alcohol rehabilitation programor any 
psychiatric programs, including residency in any psychiatric facility. 
[14] Not own or possess offensive weapons or imitations of offensive weapons.  
[15] Respect all parole conditions and any court orders. 
[16] Refrain from the illegal use or sale of drugs.  
[17] Keep the peace and be of good behaviour. 
[18] Other: Shall provide written consent to the ORB authorizing the CBSA and IAD to 
be notified of all hearing dates, to receive copies of all dispositions regarding any 
decisions made and to permit Representatives of CBSA and/or the IAD to attend 
any hearing. Further consents to the ORB notifying CBSA and the IAD if and 
when he has withdrawn his consent to the above. (Note: If you withdraw your 
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consent to the foregoing condition, you must bring an application to the 
Appeal Division forthwith to have this condition removed.) 
At each of your reporting dates you will bring with you and present to the 
appropriate CBSA Official a medical report from an appropriate psychiatrist 
giving an update of current treatment and medical assessment. (Note: If you 
withdraw your consent to the foregoing condition, you must bring an 
application to the Appeal Division forthwith to have this condition removed.) 
 
(Immigration and Refugee Board [Immigration Appeal Division] 2008, C.A. Williams, 
IAD File No./Dossier : TA2-15889) 
 
In this example, the person given a stay of the deportation order is also given 18 
areas with which to accumulate more charges for non-compliance or 18 opportunities to 
rationalize their own deportation. Constant surveillance and reporting responsibilities are 
delegated to the individual. 
Representative Sample for Post-Colonial Document Analysis of Confluence 
I have selected a representative sample of ten cases for in-depth analysis. The 
representative sample of ten of the seventy-five cases corresponded directly with the 
descriptive statistics generated by SPSS in relation to country or origin/country for 
deportation, period of time in Canada, age, how long the person has had a psychiatric 
diagnosis and access to treatment, immigration status, gender, diagnosis and most recent 
decision outcome (stay of removal order, appeal allowed, or deported). The 
representative sample generated by SPSS included three appeals cases of people from 
Jamaica, two from Somalia, one from Trinidad and Tobago, one from Guyana, one from 
China, one from Sri Lanka and one from Russia. Four people had a diagnosis of 
Schizophrenia (not otherwise specified), three had a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, 
one had a diagnosis of bipolar disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder, one had a 
diagnosis of bipolar disorder and one had a diagnosis of an anxiety disorder (not 
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otherwise specified).  Seven cases included the immigration status of permanent resident, 
two were identified as convention refugees and one case specified that the person was 
being sponsored under the family class. The average length of time in Canada was 17.4 
years. The average age was 35.6 years and the average number of years with a diagnosis 
or access to treatment was 10.   
The 10 sample cases were not significantly different than the other cases (of the 
75, where the information was available) when tested (using T-Tests for Age, length of 
time in Canada, and how long they have had a diagnosis/access to treatment and using a 
crosstab/Chi-Square test for gender) on the basis of Age, length of time in Canada, how 
long they had been diagnosed/had access to treatment or gender. 
 There is no statistically significant difference between the 10 sample cases and the 
other 64 cases (1 case was missing this piece of information) in terms of how long 
people had been in Canada.  
 
Group Statistics 
 sample-member N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Length of time in Canada 
.00 64 20.3359 10.53944 1.31743 
1.00 10 17.4000 9.81156 3.10269 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Differen
ce 
Std. 
Error 
Differen
ce 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Length of 
time in 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.029 .865 .826 72 .411 2.93594 3.55380 -
4.14844 
10.020
31 
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Canada Equal variances 
not assumed 
  .871 12.4
80 
.400 2.93594 3.37080 -
4.37720 
10.249
08 
 
 There is no statistically significant difference between the 10 sample cases and the 
other 59 cases (6 were missing this piece of information) in terms of age. 
 
Group Statistics 
 sample-member N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
AGE 
.00 59 37.1356 10.10199 1.31517 
1.00 9 35.6667 8.17007 2.72336 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Differenc
e 
Std. 
Error 
Differenc
e 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
AG
E 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.845 .361 .415 66 .679 1.46893 3.53845 -5.59582 8.53367 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  .486 12.07
6 
.636 1.46893 3.02429 -5.11584 8.05370 
 
 There is no statistically significant difference between the 10 sample cases and the 
other 56 cases (9 were missing this piece of information) in terms of how long 
they have had a mental health diagnosis/access to psychiatric treatment. 
 
Group Statistics 
 sample-member N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
How long with Diagnosis/access to 
psychiatric treatment 
.00 56 8.5595 9.25813 1.23717 
1.00 10 10.0000 7.31817 2.31421 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
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 Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Differe
nce 
Std. 
Error 
Differe
nce 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
How long with 
Diagnosis/access to 
psychiatric treatment 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.532 .469 -
.466 
64 .643 -
1.4404
8 
3.0933
7 
-
7.6201
9 
4.7392
3 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  -
.549 
14.6
83 
.591 -
1.4404
8 
2.6241
5 
-
7.0442
5 
4.1632
8 
 
 There is no statistically significant difference between the 10 sample cases and 
the other 65 cases in terms of gender. 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
sample-member * Gender 75 100.0% 0 0.0% 75 100.0% 
 
sample-member * Gender Crosstabulation 
Count   
 Gender Total 
Female Male 
sample-member 
.00 8 57 65 
1.00 0 10 10 
Total 8 67 75 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
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 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.378a 1 .240   
Continuity Correctionb .389 1 .533   
Likelihood Ratio 2.432 1 .119   
Fisher's Exact Test    .587 .299 
N of Valid Cases 75     
a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.07. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
During the generation of the representative sample by SPSS, approximately one 
out of the 10 cases could have been a woman. While this analysis does not purposefully 
exclude women, the representation of gender in these cases raised many questions with 
regards to the pathways for women and other genders found at the confluence of 
immigration, mental health and criminal justice, as well as the spectrum of constructions 
of identity, authorities and authorizations of violence and the representational discourse 
used to legitimize violence directed in gendered ways. These areas require further 
investigation.  
An overview of the processes of the immigration system IRB, etc in reference to 
deportation 
 
Canada’s immigration and refugee system currently has three main parts: 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Canada Border Services Agency, and Immigration 
and Refugee Board of Canada. Citizenship and Immigration Canada is responsible for 
who can apply for refugee protection, who can immigrate to Canada, issuing of visas, 
travel documents, determining residency obligations, administering resettlement program 
and the overall responsibility for immigration and refugee matters including the granting 
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of citizenship (Immigration and Refugee board of Canada, 2006, p.4). The Canada 
Border Services Agency is responsible for the direct policing of Canada’s borders. The 
Canada border Services Agency directly admits people to Canada, refers refugee claims 
made at entry ports to the Immigration and Refugee Board, detains people who are 
deemed a “security risk or a danger to the public” and removes people who are found to 
be “inadmissible” to Canada (Immigration and Refugee board of Canada, 2006, p.4). 
The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada is a decision making body for 
immigration and refugee matters. The Immigration and Refugee board makes decisions 
of who “needs” refugee protection, they “hear” appeals on particular immigration matters 
and are responsible for conducting admissibility hearings and detention reviews 
(Immigration and Refugee board of Canada, 2006, p.5). The Immigration and Refugee 
board is the largest administrative tribunal in Canada. While the Immigration and 
Refugee Board is accountable to Parliament via the Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration, it is identified as an “independent” part of the Canadian Immigration and 
Refugee system because it is separate from Citizenship and Immigration Canada and the 
Canada Border Service Agency (Immigration and Refugee board of Canada, 2006, p.5). 
However, this independent identification is used to imply a position of impartiality even 
though all parts of the Immigration system are listed in the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act, and are interdependent in practice (Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Act , S.C. 2001, c. 27.). 
The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada has three divisions, the Refugee 
Protection Division, the Immigration Division, and the Immigration Appeal Division 
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(Immigration and Refugee board of Canada, 2006, p. 6). The Refugee Protection Division 
is the decision making body for claims made by people who are in Canada. The 
Immigration Division is the division responsible for hearing cases about people identified 
as “foreign nationals” or “permanent residents” who are detained under a provision for 
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (Immigration and Refugee board of Canada, 
2006, p.6). The Immigration Division is also responsible for the admissibility hearings 
for those who are accused of contravening the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
(those identified for admissibility hearings are also foreign nationals or permanent 
residents) (Immigration and Refugee board of Canada, 2006, p.6). The Immigration 
Appeal Division is responsible solely for hearing appeals on immigration matters. 
Appeals can be for sponsors whose applications were denied, for removal orders, for 
permanent residents who do not fulfill the residency requirement required to maintain 
permanent residency status in Canada (i.e., who did not live in Canada for the required 
number of days per year). There are also appeals by the Canada Border Service Agency 
“on behalf of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada of decisions of on 
admissibility made by the Immigration Division” (Immigration and Refugee board of 
Canada, 2006, p.6).  What is also important to note is that, “In some cases, the CBSA has 
the power to issue removal orders, that is, to send you out of Canada, without requesting 
an admissibility hearing” (Immigration and Refugee board of Canada, 2006, p. 15).  
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 (Immigration and Refugee board of Canada, 2006, p.7). 
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The admissibility hearings are “adversarial”, meaning, the legal counsel 
representing the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration will argue for why a person 
should be removed from Canada (Immigration and Refugee board of Canada, 2006, 
p.16). The onus is therefore upon an individual or their lawyer to respond to a case built 
against them by Professional, Doctors, and Lawyers representing the government.  
(Immigration and Refugee board of Canada, 2006, p.17) 
If the CBSA deems someone a flight risk or a danger to the public, or cannot 
confirm their identity, they can be detained.  
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 (Immigration and Refugee board of Canada, 2006, p.18). 
A person cannot appeal a removal order if they are were found to be a “serious 
criminal” i.e., committed an offence punished by a term of imprisonment of two years or 
more (Immigration and Refugee board of Canada, 2006, p.19). If a person is involved in 
organized crime, deemed a security risk, or if a person has been deemed inadmissible 
because of human rights or international rights violations. A person can appeal if there 
was an “error in law or fact” or a “breach of a principle of natural justice” (Immigration 
and Refugee board of Canada, 2006, p.20). Principles of natural justice are defined as: 
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 (Immigration and Refugee board of Canada, 2006, p.27). 
 
(Immigration and Refugee board of Canada, 2006, p.22). 
The above description of the contemporary Immigration and Refugee System and 
the subdivisions is necessary for reading the appeals cases and analysis provided in this 
study. Within the contemporary structure, we see the ability to for the government to 
apply discretionary authority (to the CBSA specifically) for determinations of risk and 
threat to the public as a rationalization for detention and removal. Also, the adversarial 
process allows for the exercise of authority and power to favour the position of detention 
or removal for those deemed serious criminal or threat to the public. The Immigration 
and Refugee Board also present itself as an upholder of the principles of natural justice, 
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as fair, impartial and independent while the rationale for deportation and removal are 
heavily influenced by historical prejudices and oppressive valuations in a system that is 
far from impartial and independent in practice. 
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Chapter 9 
Confluence: analysis of cases  
The 10 representative cases selected for analysis included decision documents 
from the Immigration and Refugee Board’s Appeals Division, Immigration Division, the 
Federal Court of Canada (when a judicial review is requested by the accused) as well as 
referenced legislation. Throughout the decision making, three thematically distinct 
arguments are made: 1) that the accused has a biomedical mental illness that is 
dangerous, and only treatable with medications. The accused is solely responsible for 
managing his mental illness and not taking medications is considered both careless and 
illegal. The accuracy of the accussed’s assessment or diagnosis, the efficacy of their 
treatments and the responsibility of their caregivers is dismissed from consideration. 2) 
the accused is an antisocial, aggressive, and hostile serious criminal that cannot be 
controlled. Their criminality and aggression are attributed to the accused as an individual 
and their social, political and economic circumstances are not discussed. Their 
criminality is seen as separate from their mental health, reinforcing a distinction that 
fosters the least compassion. 3) The accused does not belong in Canada, is a burden to 
society and is a non-contributing member to Canadian society.  
These ideas reproduce: 1) a focus on the individual in biomedical terms that 
redirect responsibility solely toward the individual, 2) a notion of inherent criminality, 
dehumanized and deserving of punishment, and 3) a reproduction of the Other 
represented in terms of lack, who is not “one of us” or deserving of our support or care.  
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The accused becomes encapsulated into a general type, seen only through a lens of 
difference. 
It is important to note that in all 10 of these cases, many of the convictions upon 
which the notion of “serious criminality” is based are as a result of the surveillance of the 
criminal justice system. Charges such as failure to appear, failure to comply with 
conditions are noted often and not withdrawn even though mental illness has been 
identified and diagnosed. It is also important to note that there were no charges of 
murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, or crimes related to children. Theft was the 
most common charge and assaults were often associated with a period without basic 
necessities or care (i.e., during a period of homelessness, in a conflict at a shelter, one 
was during a raid on a building where the accused (later convicted) person was cooking 
in his own kitchen with a knife, or a period of acute mental/emotional distress. 
The analysis also reveals the necessity of the mental health system, the criminal 
justice system and the immigration system to present as independent, objective and 
judicious institutional process while clandestinely acting in concert to resist appeals for 
adequate care, safety or a consideration of external factors. This nuanced 
interdependency uncovers the confluence of violence, identity/difference and systems of 
oppression as contemporary manifestations of the legacy of colonial and imperial 
professionals of authority, the establishment and use of disciplinary hegemonies, and the 
discretionary manipulation of law to construct a dehumanized subject worthy of 
legitimized violence or expulsion.  The end result is the continuation of violent racial and 
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eugenic systems, technologies and practices of population control and nation building, 
(re)producing ideas of the savage, mad, uncivilized Other and the pristine, civil, self. 
As suggested in chapter 5, in these cases we must attend to Orientalism, (and 
dividing practices), appropriation, erasure, dehumanization, the establishment of 
professional hegemonies and hierarchies, the reinforcement of North-South relations and 
the use of moral and ethical argument to justify atrocities  as  processes and technologies 
of colonial violence. Orientalism as a process is appreciated for its production of an 
ideological fantasy (in this thesis, the processes of construction of the ideas of Oriental, 
the Orient and the Occident are used to trace the construction of the ideas of the 
untreatable, the unrehabilitatable, the undeserving alien, as well as the fantasy of the 
Canadian public). Orientalism is also appreciated for how it achieves the production of 
fixed human taxonomies of differences, the rise of expertise and professional 
hegemonies, and for its dependence on racial thinking, dominance, geopolitics and 
hierarchy. Understood through the framework of violence provided by Slavoj Žižek and 
with an analysis of confluence, we are required to consider the subjective violence 
authorized within a colonial technology such as Orientalism (the obvious forms of 
exploitation, subjugation etc.), the objective forms including the symbolic (how we talk 
about the Oriental or the untreatable within language and its forms),  and the systemic 
(that which becomes embedded within academic and professional disciplines and in law). 
To appreciate these violence technologies and their achievements, they must be 
considered within a historical, social and political confluence that questions the ends, the 
means and the social relations that carry eugenic and racial supremacist discourses. 
226 
 
The names of the people involved in these cases have been made public and 
published online through the Citizenship and Immigration Canada website (via the Reflex 
database that was available until July 1, 201318) and are still available through the 
CANLii database website. While I acknowledge the humanity and personhood of the 
people involved in these cases, I acknowledge that an exclusion of names in this work 
would provide no protection for anyone (as these are public documents) and could 
participate in the achievement of the outcomes of the dehumanizing technologies that are 
questioned throughout this research. I also acknowledge the names of those who are 
recognized in this work (and those who are not) as resisters to the oppressive, coercive 
and violent systems that construct subordinate identities and authorize and legitimate 
violence. 
The Untreatable: the biomedical, the biologically inferior, the genetically different 
 
In the cases of Carlton Anthony Williams, Kevin Sheldon Bennett and Guhad 
Mahamoud Hassan the confluence of immigration, criminal justice and mental health 
systems can be examined for their reliance on and production of identities as well as 
identifiers of people as untreatable biomedical problems achieved through violent means 
to rationalize violent outcomes. 
The Untreatable -The case of Carlton Anthony Williams:  
 
In the case of Carlton Anthony Williams, we see a primary focus on biomedical 
mental illness that is associated with dangerousness, and only treatable with medications. 
18 Shortly after the Not Criminally Responsible Reform Act passed the House of Commons on June 19, 
2013 and the Faster Removal of Foreign Criminals Act received Royal Assent on June 20, 2013 
(Department of Justice, 2013; Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2013). 
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The responsibilities for these individually localized issues are placed solely on Carlton. In 
doing so, any forces or factors outside of a biomedical explanation are eliminated from 
consideration. Carlton is then held accountable to this individually directed responsibility, 
reinforcing a portrayal of him as careless and uncooperative with rules and laws. The 
accuracy of his assessment or diagnosis, the efficacy of his treatments and the 
responsibility of his caregivers is dismissed from consideration. Carlton is constructed as 
an antisocial, aggressive, and hostile serious criminal who cannot be controlled, separate 
from his mental illness, thereby generating a baseline rationale for the authorization of 
violence. The professionals and authorities responsible for his monitoring and care 
legitimate his incarceration and removal through the deployment of psychiatric, juridical, 
and eugenic moral discourses that convey expertise, demonstrate and reproduce 
hegemony, and erase or dismiss information that would make their claims and reasoning 
permeable to criticism.  
3 documents19analyzed: 
 
1. Application to reconsider removal order 2005 
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Williams, 2005 CanLII 56880 (IRB).  
 
2. A Judicial review by the Federal Court  2006 
Williams v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1402 
(CanLII).  
 
3. Appeal to Immigration and Appeal Division 2008 
Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Williams, 2008 CanLII 
58124 (IRB).  
 
 
19 The documents will be references at the beginning of their first reference so as not to 
further crowd the text with lengthy and repeated in-text citations. 
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A removal order was made for Carlton Anthony Williams in 2002 for Serious 
Criminality (Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Williams, 2005). He was granted a 
stay of the removal order with conditions. In 2005, the Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration filed to have Carlton’s stay cancelled and for Carlton to be deported. An 
appeal was filed to reconsider Carlton’s case in 2005. The appeal was dismissed. Carlton 
and his family took the case to the federal court to appeal based on a misrepresentation of 
the powers of the Ontario Review Board in the consideration of Carlton’s Appeal. The 
Federal court allowed for the appeal to be heard and the Immigration and Appeal 
Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board granted Carlton stay of the removal 
order with conditions for a period of four years with an increase to his conditions. 
Carlton is firstly described as a serious criminal, who is severely mentally ill, 
addicted to crack cocaine, and aggressive and hostile due to “antisocial traits”. He is 
described as having “amassed over at least 50 criminal convictions”. Listed are “assault, 
sexual assault, failure to comply, attempted break and enter, drug trafficking, harassment 
and failure to appear”.   Of the seven charges listed two are related to appearances in 
court or compliance with a condition imposed by the courts. Carlton has a supportive 
family and “had made significant progress in understanding his mental illness and its 
treatment”  
His original conditions included an obligation to continue psychotherapy with a 
psychiatrist. Carlton was held responsible for “making reasonable efforts to maintain 
himself in a condition to prevent his mental illness and substance abuse from conducting 
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himself in a manner dangerous to himself and others from committing further offences”.  
He was also expected to not associate with any other known criminals.  
After Carlton’s initial stay, he was charged by officers for assault. No details of 
context to the charges were given except that Carlton was found not criminally 
responsible by reason of mental disorder for half of the charges and criminally 
responsible for the other half. He was then under the observation of the Ontario review 
board and ordered to be detained at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health in 
Toronto for “custody and rehabilitation”. Carlton is evaluated as individually responsible 
for failing to adhere to the condition of his stay and order for the stay to be canceled and 
for Carlton to be deported. The rationale given is through a consideration of the Ribic20 
factors: 
Accordingly, the Ribic factors are: 
a. the seriousness of the offences leading to the deportation order; 
b. the possibility of rehabilitation; 
c. the length of time spent in Canada and the degree to which the appellant is established 
here; 
d. the family in Canada and the dislocation to the family that deportation would cause; 
e. support available to the appellant, within the family and within the community; and 
20 The leading case on this matter is Ribic v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] I.A.D.D. No. 
636, affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Chieu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 
S.C.R. 84. 
In Ribic, the IAD noted that: In each case the Board looks to the same general areas to determine if having regard to all 
the circumstances of the case, the person should not be removed from Canada. These circumstances include the 
seriousness of the offence or offences leading to the deportation and the possibility of rehabilitation or in the 
alternative, the circumstances surrounding the failure to meet the conditions of admission which led to the deportation 
order. The Board looks to the length of time spent in Canada and the degree to which the appellant is established; 
family in Canada and the dislocation to that family that deportation of the appellant would cause; the support available 
for the appellant not only within the family but also within the community and the degree of hardship that would be 
caused to the appellant by his return to his country of nationality. While the general areas of review are similar in each 
case the facts are rarely, if ever, identical. 
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f. potential foreign hardship the appellant will face in the likely country of removal. 
The Immigration Appeals Division also states its mandate to: 
The panel is also guided bysection 3(1)(h) of IRPA, which states that: 
3(1) The objectives of this Act with respect to immigration 
are 
(h) to protect the health and safety of 
Canadians and to maintain the security of 
Canadian society… 
 
 In 2006, Carlton appeals to have his case reviewed at the Federal court level 
because Carlton feels his potential foreign hardship was not considered and that the panel 
has misinterpreted the jurisdiction of the Ontario Review Board which would not release 
him into society unless he was no longer a danger to the public (Williams v. Canada, 
2006). The federal court agreed that conditions could be imposed to address the issue of 
concern that the ORB could release Carlton without the IAD knowing or having an 
ability to decide if this is in the best interest of the health and safety of Canadian Society. 
In 2008, the IAD then adds a condition to have Carlton report to the IAD if he is released 
into the community (Canada v. Williams, 2008). His appeal to the IAD to dismiss the 
removal order due to potential foreign hardship is acknowledged by the panel as 
something that would put Carlton in a worse-off situation but is rejected as something 
that “would not shock the conscience of Canadians, particularly if the appellant is 
unwilling or unable to pursue medical treatment in Canada or his condition is not 
treatable and it is necessary to execute the removal order so as to protect the Canadian 
public.”  
A reliance on the individual in biomedical terms permits an erasure of the social, 
political and historical circumstances relevant to all people. Also, ideas of individual 
biomedical bases for mental or emotional suffering become and are reproduced as the 
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only option for intervention. Supports or care at the community or state level are 
dismissed and taken as irrelevant.  i.e., “having been diagnosed with paranoid 
schizophrenia in 1990 as well as a personality disorder…He is also troubled by frequent 
psychotic episodes and paranoid delusions because of which he believes others will harm 
him and can read his mind… it was noted the applicant was consistently non-compliant in 
respect of taking medication and attending at his psychiatrist”. The ability for a critique of 
the availability or adequacy of support is also erased through a refocusing of 
responsibility on the individual. Any criticisms regarding the efficacy of the treatment, 
why the individual may have discontinued medication or therapy are dismissed; any 
harmful side effects or experiences are rejected in favor of an emphasis on “compliance”. 
The goal or achievement not being wellness but rather whether or not one can comply 
with the demands to take medications, be observed and agree with the biomedical 
understanding of their mental and emotional distress. Carlton was identified with mental 
illness 16 years prior to 2005 appeal yet no comment is made regarding any failings on 
behalf of professionals in assessment or treatment. The opportunity for an 
acknowledgement of Carlton’s capacities and strengths is bleak within an individual 
biomedical focus. His 29 years of history in Canada, his refusals to be deported and 
appeals are not taken as evidence of any sort of capability or capacity. The implication is 
that Carlton is untreatable, he is fundamentally, biologically, or genetically inferior or 
faulty. 
The Untreatable- The case of Kevin Sheldon Bennett: 
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In this decision, the Immigration, criminal justice and mental health systems 
collaborate to ensure a common outcome, the removal of the undesirable person from 
society, and the control or elimination of a perceived threat to Canadian society which 
Kevin is not considered to be a part of, despite his 29 years of life in Canada and his 
resistance through his appeals. Kevin’s humanity is erased from this story, one that 
permits the use of harmful treatments, the elimination of freedoms, and the need for 
perpetual surveillance and biological control. Kevin’s identity is constructed as a non-
Canadian foreign Other, who must be confined/imprisoned. He is excluded from the 
protection of Canadian law, and viewed always as a potential threat. 
In this case, Kevin is constructed as someone who is incapable of having freedom, 
he is described solely as a biological anomaly, untreatable, genetically different, and form 
of subhuman person on whom medications are not effective. If he is non-compliant with 
psychiatry, these items would not be weighted in his favour as he would be considered a 
“danger to the Canadian public”. The use of discretionary authority and the selective 
interpretation of law are crucial to the achievement of this outcome. The interdependence 
of the mental health, criminal justice and immigration systems are absolutely necessary to 
confine decision criteria to individual biomedical matters, to notions of criminality, and 
to permit the IAD to weigh these matters as they chose for their desired outcome.  
One document was available for analysis: 
1. Immigration Appeals Division decision January 2011 
Bennett v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2011 CanLII 
87450 (IRB).  
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Mr. Kevin Sheldon Bennett appealed a removal order dated July 15, 2008 for 
serious criminality (Bennett v. Canada, 2011).  The decision document states at the 
introduction that a joint recommendation was accepted for a stay of 2.5 years with 
conditions. The document states that the legal validity of the deportation order itself was 
not challenged and is therefore legally valid. The appeal considered whether there are 
sufficient humanitarian or compassionate grounds that support a stay. Sheldon is 
described as “a 43-year old citizen of Trinidad and Tobago. He landed in Canada on May 
13, 1982 as a 14-year old teenager.  He was born on February 11, 1968”. He has been an 
in Canada for 29 years which is over 2/3rds of his life.  
Mr. Bennett’s is said to have testified at two hearings in 2010 and 2011. His 
mother is his designated representative who was appointed in 2009. Mr. Bennett was 
present for the second hearing in 2010 and testified for himself. His mother testified on 
his behalf in 2010. The document claims that “the panel has regard for the Ribic factors” 
but qualifies this by stating “These factors are not exhaustive and the weight given to 
them may vary according to the particular circumstances of the case”. 
The document notes that the Panel has “paid attention to “ section 3 (h,e,i) of the 
IRPA, “to protect the health and safety of Canadians and to maintain the security of 
Canadian society”, “to promote the successful integration of permanent residents into 
Canada, while recognizing that integration involves mutual obligations for new 
immigrants and Canadian society” and “to promote international justice and security by 
fostering respect for human rights and by denying access to Canadian territory to persons 
who are criminals or security risks”, and ”The document provides the specificity of the 
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Supreme Court of Canada in Medovarski case where  the objectives expressed in the 
IRPA were “viewed collectively” to  “communicate a strong desire to treat criminals and 
security threats less leniently than under the former Act”. The Panel makes it clear in the 
document that “It is the appellant’s onus to establish sufficient humanitarian and 
compassionate factors through evidence that is sufficiently clear, cogent and convincing, 
in order to get special relief”. 
In determining the “seriousness of the appellant’s criminal conduct” the panel 
begins by providing a brief listing of Kevin’s convictions and sentences. His charges 
include assault causing bodily harm, theft under $1000, uttering threats (two charges), 
and assault with a weapon. The panel also lists a charge from December of 2010 even 
though this charge has been withdrawn.  Subsequent to the listing of charges without 
reference to the contexts or details (i.e., what kind of weapon, the nature of the threats, 
were the petty thefts for food? etc.), the panel claims “The appellant’s criminality is very 
serious.  He can be dangerous and has demonstrated an escalating propensity for 
violence.” 
In the section devoted to the “possibility of rehabilitation and the likelihood of 
reoffending”, the document noted that Kevin was being held in a “secure wing of the 
Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH) and therefore not present at the 
hearing”. With regard to Kevin’s mental health, the panel describes that “there is 
significant reliable documentary evidence on the appellant’s serious mental illness” and 
that the has “approximately 30 arrest under the mental health act”. In this statement the 
panel associates any enforcement of the mental health act whether it be due to a 
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perceived or potential harm to Kevin from himself, due to lack of self-care, attempted 
suicide, cutting etc., or harm possibly to others, whether he is taken by police or 
ambulance or by family members using a Form 2 or requesting assistance to take Kevin 
to hospital for an assessment- all here are considered arrests.  Kevin has been on ODSP 
since 1994, 17 years. The Document states that “based on the medical evidence, I find 
that there is a nexus between the appellant’s mental illness and his pattern of criminality”.  
A Psychiatrist of the “COTA Health-ACT Team (Community Occupational 
Therapy Associate-COTA) (Recovery Oriented Assertive Community Treatment-
ACT))”, who has been Kevin’s attending Psychiatrist since September 2010 reports that 
Kevin “suffers from a severe and persistent form of schizophrenia.”. An ACT team is a 
multi-disciplinary community-based mental health team with powers to dispense and 
observe medication in the community 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The teams are 
standardized in Ontario and are comprised of a Psychiatrist, nurses, occupational 
therapists, and social workers, often with specializations in addictions, criminal justice, 
and sometimes social recreational programming. Specifically the Psychiatrist’s report is 
quoted in the Panel’s decision document stating,  
“During the CAMH admission, the antipsychotic medication, Clozapine 
was introduced, and Mr. Bennett underwent a course of electro-convulsive 
treatments (ECT) that eventually produced mental stability.  Adjunctive 
medications, including long-acting medication (Clopixol 200mg 
administered biweekly) and the mood stabilizer, Lithium carbonate, were 
also prescribed .towards achieving this result.  With the exception of the 
ECT, all of the above treatments remain in place.”  
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Here the sedation (via the Clopixol and Clozapine) and memory loss (via the ECT) Kevin 
has endured is used as evidence for his need for such treatments as they are described as 
producing "mental stability". 
The Psychiatrist’s report is also referenced to report on his Community Treatment 
Order which requires him to have his medications overseen by the ACT team as well as 
seeing the psychiatrist once per month. The Psychiatrist notes that “The treatment team is 
not aware of any incidents of aggression or even threatening behaviour over the past four 
months of community residence.  There was one day he inadvertently missed a dose of 
Clozapine and he immediately became paranoid, but he did not become agitated.  With 
resumption of the Clozapine the next day, he quickly returned to his best baseline.” Here 
the Psychiatrist provides support for Kevin’ “need” for Clozapine, threatening instability 
if even one dose it missed.  
The psychiatrist also reports that Kevin is “incapable of making treatment 
decisions” and his substitute decision maker will renew the CTO when the current 6 
month period is over.  The Doctor states that  
“It should be noted that one major reason for the use of the CTO is the fact 
that Mr. Bennett does suffer from a significant degree of treatment 
refractory disorganisation (emphasis added) which produces a 
circumstance in which he needs a high degree of support to sustain steady 
administration of medication, his current level of mental stability and his 
residential status.  Our ACT Team had daily contact with him, and to date, 
have been able to keep up this level of support, largely because of his 
patient cooperation with everything that is entailed by his treatment plan." 
 
Treatment refractory disorganization is a term used in Psychiatry, especially in 
cases of Schizophrenia where the use of tranquilizers/sedatives/antipsychotic/neuroleptics 
or other "psychiatric treatments" are ineffective (Elkis, 2010). The term was used as early 
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as 1950 for the drug chlorpromazine and quite heavily as of late to rationalize the use of 
Clozapine for people diagnosed with Schizophrenia (Elkis, 2010). Clozapine causes 
agranulocytosis, a dangerous reduction in white blood cells requiring weekly blood test 
when it is used. Clozapine can also cause diabetes, bowel infarction all of which can 
cause death (Townsend & Curtis, 2006). 
Kevin's ECT shocks, his injection medication (Clopixol), his dangerous 
tranquilizers (Clozapine), his loss of freedom (due to the assignment of a substitute 
decision maker, CTO and ACT team) are all seen as necessary due to his "treatment-
refractory disorganization".  The inefficacies of the Psychiatric treatments themselves, 
the individualized focus of their biomedical interventions are eliminated from the 
determination of Kevin's freedom. Kevin's "mental stability" is dependent on this, and the 
ongoing necessity for the use of violence, coercion, and restrictions on his freedoms are 
required due to "treatment-refractory disorganization". 
The Psychiatrist concludes that  
“In general, it should be noted that treatment with Clozapine often reduces 
impulsive and violent behaviour in people with Schizophrenia.  After eight 
months of treatment with this medication, it appears that Mr. Bennett is 
experiencing this benefit.  As long as he remains fully compliant with this 
medication, it is likely that he will continue to pose a reduced risk to 
public safety, other factors remaining the same, such as residential 
stability and his present apparent non-abuse of substance.”  
 
His freedom and ability to remain in Canada are dependent on his cooperation with 
violent and harmful treatments, an elimination of freedom, and a complete submission to 
an individualized assessment of his issues. 
  The same psychiatrist is quotes from a report from 2010 stating that  
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“Mr. Bennett has been definitively diagnosed with Schizophrenia, which 
in the past has featured quite severe symptomatology, both on account of 
non-adherence to medication, but also because most of the medications he 
was treated with were relatively ineffective in abating his psychotic 
symptoms as compared with his present treatment.  This incomplete 
treatment produced a pattern of homelessness and legal difficulties which 
in turn undermined efforts to provide ongoing mental health care and to 
ensure mental stability.”  
 
In the psychiatrist’s opinion, Kevin’s experiences of homelessness and legal difficulties 
are the result of his “incomplete treatment”, “compared with his present treatment”.  
Regardless of his current status, his “treatment-Refractory disorganization”, his need for 
a substitute decision maker, a CTO, his “present treatment” is described as somehow 
effective, ensuring that he will not become involved with the law or homeless. 
Kevin’s discharge into the community on a CTO under the supervision of the 
COTA-ACT team is described as a “relief from his psychotic symptoms due to 
treatment” from Clozapine and ECT “reserved for the most treatment refractory cases of 
Schizophrenia”. The psychiatrist is quoted again to make the link between Kevin’s 
criminality and his mental health,  
“While I am not intending to dismiss the relevance of other factors in his 
historical pattern of legal difficulties, in this case it is reasonable to assert 
than untreated mental illness was a significant contributory factor, and 
likely the primary factor in the problematic course which pre-dated his 
recent CAMH admission”,  
 
The statement effectively dismisses any other factors related to the legal charges and 
stating that “untreated mental illness” was “likely the primary factor” in Kevin’s 
criminality. The document names the psychiatrists who have issued and who will monitor 
the CTO and the primary worker on the treatment plan, providing legitimacy and 
authority to its validity.  The panel notes that they have also considered the opinions of 
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two other CAMH psychiatrists which also aims to provide legitimacy and authority to the 
validity of this decision.  
In item 28 of the decision document, Kevin’s perspective is presented, which is 
summarized as testimony that indicates that “he is aware of the importance of taking his 
medication.” A glimpse into the life that Kevin must agree to in order to stay the order for 
deportation is revealed: 
“The appellant testified about the assault causing bodily harm incident, the 
offence which brought about the deportation order.  He also identified his 
mental illness as schizophrenia, which causes a chemical imbalance in the 
brain.  He indicated that he takes medication: pills every day and a needle 
once a month. He subsequently said he has a needle two times per week.  
According to him, the side effects of the pills are terrible, causing 
drowsiness and nausea.  He was given pills that would address the 
vomiting.   He said that he has taken medication, eleven pills, every day, 
except he forgot to take one of the eleven pills required every day, once or 
twice.  He also has diabetes, for which he also takes medication.  He only 
has to take one pill at night, by himself.  He indicated that ACT sees him 
every day to ensure he takes his medication.   The appellant testified that 
he is staying healthy by taking medication, eating properly and sleeping 
properly.  He said he submits to blood and urine testing.  Since his release, 
they have adjusted his medication by lessening the amount of Lithium.  
The appellant’s testimony indicated that he is aware of the importance of 
taking his medication” 
 
 The panel finds that Kevin will then likely comply with the conditions of his stay 
if his mother and ACT help him. The document reiterates that Kevin is supervised taking 
his medication every day by the ACT team, has subsidized housing and sees his 
psychiatrist regularly. 
The conclusion of the panel based on his likelihood of rehabilitation is,  
 
“Therefore, on a balance I find that the appellant’s mental illness is an 
underlying reason for his pattern of criminality.  Based on the medical 
evidence, as long as he has a high level of structured and daily support 
from ACT, and the support of his mother, to ensure he takes his 
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medication, he refrains from abusing substances, his mental stability and 
his residential status there is the possibility of rehabilitation, which 
reduces the likelihood of him re-offending and posing a danger to the 
public.  I am satisfied based on the evidence that the appellant has the 
requisite high level of community and family support in regards to his 
rehabilitation.   This is a factor in his favour”. 
 
In determining the degree of establishment in Canada, the Panel notes that the 
Federal court considers the criteria for establishment from the Archibald21 case. The 
panel states that since Kevin is a long term resident, and has family, friends, is on ODSP, 
and has housing,  
 “As noted by the Court in Archibald, financial factors should not be given 
precedence over social factors in assessing establishment; both must be 
considered…Under the circumstances, the appellant’s lack of economic 
establishment does not diminish the weight I give to his time in Canada 
and his ties to the country.  Overall, this factor weighs in favour of 
granting a stay”.  
 
With respect to the degree of hardship Kevin would face if deported, it is accepted 
that Kevin would face significant hardship if he was sent back to Trinidad & Tobago and 
this was in Kevin’s favour.  The final decisions allows for a stay for 2.3 years with 15 
21 “(i)      Length of residence in Canada; 
(ii)       The age at which one comes to Canada; 
(iii)     Length of residence elsewhere; frequency of trips abroad and the   quality of contacts 
with people there; 
(iv)      Where one is educated, particularly in adolescence and later years; 
(v)       Where one's immediate family is; 
(vi)      Where one's nuclear family lives and the ties that members of the   nuclear family have 
with the local community; 
(vii)     Where the individual lives; 
(viii)    Where his friends are; the existence of professional or employment qualifications 
which tie one to a place, and the existence of employment contracts.” 
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conditions that include demands for reporting, adherence to psychiatric treatment, the 
surrendering of documents, and not using illegal substances. 
In this decision, psychiatric expertise and testimony is relied upon heavily and 
extensively as evidence requiring Kevin to submit to complete psychiatric surveillance 
including the authority of psychiatry to have control over his freedom to make decisions 
and to live in the community, in a psychiatric institution or to stay in Canada after the two 
years. The Immigration, criminal justice and mental health system collaborate to ensure a 
common outcome, the removal of the undesirable person from society, and the control or 
elimination of a perceived threat to Canadian society which Kevin is not considered to be 
a part of, despite his 29 years of life in Canada. This lengthy history in Canada is reduced 
to a history of psychiatric issues and criminal justice issues beginning in 2004 when the 
deportation order was first issued for serious criminality. His humanity is erased from this 
story, one that permits the use of harmful treatments, the elimination of freedoms, and the 
need for perpetual surveillance and biological control.  
The picture painted of Kevin is one that sees him as incapable of being free, a 
body in need of civilizing, a servant of our pharmaceutical industrial machine in need of a 
master. He is constructed as a biological anomaly, untreatable, genetically different, and 
an inferior person that is resistant to treatment even though he takes the medication that 
he is prescribed and submits to all observation and reporting requirements. In the end, the 
deportation order is still valid in law and if Kevin were to resist the harmful treatments or 
refuse the restrictions placed upon him via his community treatment order or make any 
decision for himself while he is deemed incapable, he would be in violation of his 
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conditions, thereby reinforcing a case for his “serious criminality” and his removal from 
Canada.  
Since Kevin has submitted to the coercive observational, psychiatric and decision 
making requirement, the hardship he would face if removed from Canada is considered 
valid. The hardship to his family if he is removed is also considered and his lack of 
financial establishment is not weighted against him. If he is non-compliant with 
psychiatry, these items would not be weighted in his favour as he would be considered a 
“danger to the Canadian public”.  
The use of discretionary authority and the selective interpretation of law are 
crucial to the achievement of this outcome. The interdependence of the mental health, 
criminal justice and immigration systems are absolutely necessary to confine decision 
criteria to individual biomedical matters, to notions of criminality, and to permit the IAD 
to weigh these matters as they chose for their desired outcome. Kevin is still not 
Canadian, confined/imprisoned, excluded from the protection of Canadian law, a threat, 
an anomaly and an Other. Regardless of the work being done to rationalize violence 
against Kevin he demonstrates an ongoing capacity for resistance through his appeals.  
The Untreatable-The case of Guhad Mahamoud Hassan: 
 
In the case of Guhad Mahamoud Hassan, the criminal justice, immigration and 
mental health system collaborate to fashion Guhad as a person who will forever be 
biomedically ill and therefore can never be free from psychiatric authority and 
surveillance. To achieve this outcome the panel acts to dismiss Guhad’s testimony to 
define what allowable hardship is for Guhad. Guhad’s context as a convention refugee, 
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who lost his mother to suicide and his father to war, and his sexual orientation are 
systematically rendered irrelevant to perceive a threatening body  who is biomedically 
different, violent, and in need of external control. While his testimony, sexual orientation, 
family and political history are stripped from him, he spends over 18 months incarcerated 
awaiting his due process. 
One Document was available for analysis: 
 
1) Immigration Appeal Decision 2007 
Hassan v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2007 CanLII 
70790 (IRB) 
 
A deportation order was made for Guhad Mahamoud Hassan in February of 2007 
(Hassan v. Canada, 2007). Guhad was charged with an offence (assault causing bodily 
harm in 2005) that qualifies him for inadmissibility on the grounds of serious criminality 
(i.e. “an offence punishable by a maximum sentence of at least 10 years imprisonment or 
of an offence under an Act of Parliament for which a term of imprisonment of more than 
six months has been imposed”). Guhad appealed this deportation order.  
Guhad is described as a 29 year old male who was born in Somalia, came to 
Canada in 1986 and became a permanent resident in 1992. Guhad has been in Canada for 
21 years. He was convicted of another charge of assault causing bodily harm in May of 
2006, was sentenced to a term of imprisonment and has since been on “immigration 
hold” as the Toronto West Detention Centre awaiting the results of his appeal. The panel 
notes the evidence it is considering: the appellant’s testimony, and 2 documents 
submitted by the appellant, the CPIC listing of criminal conviction and police reports and  
“related documents”. The panel notes that there is no challenge to the legal validity of the 
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deportation order itself and the appeal is therefore considering humanitarian and 
compassionate grounds. The panel has decided to stay the deportation order for 3 years. 
The decision document also states that they have evaluated the appeal based on the Ribic 
factors.  
The panel lists that Guhad has been convicted of five criminal offences dating 
back to 1998 which includes 3 assaults, two of which were assaults causing bodily harm. 
The panel comments that “these assaults are serious and the appellant poses a threat to 
Canadians”. The panel notes that Guhad’s history and country of origin are a significant 
facto in the panel’s decision. Guhad came as a Convention refugee seeker and was 
allowed to come to Canada as part of a special program after he fled Somalia for Kenya. 
After he was accepted in 1986, he came to Toronto. 
The document also notes “The appellant’s parents are both dead.  His mother died 
of an apparent suicide in 1976 and, according to the appellant, she suffered from serious 
mental illness and depression.  The appellant’s father was killed in March 1986 in the 
course of the civil unrest then plaguing Somalia.” Guhad has four siblings, three of whom 
live in the U.K. He has little contact with them. 
The decision document states “The appellant claims to be homosexual; however, 
he has not had any recent relationships, his previous encounter dating to when he was 14 
years old.  The appellant has never had relations with a woman.  The appellant testified 
that he cannot admit to being homosexual as this would not be accepted in the Somali 
community.  The panel finds that the appellant’s sexual orientation is not a significant 
factor in this appeal”. The panel choses to imply that the Guhad’s disclosure of his sexual 
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orientation is somehow invalid or false and then accept this implication as grounds for 
not considering persecution on the grounds of sexual orientation as a factor in favour of 
his appeal.  
Guhad is described as having “last worked in 1994.  He has no assets, real or 
personal property.  He lives on social assistance (Ontario Disability Support Program) 
upon which he has relied frequently since 1997.  Up until the time of his incarceration he 
was receiving upwards of $1,200 per month in addition to drug and dental benefits.”  
They also comment that he has worked as a butcher but has been unable to do that since 
“becoming mentally ill in 1995”.    
The decision document notes that a Dr. Gojer reported that Guhad “is suffering 
from Schizoaffective Disorder This is a major mental illness with features of both 
Schizophrenia and a Bipolar Disorder.  Essentially, this disorder leaves a person with 
altered mood states and psychotic symptoms like delusions and hallucinations.  At the 
height of the illness the individual loses touch with reality.” It is also noted that “Dr. 
Julian A. C. Gojer, Forensic Psychiatrist, provided a report on the appellant dated 
September 12, 2007. The panel considered Dr. Gojer’s Cirriclum [sic]Vitae and is 
satisfied that he is qualified to make a psychiatric report” 
The document notes Dr. Gojer’s descriptions of Guhad reporting that Guhad has 
had issues with drugs and alcohol that “had an aggravating effect on his illness” and that 
his illness has been associated with aggressive behaviours.  The doctor also reports that 
Guhad “is presently stable and not showing any signs of mental illness”. The panel 
describes that Guhad’s assault occurred when he was hearing voices telling him to do so. 
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In 2005 he hears these voices telling him to hurt another patient at a hospital while he 
was being treated. Guhad also testified that he sometimes forgets to take his medication 
and needs somebody to help him remember. The document details the panel’s view that 
“On the basis of the evidence the panel finds that the appellant is mentally ill and that 
when he is not medicated he poses a threat to people.  The appellant’s criminality is a 
direct consequence of his mental illness.” 
Guhad reports that he plans to go live in Ottawa with his uncle who is a social 
worker if he is not deported. Guhad reported to the panel that he will follow up with Dr. 
Gojer in Ottawa when he is living with his uncle. Dr. Gojer agreed and stated “He will 
need close follow up and regular monitoring of urine samples to ensure that he is 
compliant with abstinence form (sic) drugs”. 
The panel notes in the decision document that Guhad testified that he would never 
want to return to Somalia. His fears being that of persecution with respect to his sexual 
orientation and for fear of becoming unwell again. The respondent (The Minister of 
Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) submitted that Guhad posed a public threat 
and his risk of re-offending was high also that deporting Guhad would cause hardship 
“but other than the appellant no one else would be affected by his removal.” 
The conclusion states that the panel finds that Guhad has no establishment in 
Canada and minimal family support. Also, “When he is not medicated or abusing drugs 
and alcohol he is at risk of committing violence seemingly at random”. The panel reports 
that Guhad “clearly requires close medical supervision and monitoring to ensure his 
compliance with medication and abstinence from alcohol and illegal drugs”. The panel 
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likes the idea of Guhad following up with Dr. Gojer in Ottawa. They demand that 
evidence be provided in one year of his compliance with medical treatment and 
supervision.  Guhad is also required to “bring evidence of the adequacy of his living 
arrangements and his compliance with the requirement that he not associate with none 
drug and alcohol abuses” and demonstrate that he is attending drug/alcohol abuse 
counseling.  
The panel also concludes that Guhad’s “hardship should he be deported would 
result from the difficulty of obtaining medical treatment which could result in his 
becoming ill again”.  Their conclusion erases Guhad’s submission with regards to his 
sexual orientation and his fear of persecution. In doing so the panel preemptively 
undermines any possibility for an appeal based on humanitarian and compassionate 
grounds in this regard. The panel agreed to a stay of 3 years with 16 conditions for 
reporting and compliance. Any breach of conditions, any new charges will result in the 
cancellation of his stay and deportation from Canada. 
Guhad will be forever sick as his identity is constructed in this case and he will 
never be free. His violence is rationalized through three of the panel’s statements: 
1. “When he is not medicated or abusing drugs and alcohol he is at risk of 
committing violence seemingly at random”.  
2. “clearly requires close medical supervision and monitoring to ensure his 
compliance with medication and abstinence from alcohol and illegal drugs”. 
3. “On the basis of the evidence the panel finds that the appellant is mentally ill and 
that when he is not medicated he poses a threat to people.  The appellant’s 
criminality is a direct consequence of his mental illness.” 
 
The final decision appears to name then dismiss historical, social and political 
considerations for Guhad. The panel noted (a rarity among these cases) that “history and 
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country of origin are a significant factor in the panel’s decision”. The panel erases 
Guhad’s testimony in their decision and replaces it with their determination of what 
would be hardship for him. In the end, his 21 years of life in Canada, the fact that he 
came to Canada as a convention refugee via a special program from Somalia in 1986 
(which was the beginning of the Somali rebellion that started the civil war that continues 
to this day), the deaths of his parents (his mother by suicide and his father during the 
1986 rebellion), as well as his sexual orientation and the circumstances of his fear of 
persecutions are all reduced to a biomedical anomaly, a predisposition to violence and 
drug use that is threatening to Canadian society and a body in need of external control.  
The complexity of his life, the problem of voices telling him to hurt others while 
in hospital and taking medications as well as his states of wellness are lost in the finality 
of the panel’s decision. The ongoing threat of deportation itself is not considered a 
hardship for Guhad nor is the “immigration hold” he has been on at the Toronto West 
Detention Centre for a 18 months. He is a biological concern which is totally explained 
by Dr. Gojer and can be supervised as such. If this arrangement should fail, the 
accountability lies with Guhad alone.  
In the cases of Carlton, Kevin and Guhad, ideas of individual biomedical bases 
for mental or emotional suffering become reproduced as the only option for intervention. 
In Kevin’s ECT, harmful medication and a life under the surveillance and power of 
psychiatric authority is all that remains. The histories, social and political circumstances 
for them are erased.  The immigration, criminal justice and mental health system 
collaborate to impose a restriction to what is considered by establishing a hierarchy of 
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authority, the rationalization of violence, and the construction of an identity that is 
permanently biologically defective. The products are (re)productions of violent 
technologies and practices used to individualize social problems, deny public 
responsibility, deploy harm rationalized as treatment, and restrict how knowledge is 
authorized and legitimated. The outcomes are the violent separation of people by 
arbitrarily accepted perceived genetic variation and the segregation of people based on 
notions of (national or racial) origin. 
The Unrehabilitatable: the inherently criminal, the dangerous, the savage 
 
The cases of Carlton Anthony William (represented as exemplary for the 
interdependent constructions of the identities of untreatability, unrehabilitatble 
criminality and undeserving foreign Other), Nur Mohamad Jama and Niranjan 
Simbasivam illustrate the practices and technologies involved in the construction of an 
identity of that of an unrehabilitable criminal and the utility of this construction to 
achieve a desired outcome (deportation or containment). The dehumanized, 
unrehabilitatable criminal who is inherently dangerous and a threat to the Canadian 
public is a construction relied upon when biomedical rationale or immigration 
determinations alone do not provide the legitimizations necessary to authorize violence. 
This construction, its procedures and its outcomes depend on the cooperation of mental 
health, criminal justice and immigration systems.  
The cases of Carlton Anthony Williams, Nur Mohamad Jama and Niranjan 
Sambasivam demonstrate how the confluence and criminal justice, immigration and 
mental health systems operates to consolidate notions of unrehabilitatable criminality. 
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The criminality established in these cases is achieved by distancing mental health issues 
from criminality so as not to encourage a consideration that would suggest more support 
for a person. Rather, the support given (which is validated and authorized as effective 
treatment) only works to support the idea of a criminal who is a subordinate type of 
person. These decisions rely on the practice of evoking the idea of a subhuman, incapable 
of civility, and deserving of violence the application of discretionary and selective 
interpretation to achieve a desired outcome and the replication of forms of racialized 
subjugation presented as modern, progressive rational and reasoned decision making.   
The idea of the unrehabilitatable criminal is a necessity at the confluence of 
mental health, criminal justice and immigration systems as it permits the invocation of a 
legitimated position of moral authority. This position upholds its persona as a protector of 
the Canadian public through its selective attention to mental illness (when this attention 
serves the purpose of containment, exclusion or generally authorizing violence), while 
delineating a caveat that will ultimately require containment or removal. The practices 
and technologies involved it its replication (the notion of criminality and the protector), 
remake for us the discursive and material conditions for the existence of an 
unrehabilitatable person, void of social, historical and political contexts, and deserving of 
violence.  This notion of criminality alone would fail in the absence of an attention to 
mental health/illness. Through the confluence of mental health, immigration, and 
criminal justice systems, the Canadian identity is (re)established as a moral authority, 
relying on progressive decision making, including professionally legitimated knowledge 
and expertise and separate from a biologically inferior, inherently criminal Other. 
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The Unrehabilitatable - The case of Carlton Anthony Williams continued: 
In the case of Carlton Anthony Williams, the notion of inherent criminality is 
achieved through the categorization of charges deemed as due to mental illness and those 
deemed to be due to criminal, aggressive or hostile tendencies.  An emphasis on the 
number of charges is also used to shore up ideas of inherent criminality regardless of how 
many were laid by authorities after a realization that the person is suffering from mental 
of emotional distress. Charges laid for failure to appear, failure to comply, those laid by 
authorities during arrest, while enforcing conditions, or laid parallel to those deemed due 
to mental illness  are all considered as evidence for inherent criminality.   He is also 
depicted as a risk to the public and a threat to the public, i.e. “Further, the evidence 
provided by those responsible for assessing his state of health indicated that he continued to 
be a risk to the public and was unaware of his aggressive demeanor or the details of past 
criminal behavior”.  
The ideas of risk and threat are propagated throughout the text even though Carlton 
has been and will continue to be under strict observation.  Carlton is given condition stated 
as demands without the incorporations of supports that would make these conditions 
achievable. For example, in the 2005 decision, his previous stay conditions are listed as 
those Carlton has failed to comply with and immediately following is a ruling that due to 
a prediction of his failure with these conditions, his stay should be cancelled and he 
should be deported. During his subsequent 2008 appeal decision, these conditions are re-
imposed without any comment or consideration of why they failed, the acknowledgment 
of a requirement for more supports, or that the imposition of such conditions have and 
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will be used against Carlton in the future to support his construction as inherently 
criminal. His final stay conditions included 18 requirements for reporting, attending 
treatment and complying with psychiatry, all directing sole responsibility to Carlton for 
their success or failure. i.e.,  
“[12] Make reasonable efforts to maintain yourself in such condition that: 
a) your chronic schizophrenia and/or substance abuse will not cause you to conduct 
yourself in a manner dangerous to yourself or anyone else; and, 
b) it is not likely you will commit further offences.” 
 
If Carlton does achieve a level of wellness that permits his discharge into the 
community he is ordered to comply with extensive reporting requirements within 10 days 
and then every six months to the Ontario Review Board, the Immigration and Refugee 
Board and the Canada Border Services Agency regarding his mental status and treatment 
as reported by a psychiatrist and: 
“The reports are to contain details of the appellant’s: 
- employment or efforts to obtain employment if unemployed; 
- current living arrangements; 
- marital status including common-law relationships; 
- attendance at any educational institution and any change in that attendance;  
- participation in psychotherapy or counselling (please specify type); 
- meetings with parole officer, including details of any violations of the conditions 
of parole; 
- other relevant changes of personal circumstances.” 
 
Any failure to report will be seen as another piece of evidence supporting Carlton’s 
serious criminality.  
The Unrehabilitatable - The case of Nur Mohamed Jama:  
In the case of Nur Mohamed Jama, the process of constructing an inherently 
unrehabilitatable criminal, the authorization of his incarceration for two years, and his 
eventual deportation to Somalia is exposed for its reliance on dehumanizing practices. To 
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legitimize this outcome, the mental health, criminal justice and immigration system work 
interdependently to limit the consideration of Nur as a convention refugee, or his 
emotional distress or any provisions for his wellbeing or safety. He is depicted as someone 
who is unrehabilitatable, and his lack of income, housing and employment are used to 
support this argument rather than make the case for his need of support.  The appeals 
adjudicators advance their position as upholding the integrity of Canada’s immigration 
system and the safety of the Canadian public by selectivity and partially applying legislation 
at their own discretion weighted to their own liking in order to achieve the deportation of 
Mr. Jama.  
Two documents were available for analysis: 
1. Immigration Division, Detention Review January 2007 
 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Jama, 2007 CanLII 12831 (IRB).  
 
2. Federal Court of Canada Decision March 2008 
 Jama v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 374 (CanLII). 
 
  Mr. Jama is described as a “Citizen of Somalia” and was born there in 1964 
(Canada v. Jama, 2007). Mr. Jama is 39 years of age in 2002 when he was charged with 
his first Canadian offence. Mr. Jama came to the United States of America as a 
Convention Refugee in 1992. He came to Canada as a visitor in 2002 from Uganda with 
an expiration date of 60 days from his arrival (residing for 6 years in Canada plus close to 
10 in the United States). 
The January 2007 document is a detention review for Mr. Jama that must be 
conducted for those held in detention under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.  
The review begins with a listing of Mr. Jama’s criminal convictions. Mr. Jama was 
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incarcerated and given a departure order was granted in 2002. Mr. Jama was then 
released into the custody of the Toronto Bail Program. After Mr. Jama “failed to depart 
Canada in accordance with the terms of the departure order”, he was given a deportation 
order and taken back into custody after the Toronto Bail Program withdrew their 
supervision after Mr. Jams’s “failure to abide by their conditions” in both 2003 and 2004.  
Mr. Jama could not be removed from Canada as a convention refugee and the 
U.S. did not want to take him due to his accumulation of criminal charges. Mr. Jama 
remained incarcerated and in January 2005, “a process was initiated to procure an opinion 
by the Minister …as to whether Mr. Jama poses a danger to the public.” This would be 
the only way Mr. Jama could be deported to Somalia as a convention refugee. He was 
released under the Toronto Bail Program’s supervision and accumulated more criminal 
charges leading to another incarceration. “In August 2005, final submissions were 
forwarded to the Minister’s delegate in Ottawa for purposes of the application” to find 
him a danger to the public thereby rationalizing his permanent incarceration until a ruling 
was made on his dangerousness to the Canadian public making him eligible for 
deportation.  
“On 8 December 2006, Mr.  Jama signed a declaration reflecting his desire to be 
returned immediately to Somalia and his lack of fear of being so returned.” He retracted 
this declaration in January 5th, 2007, less than a month later. There was already a flight 
booked for Mr. Jama even though his ruling regarding his “dangerousness” to the 
Canadian Public had not been made.   
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On page 3 of the decision document, it is mentioned that in 2005, Mr. Jama’s 
council submitted a letter from Mr. Jama’s physician confirming that,  
he suffers from bipolar affective disorder and post-traumatic stress 
disorder. The former condition afflicts him with, among other symptoms, 
poor judgment during manic phases. He requires medication and a 
supportive environment in order to do well, and, in the submission of his 
counsel, the Toronto Jail is not such an environment.  
 
Mr. Jama’s council questioned why “the case has been under consideration now for fully 
seventeen months without any indication that an opinion is forthcoming soon”. Council 
was informed that it was only in the “early stages”. 
Mr. Jama’s council expressed concern at the duration of Mr. Jama’s detention at 
so dismal a venue as the Toronto Jail, and, while recognizing that the Immigration 
Division of the Board has no authority over setting the place of detention, opined that 
detention at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health in Toronto would probably be a 
much more suitable place of detention in this case. She added that the detention has made 
Mr. Jama so despondent that at times he is prepared to accede to removal to Somalia 
which would have a harmful impact to Mr. Jama. Mr. Jama’s lawyer suggests a Social 
Worker from Regent Park Community Health Centre to act as a representative when Mr. 
Jama is incarcerated and suffering too greatly to make a clear decision. She asks for the 
opinion of CAMH and a psychiatric assessment. The judge rules that Mr. Jama is too 
dangerous to be released and lists his criminal convictions as evidence for this necessity.  
The judge suggests that the convictions accumulated under the supervision of the 
Toronto Bail Program are evidence for dangerousness, rather than it being evidence for 
the incapacity of the bail program to provide or facilitate adequate care for Mr. Jama. The 
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Judge described Mr. Jama as “an active and unrehabilitated criminal recidivist”. His lack 
of convictions since August 2006 is dismissed from consideration because he was in 
detention, yet this is simultaneously wielded as evidence for his dangerousness.  A 
consideration of the circumstances and benefits that he has begun to connect with mental 
health services in the community including Regent Park Community Health Centre are 
also erased from consideration. An application to Turning Point addiction rehabilitation 
program is used as evidence for Mr. Jama disclosing that he is “actively addicted to 
alcohol and cocaine”. This is also relied upon as evidence to support the he cannot “be 
relied upon to desist from continuing dangerous criminality”. He has been receiving 
medical care since 2003 and support from Regent Park CHC since 2002. These services 
are deemed as ineffective due to his accumulation of criminal charges many of which 
result in his further incarceration without access to treatment or care. Rather than the 
charges being dismissed due to his need for support, in this case, all is used to support an 
argument for criminality. 
The judge also argues that no “adequate settlement arrangements exist, no 
employment, no income”. This is raised to argue for his detention based on the fact that 
he is therefore unlikely to appear for his removal hearing, not to raise any issue with 
regards to support he may need in terms of settlement services. Mr. Jama’s distress 
regarding his confinement, delays in decision from the courts and lengthy incarceration 
are downplayed being described as “impatience” and “frustration”.  
The judge dismisses Mr. Jama’s legal right for prioritized treatment for vulnerable 
persons citing that the detention review is not held accountable to this guideline 
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regardless of how long Mr. Jama has been detained. Keeping Mr. Jama in jail without 
supports regardless of his mental statues is therefore authorized. His lengthy jail time is 
described by the judge as not unreasonable or indefensible due to his criminality, the 
Toronto bail program is described as “remarkably patient”. The decision results in Mr. 
Jama being held for another 6 months in detention while he awaits his ruling on 
“dangerousness to the Canadian Public” so that the can be deported. 
The 2008 document from the Federal Court of Canada reviews Mr. Jama’s 
decision on his danger to the Canadian public (Jama v. Canada, 2008). The decision 
opens by stating that Mr. Jama had two years to submit evidence and arguments about his 
Danger opinion. They note that he has made three submissions. The court states that Mr. 
Jama did not challenge the last Danger opinion implying that he has accepted this opinion 
rather than being forced to submit to the overpowering counter arguments and detentions 
that he has been subjected to as his lawyer noted in the detention review. 
Mr. Jama’s application is dismissed because he did not have an explanation for 
his delay. However, when Mr. Jama was detained in prison awaiting his ruling on 
dangerousness, delays by the criminal justice systems did not affect the deportation order. 
Mr. Jama held as solely responsible for providing new evidence of risk issues to Somalia, 
even though he is a convention refugee. He is held as at fault for his mental disorder and 
is described as non-compliant with his medications. The availability of medication or 
treatment is described to be “of no consequence to a person who has shown extensive 
reluctance to benefit from the same.” Simply put, it does not matter that he was kept in 
jail and was not offered treatment or services, he denied them in the past, therefore he is 
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dangerous. The court also argues that staying the removal order would upset the public 
interest which supports the removal of people deemed a danger to the public. The 
protection of Canadian society is held as utmost importance; Mr. Jama does not belong to 
this society. 
This decision upholds the view that Canada is fair and maintains “the integrity of 
the Canadian refugee system” even though we are deporting a convention refugee to their 
country of origin after holding them in jail for two years and dismissing opportunities for 
support, or treatment, even though the person has long standing mental health and 
substance use difficulties. 
With respect to the consideration of irreparable harm, the court decision also 
states that there has not been a material negative change to Somalia therefore he can be 
deported there. Mr. Jama has to prove that irreparable harm will come to him if he is 
deported to Somalia his mental health issues, incarceration and substance use issues are 
not considered here. The Federal court does not consider deportation of a convention 
refugee with mental health concerns and substance use issues a form of harm. It is 
supported thusly in the documents: 
Contrary to the vague representations by the Applicant, rega The Federal 
Court jurisprudence also establishes that irreparable harm must be something 
more than the inherent consequences of deportation. As Justice Denis 
Pelletier stated, in Melo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 
2000 CanLII 15140 (FC), (2000), 188 F.T.R. 39: 
[21]      …if the phrase irreparable harm is to retain any meaning at all, it 
must refer to some prejudice beyond that which is inherent in the notion of 
deportation itself. To be deported is to lose your job, to be separated from 
familiar faces and places. It is accompanied by enforced separation and 
heartbreak. 
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With regards to his family and mental health services in Somalia, the Court states 
that since his other mentally ill siblings are institutionalized, and not “tied to a tree”, this is 
acceptable. In this instance, the courts makes the point of delineating who is deserving of 
safety and care (the Canadian public, to which Mr. Jama does not belong) and who is 
associated with savagery and incivility (the only way Mr. Jama would be considered for a 
stay is if his deportation resulted in him being “tied to a tree” as a result of his mental health 
issues). Otherwise, the violence of his deportation, incarceration or conditions of 
institutionalization are acceptable in comparison to a potential or even the low probability of 
a threat to the Canadian public, the integrity of the Canadian Immigration System, its 
protector role and civil promotion of justice. 
The court documents assert that the Minister is protecting the Canadian public by 
favouring the decision to deport Mr. Jama.  In summary, Mr. Jama’s appeal to the 
dangerousness opinion is “too late”, they have asserted that deportation to Somalia of a 
convention refugee with mental health issues is not an irreparable harm and the safety of 
the Canadian public outweighs any harm that would come to Mr. Jama therefore he fails 
the tripartite test. The immigration system states their position as those who are charged 
with “the maintenance and protection of the security of Canadian society and the integrity of 
Canada’s immigration system”. An elaboration of their self-proclaimed valorous efforts 
described in the Federal court decision documents claim that their decision is 
establishing fair and efficient procedures to maintain the integrity of the 
Canadian refugee system, protecting the safety and security of Canadian 
society, and promoting international justice and security by denying access 
to Canadian territory to persons who are security risks or serious criminals. 
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The law states that Canada should deport him as soon as possible rendering a stay 
decision illegal. Upholding this “as soon as possible” principle is what is decided will 
effect the integrity of the immigration system and the public’s confidence, not whether 
we provide adequate care to a convention refugee with mental health issues, no money, 
and issues with alcohol or whether he is imprisoned for two years without access to care 
(which is described of as inconsequential in terms of availability) to deport him. In the 
final decision, the application for a stay of removal from Canada is dismissed and Mr. Jama 
deported to Somalia.  
The danger opinion itself is described as “self-explanatory”. Mr. Jama’s voice is 
included only in the appendix in the documents used to determine his “dangerousness”. 
He describes the charge of carrying a concealed weapon as one where he was given 
misinformation by a cousin regarding where he would be deported to (he presumed the 
US) if he pleaded guilty. He also describes being tricked by a security officer to reveal a 
weapon in his home. His charge of drug trafficking was laid by an undercover police 
officer who approached him for cocaine while Mr. Jama was intoxicated. Mr. Jama 
claims he was given baking soda by a woman in the area and then approached by the 
undercover officer who charged him after he tried to make a quick twenty dollars. A 
situation that appears to be a set-up is only considered as one of cocaine trafficking 
thereby supporting the argument that Mr. Jama’s criminality is dangerous.  
Mr. Jama describes an incident where he also stole forty dollars from a man at a 
bank machine by pushing him and taking the money. He was charged with assault for the 
push and convicted of theft under five-thousand dollars. On another occasion he stole 
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twenty dollars from someone’s purse when he wanted to buy a drink at a coffee shop, he 
was charged with theft under five-thousand dollars and assault. Mr. Jama denies that any 
assault took place but admits to the theft of the twenty dollars. He describes the charges 
in the US as a situation where he was charged with possession of a weapon during a drug 
bust in his building when he was actually in the process of cooking (holding a kitchen 
utensil). The other charges were for stealing one can of beer or “a couple of cans” of 
beer. 
For Mr. Jama’s Danger opinion to be formulated, they cite his “very expensive 
and most serious criminal history” including “multiple offences for weapons possession 
narcotics trafficking (cocaine) battery on a personal multiple assaults; malicious mischief; 
criminal mischief 4th and 5th degree; multiple driving offences; multiple fail to comply 
offences; obstructing law enforcement officer counts, unlawful bus conduct; possession 
proceed of crime”. As the Federal Court documents state that, “He will not report and 
clearly will continue to victimize the unsuspecting innocent members of the population if 
given another chance”. A mental health coordinator stated in the document that, 
This writer has provided extraordinary supervision two time per week to 
no avail as Mr. Jama has been arrested repeatedly and this writer holds 
little hope of him being rehabilitated…Mr. Jama does not take his 
medication as prescribed as recently it has come to my attention that he 
has been consuming alcohol, it is for these reasons that supervision has 
been withdrawn. 
 
The end result, a man who came to Canada via Uganda as a US convention 
refugee from Somalia with a diagnosis of bipolar disorder, PTSD and issues with alcohol 
is imprisoned for two years, deemed too dangerous to be in public (thereby incarcerated 
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without access to support or treatment), and deported back to Somalia without any 
provisions for his safety or wellbeing.   
The Toronto Bail Program, the Immigration system and the mental health systems 
represent themselves as “remarkably patient”, “fair and efficient,” maintaining “the 
integrity of the Canadian refugee system, protecting the safety and security of Canadian 
society”, and “promoting international justice and security”. Mr. Jama is charged to the 
fullest extent of the law for theft for small sums of money or for small quantities of alcohol 
and these are summarized together with charges laid during drug raids or undercover work 
(which are of increased risk for those who live in over policed areas and racially or class 
profiled areas). He is dehumanized, depicted as dangerous, a risk to others, too dangerous to 
be amoung the public, yet not worthy or protection from the violence of incarceration, 
refused access to support or deportation as a convention refugee. No one asks a question 
about the circumstances of his PTSD, why he needs the alcohol, or what may be of support 
to him beyond the inconsistent supervision demands of compliance by the Toronto Bail 
Program. His mental illness is biological and requires medication which Mr. Jama is non-
compliant, his theft of money and alcohol are due to his inherent criminality and he is not a 
member of Canadian society deserving of the safety or protections of Canadian systems or 
governments. 
In order for this to occur Mr. Jama’s incarceration was necessary or else his 
deportation could be delayed. He needed to be deemed dangerous, or his deportation would 
not have been permitted. To do so, the immigration, criminal justice, and mental health 
systems often worked interdependently to secure this outcome. Through the workings of the 
263 
 
Toronto Bail Program, charges continued to be accumulated, rather than being diverted or 
dismissed due to mental disorder. Mr. Jama was held as solely responsibly due to 
criminality, and his access to treatment is considered to be of no consequence.  
Upon this foundation, the mental health system supports the construction of his 
identity as inherently dangerous and criminal by stating that he is non-compliant with 
medications (as though taking pills equates with recovery) and unable to refrain from 
breaking the law. He is unrehabilitatable, and his lack of income, housing and employment 
are used to support this argument.  The Immigration system advances their position as 
upholding the integrity of Canada’s immigration system and the safety of the Canadian 
public by selectivity and partially applying legislation at their own discretion weighted to 
their own values in order to achieve a single outcome, the deportation of Mr. Jama.  
The Unrehabilitatable - The case of Niranjan Sambasivam: 
In the case of Niranjan Sambasivam, the mental health, criminal justice and 
immigration systems construct then rely upon an image of a violent Tamil youth who 
hijacks the peace and security of the Canadian public by “showing up” with “carloads” of 
other Tamil youth and assaults people with weapons in order to authorize his deportation. 
The Canadian mental health system is seen as having provided adequate assessment and 
offering sufficient treatment (medication and surveillance), the criminal justice system 
depicts itself as removing a criminal element from society and upholding Canada’s 
“interest in combating terrorism”.  Any lack of employment, money or education is 
considered as a lack of Niranjan’s establishment in Canada. Any attention to the social 
and political contexts of his settlement (including the fact that he was sponsored by his 
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mother who is a convention refugee) is erased in the redirection of the focus to Niranjan 
as an isolated individual. He is then made worthy of violence, excluded as a member of 
Canadian society, biomedically malfunctioning and resistant to the care being provided or 
unworthy of the provision of care offered to Canadian citizens even though his family has 
agreed to pay for his care. He is made into an unrehabilitatable criminal who is 
untreatable, underserving of Canadian care and deserving of punishment to himself and 
his family.   
One document was available for analysis: 
1) Immigration Appeals Division Decision on removal Order Appeals March 
2007 
Sambasivam v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2007 
CanLII 69167 (IRB). 
 
Niranjan Sambasivam appealed a removal order made against him in 2005 for the 
possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose (Sambasivam v. Canada, 2007). He was 
26 years of age at the time of the decision.  Niranjan was born in Sri Lanka and was 
sponsored by his mother who was deemed a convention refugee and landed with his sister 
in 1999. He has been in Canada for over 8 years and has had a diagnosis of mental health 
issues and access to treatment for over 7 years. 
The panel notes that there is “no challenge to the validity of the removal order” 
ensuring that the best possible result for the appeal would be a stay. The appeal is 
supposed to consider the best interest of any child affected by Niranjan’s removal. In this 
case, there are his sister’s children with whom he lived with for a period of time. The 
decision  is stated on the first page to dismiss the appeal and the deport Niranjan as there 
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are “insufficient humanitarian and compassionate grounds” after taking into 
consideration the best interests of any child that allow for a granting of the appeal or a 
stay. 
His mother, grandmother, two brothers and his sister live in Toronto. His sister is 
married and has two children. The document states that Niranjan has been convicted of 
“numerous offences, many violent offences involving weapons”. At the time of the 
decision he is being held at the Toronto West Detention Centre. 
The panel states that its decision is guided by the Ribic22 factors and.. by section 3 (1)(h) 
and 3 (1)(i) of IRPA: 
 
(h) to protect the health and safety of Canadians and to maintain the security of 
Canadian society. 
  
(i)  to maintain and protect the health, safety and good order of Canadian society 
 
The document states that “At both sittings of the hearing, the appellant appeared 
to have been on his medication.  He was lucid and I was satisfied that he understood the 
nature of the proceedings”.  The statement is used to imply that his ability to understand 
the nature of the court proceeding and be in a lucid state could only be possible if he was 
taking medications. Niranjan is described as having a lengthy criminal history spanning a 
period of seven years. The document describes the first incident which involved Niranjan 
being pulled over and he punched one of the two “peace officers” in the left shoulder. In 
the description of this altercation, the documents states that Niranjan could not initially 
22 See Carlton Anthony Williams section on untreatability for listing of Ribic factors. 
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remember what had transpired on the date and “he had to be prompted by his counsel in 
order to remember”. Here the panel questions the legitimacy of Niranjan’s version of the 
story pertaining to this first charge by suggesting that being prompted is evidence of not 
being able to remember.  Niranjan reported that he was dragged out of his car and he 
merely shoved the officer in self-defense. 
The panel restates the opinion that Niranjan is “a poor historian” and that “he has 
a poor memory” thereby invalidating his version of what transpired. Niranjan is described 
as remembering an incident resulting in a conviction for possession of a weapon in 
February of 2003 when he was arguing with his mother and “smashed things in the 
house” he also described the details where he picked up a knife and his mother called the 
police. The document states that “he could not remember that he pleaded guilty to that 
charge”, supporting again an argument for Niranjan having a poor memory. 
Another incident is described where Niranjan was convicted of an assault in 2004. 
Niranjan’s version of the story reports that his mother contacted him regarding an 
argument with a tenant. The document describes that “two carloads of Tamil youths (sic) 
showing up at the appellant’s mother’s residence and assaulting the victim”.  The images 
racially identified gang violence is evoked in the description which selectively used the 
words “carloads” rather than merely stating the number of individual arousing fear in the 
reader, suggesting uncertainty with regard to how many “Tamil youths” are “showing 
up”. The document notes that although the victim in this incident identified Niranjan, 
Niranjan denied beating the victim stating that his brother hit the victim first. To 
undermine Niranjan’s account, the document states “in view of the appellant’s poor 
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memory regarding other incidents, and his conviction for this incident, I prefer the details 
outlined in the police report which indicate that the appellant did assault the victim”. 
Consequently the conviction by police and the preference of the panel chair is seen as 
legitimate evidence for Niranjan’s conviction of assault. 
Another incident is mentioned where Nirnajan and a friend “trashed a double 
double pizza store” with no reference to specific damages or costs of damages. It is said 
that he “assaulted a customer and his dog and then turned on the owner of the restaurant”. 
The imagery here presented Niranjan as an animal who turns toward prey as though 
completely controlled by instinct, alluding specifically and directly to savagery. Niranjan 
only recalls throwing things inside the restaurant but is described as having “no 
recollection of what transpired”. A final incident is described in 2005 where Niranjan 
stabbed his brother and apologized. There is no reference to any charges laid or 
conviction. 
The panel summarizes that,        
“It is evident to this panel in view of the above incidents that the appellant that the 
appellant’s behavior is out of control and he potentially poses a threat to the Canadian 
public.” After the summarization of Niranjan’s poor memory and criminal violence, the 
document notes that as early as August of 2000, a Doctor’s letter confirmed that Niranjan 
was suffering from suspected “conduct disorder, with a differential diagnosis of early 
stage of Bipolar Affective Disorder or Schizophrenia".   
 
A 2005 letter stated that Niranjan was attending the outpatient clinic with his 
doctor from 2000-2005, was being treated for “bipolar disorder and poor anger control” 
but “had only attended on three different occasions”.  
Nirnjan’s diagnosis is said to be “confirmed” by a letter dated July 2007. The letter states:  
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This man suffers from a chronic, and rather severe, mental illness, namely Bipolar 
Affective Disorder (BAD), and also, possibly, Intermittent Explosive Disorder, 
Typically, BAD becomes evident during pubescent to young adulthood. 
 Untreated, BAD can lead to poor impulse control, lack of judgment, over-
excitability, hypomanic episodes, crushing depressive episodes, and high level of 
anxiety. 
  
In my professional opinion Mr. Sambasivam’s chronic conflict with the law and 
his inability to control his impulses are primarily due to his mental illness.  What 
makes this man’s difficulties more entrenched and problematic is his inability to 
adhere to a treatment structure.  
 
A Dr. Hassan agreed to take on Niranjan into his psychiatric practice, Dr. 
Hassan’s submission indicated that Niranjan , “will require ongoing psychiatric follow-
up, adherence to the treatment plan, abstinence from alcohol and drugs and regular 
ingestion of his medication.  Compliance will be a key factor in successful transition 
back to society.” The bold is placed there by the Panel chair.  The Panel notes that Dr. 
Hasan has a treatment plan set out for Niranjan but the panel is  “not satisfied that there 
are enough safeguards in place to monitor this appellant and ensure  that he is compliant 
with any plans laid out for him”.  
A letter is cited from Dr Hassan from January 2008 stating that  
… 
In summary, Mr. Sambasivam’s impulsive violent behavior is due to a mental 
health illness that can be adequately controlled by effective psychiatric 
treatment.  Without regular psychiatric follow-up and treatment this man 
will most likely reoffend.  On the other hand, effective ongoing psychiatric 
treatment will allow him to conduct his life with acceptably low risk of acting 
out. 
 
The bold here is the panel’s again. 
The letter indicated that this behavior is different than usual, that Niranjan 
presented as angry and frustrated with all of the reporting conditions and compliance 
requirements imposed on him. The letter itself confirms Niranjan’s attendance at a 
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psychiatric appointment and reports that he would not use alcohol or drugs. In the 
contexts of the appeal decision, the letter is being used as evidence that he will not be 
compliant with treatment thereby making him “likely to reoffend” and supporting an 
argument for a denial or dismissal of his appeal.  
The panel also decides that they have an issue with Niranjan’s ability to pay for 
his own healthcare as he is unemployed and his mother is on social assistance. Nirnajan’s 
mother stated that Niranjan’s “two brothers are working full-time and have agreed to 
assist in covering costs of the medication”. The panel dismisses this information because 
no letters were submitted by the brothers. The fact that Niranjan’s health needs are 
unsupported by the Canadian health care system (because he is sponsored by a 
convention refugee) is projected as a fault or incapacity onto Niranjan. His family 
members in Canada are dismissed as a reason for keeping him here as they are seen as 
ineffective in assisting him in getting the treatment he requires. The eight years since he 
has been diagnosed is highlighted as evidence for the family’s ineffectiveness rather than 
the ineffectiveness of the psychiatric treatment he has received. His mother’s support, 
cooperation with the courts process and appeals procedures are not considered as 
evidence of support nor is his brothers’ willingness to pay for the medications. 
The presence of Niranjan’s family in Canada weighs in Niranjan’s favour during 
the appeals process due to the Ribic factors, however, this is being dismissed because 
“the hardships that they will endure if he is removed from Canada are outweighed by the 
appellant’s potential risk to the public”.  The panel states that they are required to 
consider the “fundamental justice balance” to evaluate if Niranjan’s charter rights, 
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specifically section 7 that states that “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security 
of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the 
principles of fundamental justice.”  They cite the Suresh vs Canada Decision of 2002 
where the deportation of a convention refugee to a place where he would be tortured is 
weighted against Canada’s “interest in combating terrorism” (this bold is mine). The 
Suresh decision was very highly publicized and included the following respondents in the 
decision making process: 
• The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
• Amnesty International,  
• the Canadian Arab Federation, 
• the Canadian Council for Refugees,  
• the Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils, 
• the Centre for Constitutional Rights,  
• the Canadian Bar Association and 
• the Canadian Council of Churches  
 
The result was that the decision to deport Suresh to torture was found to violate 
the principals of fundamental justice and the appeal was allowed.  In the Romans case 
cited, it was found that the member who issued the deportation order was “perverse in his 
conclusions that the hardships faced by the applicant in Jamaica would not be 
significantly worse than he faced in Canada where the applicant has a support group and 
the possibility of treatment”. 
In considering hardship that Nirnajan would face, the panel concludes that he is 
not considered a convention refugee because his mother is and she sponsored him. 
Niranjan submitted a 243 page document to speak to the country conditions in Sri Lanka. 
This is reduced by the panel as documents that “support the ongoing strife in Sri Lanka 
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focusing on the plight of Tamil males”. Since Niranjan was “young when he left Sri 
Lanka “therefore, he was not politically involved”. The panel notes that information was 
submitted on the “marked deterioration of the countries mental health 
facilities…declining government health funding has resulted in understaffing, poor 
accommodation and a lack of necessary drugs and equipment…..Rising levels of 
psychiatric disorders are also exacerbating the situation in Sri Lanka’s mental 
institution”. The differences in care in Sri Lanka and Canada are dismissed as Niranajan 
is predicted to be non-compliant anyway. They distinguish Niranjan’s case from the 
Romans’ case where Romans was under strict supervision and held in a facility. 
Niranjan is considered to be “not established in Canada” since he has only 
sporadic employment and “no special skills or education”. Therefore deporting him 
would not be disruptive to his career.  His lack of employment opportunities or lack of 
access to education are seen as evidence for him not being established rather than being 
considered as highlighting a need of more comprehensive settlement supports or services. 
The hardship Niranjan would face is downplayed further by stating that this would not be 
the first time he would be without family and that “it is possible that the appellants father 
is in Sri Lanka” even though his mother has indicated that Niranjan does not know his 
father nor do they have contact with him. 
The panel decides that Niranjan does not have any close relationships other than 
his mother. His sister, two brothers and his sister’s children who reside in Canada do not 
affect his determination even though he has lived with his sister and her children. This is 
disregarded because “there was no supporting testimony either orally or in writing 
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regarding the hardships if any, they would endure if he were removed from Canada”.  It 
is judged that is would be in the children’s best interest if he were to be removed from 
Canada. The appeal is dismissed and Niranjan is deported. 
The final decision of the appeal permits a portrayal of Niranjan as a violent Tamil 
youth who hijacks the peace and security of the Canadian public by “showing up” with 
“carloads” of other Tamil youth and assaults people with weapons. His mental health is 
described as a biomedical condition that is to be treated with medication which Niranjan 
is non-compliant with. This is held to be an absolute truth even though it is noted that “At 
both sittings of the hearing, the appellant appeared to have been on his medication.  He 
was lucid and I was satisfied that he understood the nature of the proceedings”. The 
Canadian mental health system is seen as providing adequate assessment and offering 
sufficient treatment (medication and surveillance), the criminal justice system is 
removing a criminal element from society and upholding Canada’s “interest in combating 
terrorism”.  The Canadian immigration system represents itself  as ensuring that the Ribic 
factor are “considered” and all families, children, length of time in Canada, 
establishment, or potential harms to Niranjan have been considered.  
The impact of his mental health on his behavior or on the construction of his 
criminality is only used to support an argument that his ability to refrain from criminality 
will be undermined by his inability to manage his own mental health thereby making him 
more at risk of being violent or criminal. Niranjan is held to account for his mental 
health; his psychiatric care is never questioned as inadequate or insufficient to address 
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Niranjan’s support needs. Therefore the possibility of his improvement or rehabilitation is 
eradicated from consideration. 
Any lack of employment, money or education is considered as a lack of 
Niranjan’s establishment in Canada. Any attention to the social and political contexts of 
his settlement is erased in the redirection of the focus to Niranjan as an isolated 
individual. The context of him being sponsored by a convention refugee is also 
eliminated in the categorization of Niranjan as a landed immigrant and not directly a 
convention refugee (thereby not included in any consideration for the rights and 
privilege’s afforded to convention refugees who may be fleeing persecution based on 
race, religion, political opinion, nationality or membership in a particular social group).  
The 7-8 years that Niranjan has lived in Canada and the presence of his mother, 
two brothers, sister and nieces/nephews in Canada is dismissed in relation to a 
consideration the safety of the Canadian Public, any harm to the family is permitted with 
this consideration, any potential foreign hardship is permitted for Niranjan. He is now 
worthy of violence, not a member of Canadian society, biomedically malfunctioning and 
resistant to the care being provided or unworthy of the provision of care offered to 
Canadian citizens even though his family has agreed to pay for his care. He is an 
unrehabilitatable criminal who is untreatable, underserving of Canadian care and 
deserving of punishment to himself and his family.   
The discretionary application of law when considering the Ribic factors alongside 
the dehumanization of Niranjan, the construction of his identity as undeserving, 
untreatable and unrehabilitatable depend on the interdependence of the mental health, 
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criminal justice and immigration systems. The authorization of violence to Niranjan at all 
of these levels and in the end result is also dependent upon this confluence. The 
delegitimization of Niranjan and his family by attacking Nirnajan’s memory/credibility, 
dismissing  his family’s support by establishing a requirement that only acknowledges 
documentation as legitimate proof of care and support, and by undermining his need for 
protection and care through a technocratic categorization that separates him from the 
protection of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, relies on established 
systems of professed legitimacy and fairness yet enacts racialized and eugenic colonial 
forms of violence. 
This is a clear example of confluence which common in the cases analyzed. 
Niranjan’s dehumanized identity depends on the colonial processes of Orientalism, 
erasure, the interdependence of the mental health, criminal justice and immigration 
systems, the practices of the selective referencing and discretionary interpretation of law 
by authorities and administrators, the appropriation of Niranjan’s own testimony wielded 
against him and the reliance on moral and ethical arguments to justify atrocities (i.e. 
considering safety to “the Canadian public” as the primary consideration which depends 
on its own construction of who it includes and the construction of who it excludes), all to 
advance a eugenic and racial colonial nation building project.   
The Undeserving: the foreign, the alien, the Other 
 
Through the cases of Carlton Anthony Williams, Wei Yang, Junior Christopher 
Weekes, Steven Anthony Bryan, and Audley Horace Gardiner, we can discern how 
notions of a foreign alien or undeserving Other are also relied upon (interdependently 
275 
 
with the notions of untreatability and unrehabilitatability) at the confluence of 
immigration, mental health and criminal justice systems to authorize and legitimate 
violence.  
The Undeserving-The case of Carlton Anthony Williams continued: 
In the case of Carlton Anthony Williams, Carlton is also reproduced as someone 
who is Other, who does not belong in Canada, and is a non-contributing burden to society 
thereby underserving of Canadian support or care. Carlton is identified early as 
originating from Jamaica and not being a Canadian citizen. The history of the 29 years he 
has spent in Canada is reduced to a history of his criminal charges, and an abridged 
history of his psychiatric involvement. Although he has family and they are described as 
supportive, a rationale is advanced that the family will not face any “undue hardship” if 
Carlton is to be deported. Although Carlton has been in Canada for 29 years, he is 
deemed as undeserving of care or treatment and a burden to Canadian society. His 
conditions demand that he maintain full-time employment while simultaneously being 
incarcerated at medium security mental health institution which involves perpetual 
supervision and facilities to restrain, individually confine and forcibly sedate individuals. 
In a medium security facility, people are allowed to occupy communal areas and 
participate in programs where eligibility is determined on an individual basis through an 
assessment of compliance.  The inclusion of a requirement for full-time employment 
merely acts to reinforce the idea that Canadians are expected to be employed and this is 
all too often solely the responsibility of the individual. It also served to act as a condition 
that Carlton will not be able to fulfill in his current situation and thereby used as evidence 
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for his burdensome status in reference to Canadian society (which he is not considered 
part of). The safety and health of Canadian society is proclaimed to be upheld while 
Carlton is confined within conditions that make it difficult for him to be well or be 
considered as included in Canadian Society.  
Any resistance is often taken as evidence for an illness or criminality, rarely 
provoking discussions on why so many people appeal removal orders and have difficulty 
succeeding within biomedical, criminal justice or immigration systems as a non-citizen. 
These practices have all too common trajectories and outcomes that replicate the violent 
technologies of colonization. Ideas symmetrical to the colonial projects of developing 
mechanism of identification to establish hierarchies (racial, mental, gendered, abled, etc.), 
the deployment of dehumanizing discourses, and a reliance on eugenic morality continues 
to achieve their mandate to perpetuate regimes of authority, disciplinary knowledge, and 
subordination.   These violent technologies of colonization, left un-interrogated, invoke 
ideas of the untreatable, the unrehabilitatable, and the illegal alien. They reproduce the 
systems of identification that taxonomize people into established hierarchies of worth, 
rationalize punishment, and legitimize the abandonment of human beings for the overall 
goals of eugenics. In order to achieve these outcomes, these systems must complement 
one another. The laws, procedures of authority, and hegemons of disciplinary expertise 
must all act in accordance with their mandate of protecting and reproducing a state forged 
with the violent technologies of colonization. Acknowledging the historical goals, means, 
and outcomes of colonization permits our ability to recognize them today as 
institutionalized in law, procedures of authority, and hegemonies of expertise. 
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The Undeserving - The case of Wei Yang: 
In the case of Wei Yang, we see the alliances of the mental health system, the 
immigration system and the mental health system working to secure the installation of a 
mechanism of interdependent surveillance and control. Any lapses in mental health status 
will hold Wei solely and criminally accountable.  His extensive reporting requirements are 
demanded regardless of the fact that he has been assigned to a homeless shelter and living 
under the perpetual threat of deportation should he find himself charged with another crime, 
use drugs, find another place to live, miss a reporting deadline or breach any of the 16 
conditions set out for him. During this process, the mental health, immigration and criminal 
justice systems represents themselves as cooperative and generous, “humanitarian and 
compassionate” for considering a stay. Wei’s conditions are established to ensure that 
through their production of material in support of a construction of criminality or 
untreatability, that the opportunity for deportation will present itself in the future as Wei’s 
status in Canada is Other. 
One document was available for analysis: 
1) Immigration Appeals Division decision 2010, March 
Yang v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2010 CanLII 
91452 (IRB). 
 
Wei Yang appealed a deportation order made against him in 2008 for the 
conviction he has received in April 2007 of “one count of assault with a weapon contrary 
to Section 267(a) of the Criminal Code of Canada” (Yang v. Canada, 2010). Wei is 
described as a permanent resident of Canada and a Citizen of China who came to Canada 
in 2003. At the time of the decision, Mr. Yang had been in Canada for 7 years. Wei came 
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to Canada from a UNHCR refugee camp in Thailand. Wei received “thirty- days, pre-trial 
custody coupled with twelve months probation and a five-year weapons prohibition was 
imposed on him”. Since the conviction attracts a maximum penalty of up to 10 years 
(which Mr. Yang did not receive) he is eligible for deportation. Wei asked to stay the 
deportation order on humanitarian and compassionate grounds. The IAD makes certain to 
state that Wei “does not challenge the validity of the deportation order” thereby ensuring 
that the deportation order could be upheld and enforced at a later date. The Lawyer for 
the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (which is the representative of 
the Canadian Border services Agency) and Wei’s lawyer agreed to a 5 year stay with 
significant conditions.  The panel agrees to accept the “joint recommendation” of a stay 
for 5 years. 
The panel states that they have reservations about the decision. Specifically that 
Wei used a “meat cleaver to menace a Rogers’ sales agent who he believed sold him a 
defective cellular telephone.” The document notes that Wei did not cause actual physical 
harm however, “the weapon he used had the potential to inflict serious harm on his 
victim.” The second reservation is that Wei “has a history of mental illness” and they 
were unclear what supports he had. The third reservation was the accumulation of “two 
further offences that involved violence” and another for “the possession of weapons 
dangerous to the public peace”.  
One of the conditions is that Wei be supervised by the Toronto Bail Program 
including the approval of where he lives and if he should move or change his address, he 
is expected to “sign any and all consent release forms required by the Toronto Bail 
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Program” and “be amenable” to this supervision. The Toronto Bail Program also 
supervises Wei “plan of care” which “calls for the appellant to live at Seaton House 
where he will be treated by an on-site psychiatrist”. Seaton House is the largest shelter for 
men experiencing homelessness in Toronto and was built during the Great Depression to 
provide a place to sleep and meals to men looking for work. It is temporary shelter and 
not considered stable housing.  
The document notes that Wei has been diagnosed with an anxiety disorder and is 
currently on medication that will also be supervised by the Toronto Bail program and a 
mental health coordinator with the “immigration section of the Toronto Bail program”. 
The panel notes that they have confirmed with “the appellant’s designated representative” 
that his is currently on “the medical regime outlines in the plan of care and that his 
regime is expected to continue while he is at Seaton House.” The panel states that Wei 
has agreed to be supervised by the Toronto bail Program (suggesting that he had the 
opportunity to disagree which would result in his deportation). The panel also notes that 
there is an “agreement of supervision” that allows the Toronto Bail Program to share 
information with the CBSA, the police “and other parties the Programme deems 
necessary to fulfill its function”. The Bail Program is also expected to notify the CBSA if 
the relationship is terminated between Wei and the CBSA or for any other breach of 
conditions. Wei is given 16 conditions with which he must comply with. He is to 
surrender copies of all his travel documents and identification documents to the IAD, 
report to the CBSA every six months with a written report, in-person, outlining the 
following: 
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• employment or efforts to obtain employment if unemployed; 
• current living arrangements; 
• marital status including common-law relationships; 
 
He is required “Engage in or continue psychotherapy or counselling”, to take responsibility 
for his mental health  so that “your mental health condition will not cause you to conduct 
yourself in a manner dangerous to yourself or anyone else; and (b) it is not likely you will 
commit further offences”. There are also stated demands to not commit crimes, use drugs, 
carry weapons, or knowingly associate with individuals who have a criminal record. 
 In the case of Wei Yang, we see the collaborations of the mental health system, the 
immigration system and the criminal justice system working to secure an unfavourable 
situation for Wei and the installation of a mechanism of interdependent surveillance and 
control for the immigration, mental health, and criminal justice systems. Wei is described as 
having a mental illness which is a biomedical concern, is being treated with medications and 
supervised by a psychiatrist and mental health coordinator. Any lapses in mental health 
status will hold Wei accountable. His charge of assault with a weapon is left uninterrogated 
and laid to its fullest extent without a consideration of diversion of the charge. His extensive 
reporting requirements are demanded regardless of the fact that he has been assigned to a 
homeless shelter and living under the perpetual threat of deportation should he find himself 
charged with another crime, use drugs, find another place to live, miss a reporting deadline 
or breach any of the 16 conditions set out for him. The mental health, immigration and 
criminal justice systems represents themselves as cooperative and generous, “humanitarian 
and compassionate” for considering the stay. For Wei a case is already being amassed 
against him, the case for his dangerousness lies with his “agreement” to surrender all 
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privacy so that the Toronto bail Program and the CBSA can ensure his surveillance. While 
Seaton House provides basic necessities and care, it will unlikely be a place where Wei will 
be encouraged and supported to find employment or education, be distant from illicit 
substances, or be in contact with those without criminal histories. Instead, Wei will be held 
to account for not thriving in a basic shelter, for not having an improved mental health status 
when only medications are considered, or for being charged with a crime in one of the most 
over-policed areas of Toronto. Wei is treated as undeserving of freedom, undeserving of 
adequate levels of care and support. While notions of Wei’s criminality are being developed 
and evidence of his untreatability being collected, the 16 conditions will ensure that the 
opportunity for deportation will present itself in the future as Wei’s status in Canada is 
Other, requiring Canadian civilizing and submission or imminent expulsion.   
The Undeserving - The case of Junior Christopher Weeks: 
In the case of Junior Christopher Weeks, we see the practice of the selective and 
discretionary application of law in Junior’s decisions that authorize his deportation. These 
legitimizations rest on the immigration, criminal justice and mental health systems 
construction of Junior as a foreign Other underserving of the rights and protections of a 
Canadian citizen. Regardless of the 15 years that Junior has been in Canada, he is decided 
upon as a foreign Other not deserving of acquittal.   Although Junior’s criminality has 
been evaluated as not a threat to the Canadian public, he remains under threat of 
deportation due to a determination of serious criminality. 
Three documents were available for analysis: 
1. An application for a Judicial review by the federal court, March 2008 
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Weekes v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 293 (CanLII). 
Retrieved December 23, 2013 from http://canlii.ca/t/1w22b 
 
2. A Judicial review by the Federal Court,  June 2008 
Weekes v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2008 FC 820 
(CanLII). Retrieved December 23, 2013 from http://canlii.ca/t/1zcwp 
 
3. Appeal to Immigration and Appeal Division March, 2009 
Weekes v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2009 CanLII 
78181 (IRB). Retrieved December 23, 2013 from http://canlii.ca/t/2840c 
 
In March 2008, Junior Christopher Weeks appealed a decision by the Immigration 
Appeal Division that denied him and extension of time in which to appeal his removal 
order (Weekes v. Canada [Citizenship and Immigration], 2008). He represented by his 
litigation guardian John Norquay. Junior is described as a citizen of Guyana. He was 
sponsored by his father and became a permanent resident in 1995, 13 years prior to this 
decision. In 1997 and 1998 Mr. Weeks accumulated a number of criminal charges that 
are listed early in the document including: cocaine possession, failure to attend Court, 
obstructing a peace officer, failure to comply with a probation order, uttering forged 
documents and possession of stolen property exceeding five-thousand dollars. A deportation 
order was issued for him in October of 1998 while he was incarcerated at Maplehurst 
detention Centre. 
Junior reports that his previous lawyer filed an application for an extension in 
1999 and never received a response. The Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration claims 
they did not receive the application. From 1998-2006 Junior was in custody and released 
on bond twice.  In September of 2006 he was informed of his removal date, in October he 
resubmitted his application for an extension in order to appeal his deportation order, 
which was denied in April 2007.  
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The entirety of the IAD’s decision reads as follows: 
The application for the late filing of Notice of Appeal of 
deportation order issued over 8 years ago is denied. The 
appellant failed to establish as to why he had to wait so long 
before filing an appeal against his deportation. I certify that 
this is the decision and reasons of the member in this appeal. 
 
The March 2008 review examined whether Junior was denied procedural fairness 
when he was denied his extension. Junior argues that the IAD breached procedural 
fairness by failing to provide adequate reasoning for the decision. Junior highlights two 
important issues: 1) that he had applied in 1999; and, 2) he belongs to a vulnerable group 
that was unable to appreciate that he had to appeal in a given time period. Junior 
submitted that the “ IAD’s use of the phrase “waiting so long before filing an appeal” 
demonstrates a failure to appreciate the significant problems and particular circumstances 
faced by the applicant and is not in the spirit of Guidelines 8 on Procedures with Respect to 
Vulnerable Persons Appearing Before the IRB.” 
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (of the respondent to this 
application), submitted that reasons for decisions only need to be given in 3 
circumstances “(1) with respect to final decision of any division of the Immigration and 
Refugee Board, (2) where the Refugee Division rejects a claimant’s claim for refugee 
protection, and (3) where the person concerned or the Minister requests written reasons for 
the final decision” and that this decision was interlocutory or provisional and therefor no 
reasoning was necessary. The document cites these cases to validate this point "(Faghihi v. 
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 CanLII 9370 (FC), [2000] 1 F.C. 
284 
 
249 (T.D.), upheld on appeal in 2001 FCA 163 (CanLII), 2001 FCA 163; Ali v. Canada 
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 1153 (CanLII), 2004 FC 1153)." 
The respondent (Minister of CIC) submitted that they have considered the only 
medical/psychiatric evidence that was provided and this included a letter from Dr. Jerry 
Cooper,  
who speculatively concluded that the applicant may have schizophrenia, but 
that he was not certain. The respondent noted that Dr. Cooper’s letter further 
stated that he found the applicant to be of low average to average 
intelligence, oriented in all spheres with social judgment superficially intact. 
The respondent submitted that there was also evidence before the IAD 
showing that the applicant was capable of, in the past and currently, 
appointing a lawyer to represent him in immigration and criminal matters 
 
In this section of the decision document the court aims to undermine the existence or impact 
of any mental health issues that Junior may be struggling with so as to dismiss it from 
consideration. The respondent also submits that Junior had “waived his opportunity to 
raise an objection to the appeal process” at the time of his appeal or the 8 years after. As 
the document notes, “inadequate representation from counsel does not entitle the 
applicant to have a decision set aside.” 
In the decision analysis, the court addresses two issues. The first is “what is the 
appropriate standard of review”. With regards to giving reasons for the decision and 
procedural fairness, the court finds that, “The overall decision of the IAD is a question of 
mixed law and fact, reviewable on a standard of reasonableness”. The second issue the 
court addresses is “did the IAD breach procedural fairness in failing to provide the 
applicant with adequate reasons for its decision”?  The judge determines that these are 
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inadequate and rules that the judicial review be allowed and referred to a different panel 
of the IAD.  
The judicial review decision was made on June 30, 2008 with regards to the 
decision that was made to not defer his removal from Canada (Weekes v. Canada [Public 
Safety and Emergency Preparedness], 2008). Junior’s representative, Mr. Norquay, 
reported on Junior’s history of mental health problems including a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia in 1990 by a psychiatrist, Dr. Cooper. A copy of Dr. Cooper’s report is 
included as a piece of evidence. Mr. Norquay reports that he met with Junior in October 
of 2006 and found that Junior “did not understand or appreciate the nature of the 
proceedings against him”. Mr Norquay describes Junior’s criminal record as relatively 
minor. two charges were related to legal proceeding, i.e., failing to attend court and 
failing to comply with probation, he has been given conditional discharge and further 
charges in 2000 and 2001 were withdrawn. He has served his short sentences already for 
the other charges, 13 days, 60 days, and one month respectively. 
The decision document notes that Mr. Norquay provided a copy of the facsimile 
confirmation from 1999 when Junior’s previous lawyer submitted the first application for 
an extension of time to appeal the deportation order.  It is noted that no response was 
received by Junior or his representatives nor was a decision made by the IAD. The Judge 
notes that the original refusal of deferral of Junior’s removal order was an error because 
relevant evidence was ignored. The judge also notes that in 1999, the report from Dr. 
Cooper “expressed the opinion that the Applicant would not be able to understand the need 
to appeal the deportation order”. 
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The document describes that the officer who denied Junior the deferral took into 
account his “impecuniosity” (lack of money), “lack of a permanent address and prior 
breaks of condition of his release”. The officer is noted to have said,  
“that since the Applicant has no means to support himself financially, has 
been in receipt of social assistance and had no fixed addressed but was 
residing at the Salvation Army, has previously breached the condition of his 
release and had been charged with possession of cocaine, which charge was 
subsequently withdrawn, he, the Applicant, would likely return to “street 
life” if released from detention”.  
 
The application for judicial review is then allowed and the decision of the officer to not 
defer Junior’s deportation is quashed.  
In March 2009, a decision was made with regards to Junior’s deportation order 
appeal. Junior is requesting a stay of 2 years (Weekes v. Canada (Public Safety and 
Emergency Preparedness), 2009).  
The panel decides that it would not be appropriate to grant an outright appeal 
under section 67(1) of the IRPA which states  
67. (1) To allow an appeal, the Immigration Appeal Division must be 
satisfied that, at the time that the appeal is disposed of, 
 (a) the decision appealed is wrong in law or fact or mixed law and      
fact; 
 (b) a principle of natural justice has not been observed; or 
 (c) other than in the case of an appeal by the Minister, taking into 
account the best interests of a child directly affected by the decision, 
sufficient humanitarian and compassionate considerations warrant special 
relief in light of all the circumstances of the case. 
  
Junior’s decisions up until this point has been wrong in fact and the federal courts 
have acknowledged this yet the IAD is only allowing a stay of two years. The panel also 
notes that he is not in receipt of social assistance. They also note that with regards to his 
criminal record, “The appellant’s CPIC record reflects convictions from 1998. They are 
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property offences.  There is no history of violence and there have been no other criminal 
convictions since that time.” Junior had designated representatives testifying on his 
behalf, his father and his step-mother. The panel reviewed the Ribic factors for Junior’s 
case and in term of the seriousness of his offence, the panel found that the crimes are 
“somewhat dated” and the sentences indicate that they are not serious charges. 
In terms of rehabilitation, Junior is noted to be “responding well to his 
medication”, even though he requires designated representatives. He is also noted to “not 
present a risk to public safety”. In terms of his length of time in Canada and 
establishment, this is weighted in Junior’s favour because he has been in Canada since 
high school, has some employment history, and family that is socially established here. In 
terms of hardship to the family, the panel determines that his family would be “quite 
devastated”. 
With regards to hardship Junior would face if sent to Guyana, the panel notes that  
“It is clear to me from that evidence that the mental health system in 
Guyana is unlikely to provide much support to the appellant were he to be 
removed there.  In particular, the report from the World Health 
Organization confirms that the mental health system in Guyana is 
fragmented and poorly resourced, and that persons with mental health 
disorders are reported to suffer discrimination in their communities, 
workplace and educational institutions.  Mental health services appear to 
be inadequate.  As well, the appellant does not appear to have any family 
support in Guyana and, given his limited cognitive ability and his mental 
health problems, the appellant would clearly experience significant 
hardship were he removed to Guyana.” 
 
The panel finds that “special relief” is warranted and the stay is allowed for 2 
years with 10 conditions to report and information changes, address changes, 
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employment, education etc.  to the IAD and the CBSA, surrendering documents and 
taking responsibility for his mental health. 
The final decision leaves Junior’s deportation order intact. The courts and IAD 
have acknowledged the errors they have made in what information was being considered 
and within the evaluations of the Ribic factors that would render the deportation order 
invalid and make the act of deporting Junior devastating to his family and harmful to 
Junior. Regardless of the 15 years that Junior has been in Canada, he is decided upon as a 
foreign Other not deserving of acquittal.   The period that Junior was in custody up until 
2006 is not recognized by the courts or the IAD as a violence they have enacted by 
denying responsibility for not responding to his initial appeal eight years ago.  Although 
Junior’s criminality has been seen as not a threat to the Canadian public, he is still under 
threat of deportation due to a determination of serious criminality. If he is to fail to report 
or comply in accordance with the 10 conditions of his stay, Junior would still be 
deported.  He is both constructed as someone who is capable enough to understand the 
decision of the courts and the IAD to render their decisions valid yet is not mentally well 
enough to represent himself or to be able to live in Canada without compliance with 
psychiatric treatment as outlined in his conditions. The selective and discretionary 
application of law in Junior’s decisions that authorize his deportation all rest on their 
construction of him as a foreign Other underserving of the rights and protections of a 
Canadian citizen. 
The Undeserving - The case of Steve Anthony Bryan: 
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In the case of Steve Anthony Bryan, we see the selective and discretionary 
authority of the mental health, criminal justice and immigration system to weigh 
evidence, apply law, and impose conditions in order to achieve their desired outcome 
(deportation, incarceration, or surveillance). Also rendered transparent is the antagonism 
within the criminal justice, mental health and immigration systems through the Minister’s 
actions to appeal Steve’s stay order to achieve deportation.  Mr. Bryan’s criminality is 
linked to his mental “illness” and the use of imprisonment is rationalized though this 
linkage. The probability of achieving wellness and integration or belonging in Canada is 
foreclosed upon for Mr. Bryan. Under threat of removal, constant surveillance and 
biomedical rule, finding a job and becoming a Citizen are not foreseeable options. Bryan 
is designated a life of a foreign threat being contained and watched. 
One document was available for analysis: 
1) Federal Court Judicial Review February 2006 
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Bryan, 2006 FC 146 
(CanLII).  
 
In 2006 a judicial review was held for a decision of the IAD made in April of 
2005 that stayed a deportation order for Steve Anthony Bryan for 4 years with conditions 
(Canada [Minister of Citizenship and Immigration] v. Bryan, 2006). Mr. Bryan was born 
in 1972 in Jamaica; he is 34 years of age at the time of this decision and became a 
permanent resident in Canada in May of 1989. Mr. Bryan has lived in Canada for 17 
years. The introduction to the decision reads as follows” The Respondent led a law-
abiding life until approximately 1995, when he was diagnosed with schizophrenia. His 
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mental state led him to commit numerous criminal offences and he has accumulated 36 
criminal convictions since 1995.” 
The court document notes that Mr. Bryan has been detained at various 
correctional and mental health facilities since late 2000. He is currently being held (at the 
time of the review) at the St. Lawrence Valley Correction and Treatment Centre, Secure 
Treatment Unit in Brockville, ON. The deportation order was made in March of 2004 on 
ground of serious criminality. Mr. Bryan has been in detention since March 2005. The 
immigration division reasoned that “the absence of a "plan B" in the form of a stay in a 
suitable halfway house as a key factor in its decision”. 
The Minister of citizenship and Immigration applied for a review of the stay 
decisions because the plan for Mr. Bryan had not been finalized and this is insufficient 
grounds with which to grant a stay. It is noted in the court document that the admission 
process was underway for Regeneration Housing and Support Services for My. Bryan. 
In the board’s decision granting the stay, the panel notes that  
In the circumstances of this case I do not believe that the appellant should 
be held at fault for the absence of an appropriate release plan. In my view, 
accountability rests with his counsel, his designated representative, his 
family, and medical practitioners, social workers and other professionals 
on whom the appellant relies to make appropriate Decision [sic] on his 
behalf. Although the plan lastly provided by Ms. Boardman [Ms. 
Boardman is the Respondent's social worker] is still unclear, I am satisfied 
that Ms. Boardman and others have decisively turned their mind to the 
appellant's plight. I am also satisfied that, albeit belatedly, concrete steps 
are being taken to ensure that the appellant is provided with an appropriate 
release plan. The appellant asked that I consider a stay of his removal 
order to show that he can be fully rehabilitated and I have turned my mind 
to this. For the above reasons I do believe that the granting of a stay is 
warranted. A stay of removal from Canada is granted for four years with 
specific stringent conditions. 
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Mr. Bryan is given 19 conditions regulating his behavior one of which is “to 
reside exclusively at a place arranged by his social worker and Regeneration Housing and 
Support Services, and he has to comply with all conditions placed upon him by the 
Toronto Bail Program, or any other similar program”. The court has an interim review 
scheduled for January 2006 of Mr. Bryan’s stay. The Minister wants to continue with the 
judicial review of the decision so that the board is forced to reconsider the stay. 
The Minister argues that the plan for Regeneration House was accepted even 
though Mr. Bryan had only been put on a waiting list. The Minister also argues that 
supervision from the Toronto Bail Program was not in place and had a letter from the 
Executive Director of the Toronto Bail Program stating that they “could not and would 
not” continue to supervise Mr. Bryan if a stay was granted. Mr. Bryan and his counsel 
submit that the Board had considered all of the evidence and factors and the decision was 
“within the Board’s discretionary power.”  
The court finds that the Board does have discretion to stay a removal order on 
humanitarian and compassionate grounds “in light of all the circumstances of the case”.  
Also, “The Board is also given a broad discretionary power to impose, vary and cancel 
conditions, and to reconsider any stay that it grants.” The court rules that the plan does 
not need to be finalized in order for a stay to be granted.  The Ribic factors were 
considered, the stay is warranted and the application for judicial review is dismissed.  The 
court also notes that if the plan does not get finalized, the stay can be cancelled by the 
Board or the Minister’s initiative. 
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In Mr. Bryan’s case, the discretionary authority of the Board to weigh evidence, 
apply law, and impose conditions is made transparent. This discretionary authority serves 
to hold Mr. Bryan responsible for his 19 conditions while any failure on the part of the 
systems that support him (due to lack of available services for Mr. Bryan or by way of 
finalizing a plan prior to his court decision) will not be considered as factors relating to 
his ability to stay well or away from the criminal justice system.  Also rendered 
transparent is the antagonism within the criminal justice, mental health and immigration 
systems for Mr. Bryan’s favor (a stay for 4 years), the decision is appealed by the 
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration to have it undone and the deportation order 
enforced.   Mr. Bryan’s criminality is linked to his mental “illness” and the use of 
imprisonment is rationalized though this linkage, i.e. “Mr. Bryan has been detained at 
various correctional and mental health facilities since late 2000”. The nature and 
circumstances of his 36 charges are not discussed in this case as they are not required in 
this instance to argue for his serious criminality. The outcome desired is achieved, the 
imposition of 19 regulatory behavioral conditions, a stay that can be revoked at any 
moment and the sustenance of a deportation order that cannot be challenged. The 
probability of achieving wellness and integration or belonging in Canada is foreclosed 
upon for Mr. Bryan. Under threat of removal, constant surveillance and biomedical rule, 
finding a job and becoming a Citizen are not foreseeable options. Bryan is designated a 
life of a foreign threat being contained and watched. 
The Undeserving - The case of Audley Horace Gardiner:  
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In the case of Audley Horace Gardiner, we see the interdependence of the criminal 
justice immigration and mental health systems achieve an outcome of deportation, without 
family support, stable housing, without access to affordable medication, and likely to end up 
on the streets.  Audley, who has lived in Canada for over 30 years, was “compliant” with the 
mental health system for over a decade, submitting to complete observation, injection 
medication and a life without freedom.  Authority is established through the validation of 
facts (that rests on the invalidation of counter facts), the forging of a portrait of violent 
criminality (dependent on an erasure of social, historical and political circumstances) and the 
establishment of Audley as a foreign subject who is not a member of Canadian society 
therefore undeserving of Canadian care (abridging his 30 years in Canada to a history of 
violence and mental illness). The Canadian government reinvigorates its position as the 
protector of Canadian society, as reasonable, and humanitarian and compassionate in it 
considerations.  
Two documents are available for analysis: 
1) Immigration Appeals Division-Removal order appeal January 2008 
Gardner v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2008 CanLII 
69814 (IRB). Retrieved December 23, 2013 from,  http://canlii.ca/t/222n0 
 
2) Federal Court Judicial Review July 2011 
Gardner v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 895 (CanLII). 
Retrieved December 23, 2013 from, http://canlii.ca/t/fmf79 
 
Audley Horace Gardiner appealed a deportation order made against him in April 
of 2007 for a conviction in 2005 of assault with a weapon (Gardner v. Canada [Public 
Safety and Emergency Preparedness], 2008). The panel’s decision document states that 
they will consider the Ribic factors. It is stated that Audley has a diagnosis of paranoid 
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schizophrenia and was found not criminally responsible in 1993. Since 1993 Audley 
received injection medications from CAMH, he was at CAMH for a year and a half then 
released under supervision in the community where he would be required to go to CAMH 
once per week for assessment and medication. The panel notes that in 2003 Audley’s 
injection medication was changed to pills. It is described that he has continued and is 
presently taking his medications. 
Beginning in 2005, over a period of 11 months, Audley was convicted of three 
assault charges. Audley testified that these were in self-defense. The panel notes that the 
police reports do not reference self-defense and one of the assaults does not even have a 
police report. Audley plead not guilty and served 163 days in jail of a 2 year sentence. 
The panel states that it has no report from a psychiatrist of psychologist to suggest that 
these 3 crimes were a result of a deterioration of Audley’s mental health. They also state 
that there is no reliable documentary evidence that “there is a change in medication that 
could be prescribed that could stabilize the appellant in such a way that he would not be 
likely to re-offend.”  
The panel describes that in the absence of evidence, or based on the evidence it 
has, “there is a possibility of reoffending and that the possibility of rehabilitation has not 
been established”. The panel takes as evidence a letter from the Minister of the Solicitor 
General and Correctional Services as evidence that Audley is “a very high risk offender”.  
The Minister’s letter also states that it is likely that Audley had a psychotic break-down 
but this is discredited by the panel as speculation.  
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Ms. Stewart from the social work department states that Audley is “resistant to 
psychiatric care, if not closely supervised”. Audley had been co-operative with 
medication at the Toronto West Detention Centre where he has been in detention since 
2006. The panel received two letters from a mental health organization, “Homeward”. 
The letters indicate that housing at a private boarding home is being arranged, psychiatric 
follow up is being set and Audley agreed to take medication as prescribed, by injection, 
once per month. The panel determines that none of this is enough evidence to convince 
the panel that Audley’s violent behavior can be controlled. 
The panel notes that Audley has one sister and does not know what her role is in 
Audley’s life. They do however note that Audley’s sister did not testify, implying that if 
she was a part of his life, she would be present to testify.  Audley testified that he has 
other brothers and sisters in Canada but has not seen them for years. He also has a son but 
has not seen him since 1997 and does not know which name he goes by. The panel 
concludes that Audley’s deportation would not cause any harm to his family and that he 
received no support from them. The panel also states that the degree of hardship to 
Audley if he was to be deported to Jamaica is to be established by evidence submitted by 
Audley. They will not consider previous decisions to this end and therefore this factor is 
eliminated from consideration. 
The panel decides that Audley has not been,  
a productive member of Canadian society, he does not own any property, 
and the likelihood of finding a job in Canada is no higher than the 
likelihood of finding a job in Jamaica since there is no evidence from 
either country as to any job offers or any attempt on the part of the 
appellant to obtain employment in either country.  
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Audley testified that he has worked in Canada for a number of years and he received 
Canadian Pension Plan payments and he as well has $5000 in the bank.  The panel 
dismissed this testimony due to a lack of documentary evidence. 
The panel dismisses the appeal. Stating,  
The evidence the panel has is of an appellant who is a paranoid 
schizophrenic who, despite being on medication, has engaged in criminal 
activity of a violent nature.  The panel has insufficient reliable or 
trustworthy evidence that he can be brought under proper medical control 
and would not pose a threat to Canadian society.  
 
In July of 2011 Audley had a judicial review by the federal court of Canada on a 
decision to not grant Audley permanent residency status based on humanitarian and 
compassionate grounds (Gardner v. Canada [Citizenship and Immigration], 2011). 
Audley sought to resist his inadmissibility decision for serious criminality that made him 
eligible for deportation. For almost 5 years now Audley has been fighting to stay. 
The Federal court document reports that Audley is 48 years old at the time of this 
decision. He was sponsored by his sister in 1980 when “he was just 18 years old” Audley 
has been in Canada for over 30 years. The courts reviews his history in Canada in relation 
to the mental health system and criminal justice system: 
 …was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and found not criminally 
responsible following a violent offence.  The Applicant received in-patient 
care for a year and a half.  After his discharge in 1993, the Applicant 
received outpatient care in the form of weekly assessments and medication 
monitoring.  He was given antipsychotic medication by injection until 2003, 
at which time he began taking pills instead.  The Applicant is also diabetic. 
 
Diabetes is one of many negative side effects of long-term anti-psychotic medication use. 
The Federal court document cites that in 2004, Audley lost his housing by way of 
eviction. He spent “the next year and a half living in various homeless shelters”. Audley’s 
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counsel reported that it was during this time that his “schizophrenic symptoms” returned 
and made it difficult to manage his diabetes or medications regularly. In the 2008 
decision,  the charges accumulated in 2005 were deemed due do unmanageable 
criminality. They reasoned that Audley had been taking medication regularly and since 
no psychiatrist had submitted evidence noting a deterioration during this time, it must be 
therefore due to his irreparable, unrehabilitatable criminality. 
The 3 charges of assault began when he was charged for stabbing another resident 
at a shelter. The 2008 document notes that Audley reported that these were in self-
defense but since the police report either did not exist nor did it reference self-defense, it 
was not considered. The Federal court reviewed the 2008 decision findings and 
concluded, “that the Applicant had committed these violent assaults while on medication, 
and therefore he posed too great a continuing threat to the health and safety of the Canadian 
public”. Audley submitted a pre-removal risk assessment application in 2008. It was 
found that since any risk to Audley’s life would come from inadequate medical care this 
does not constitute a risk worthy or protection under the law. See section 91 (1)b, (iv)23 
of the IRPA. 
23 97. (1) A person in need of protection is a person in Canada whose removal to their country or countries of 
nationality or, if they do not have a country of nationality, their country of former habitual residence, would subject 
them personally 
(a) to a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention 
Against Torture; or 
(b) to a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if 
(i) the person is unable or, because of that risk, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of that country, 
(ii) the risk would be faced by the person in every part of that country and is not faced generally by other individuals in 
or from that country, 
(iii) the risk is not inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions, unless imposed in disregard of accepted international 
standards, and 
(iv) the risk is not caused by the inability of that country to provide adequate health or medical care. 
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 In October of 2010, Audley was found to be unfit to instruct counsel and his niece 
was appointed litigation guardian. The decision considering humanitarian and 
compassionate grounds reasoned that Audley is a future danger to the Canadian public 
because he “was a high risk offender who violently attacked strangers without 
provocation”.  They found that Audley’s plan to live with his niece for support, to see a 
community mental health program 5 days per week and to take his medication was 
insufficient because he did not agree to take injection medication.  
 The court’s decision document notes that the CBSA has already been arranging 
for Audley’s deportation to Jamaica. They had been working with a Captain Rubin 
Philips to transport Audley to Jamaica (apparently the captain appropriated thousands of 
dollars and is no longer involved according to the Federal court documents). The 
psychiatrist in Jamaica who was contacted reported that Audley would not be able to 
afford medication in Jamaica, even under subsidy. The psychiatrist also reported that 
Audley could only stay in a shelter for 30 days and he could not stay in hospital as there 
are not enough beds for housing purposes. The psychiatrist also noted that Audley did not 
have family in Jamaica and that “this man is more likely than not to end up on the streets 
of Jamaica”. 
The officer making the humanitarian and compassionate grounds decision 
dismissed the submissions from the Psychiatrist from Jamaica “since the doctor had not 
personally met the Applicant and had no first-hand knowledge of the family’s whereabouts 
or finances”.  The Officer then relied on the psychiatrist’s evidence to state that “30 days of 
housing would be available, subsidized medication was available as long as the Applicant 
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secured a tax-payer registration number, and that the mental hospital is able to serve acutely 
mentally ill patients.” Here the officer works to completely falsify the availability of 
housing, medication and hospital care for Audley in order to authorize his deportation. 
 The officer considering the humanitarian and compassionate grounds also 
references a UK Home Office report mentioning that mental health services are moving 
towards more community based mental health care as evidence for available treatment. 
Audley’s counsel reported that homelessness, an increased risk of police brutality, 
unprovoked attacks as well as prejudice by the public was a likelihood for Audley. The 
officer dismissed these reports as speculative and that there was insufficient evidence to 
support this claim.  
With regards to family support, the officer reported that “If Mr. Gardiner’s family 
in Canada is indeed attached and committed enough to help him in Canada it is not evident 
why they would be disinterested in redirecting their energies and financial resources to assist 
him in Jamaica.”   
In reviewing the question of “did the officer unreasonably reject the proposed plan 
of care, based on an exaggerated perception of the applicant’s risk to the public?” The 
federal court found that the  
officer undertook a detailed analysis of the Applicant’s file and came to a 
reasonable conclusion.  As a long-time Canadian resident suffering from 
mental illness, the Applicant presents a sympathetic fact scenario.  However, 
I am unable to say that she erred in concluding that the proposed care plan 
was insufficient. 
 
The suggested support plan of the niece and community based mental health care was 
deemed insufficient because it was voluntary. The court states in the decision document 
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that the officer “could have come to the opposite conclusion, but given that her decision 
was justified, transparent and intelligible, it must stand”.  
In reviewing the question of  “did the officer unreasonably conclude the applicant 
would have family and community support in Jamaica?”Audley submitted that the officer 
erred in finding that community-based treatment is available in Jamaica and that his 
family would be able to provide support for him there. The court adhered to the 
arguments and considerations of the humanitarian and compassionate grounds 
consideration officer.  The existence of his father in Jamaica and his brother (although his 
father is 80 years old and has pancreatic cancer and his brother is estranged) is considered 
as the existence of family support. The UK Home Office report document is taken as 
evidence that community-based services are available to Audley. This is considered over 
the direct testimony from a psychiatrist who currently works in Jamaica who stated that 
Audley would only have housing for 30 day, he would not be able to afford medication 
even under subsidy and he would likely end up on the streets. This is also seen as a 
reasonable plan instead of staying in Canada with his niece and being treated by a 
community-based team. As the court document notes, “The Applicant’s niece appears to 
be concerned with the Applicant’s well-being, so, as noted by the Officer, the possibility 
exists that she, and other family members, might be able to re-direct financial assistance in 
order to help re-establish the Applicant in Jamaica.  These conclusions were open to the 
Officer”. 
As to the question, “did the officer unreasonably conclude that the applicant would not face 
risk in Jamaica?” the court acknowledged that permanent residents have fewer rights than 
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citizens of Canada in that they can “lawfully be removed from the country 
notwithstanding difficult personal circumstances or vulnerabilities.” The court also 
suggests that Audley is using his mental illness to manipulate his citizenship status. The 
document states that “H&C consideration is exceptional and discretionary, and is not a 
“back door” through which to gain entry into Canada when the front door is closed”. In the 
final analysis the court reports that “The Officer gave thorough and detailed reasons.  The 
decision is intelligible, justified and transparent.  The Applicant has not shown that evidence 
was ignored or over-looked.  Judicial deference is due to the decision and this Court will not 
interfere”. 
Audley submitted that section 36(1) of the IRPA is discriminatory to people with 
mental illness (i.e. the serious criminality section that makes one eligible for deportation) 
because  
it fails to take into account the already disadvantaged position of mentally ill 
foreign nationals.  The result being that they are denied the benefit of 
permanent residence and protection from removal because of their disability, 
based on stereotypical assumptions that mentally ill people are inherently 
dangerous and incapable of rehabilitation.  
 
The respondent dismisses this as “speculative” and cites a previous decision (Chiarelli v 
Canada [1990]) “as authority” that allows for limiting the rights of non-citizens to remain 
in Canada over the protection from discrimination provisions of the charter. 
The court states that, 
once the government creates a right available to everyone, in that case free 
health care, access to that right must be provided equally.  However, in this 
case, the government has not created such a right. Section 6 of the Charter 
and Chiarelli, above, authoritatively establish that foreign nationals have no 
right to remain in Canada, no matter their state of mental or physical health.  
The Applicant’s argument fails. 
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The application for judicial review is dismissed and Audley is deported. The UN human 
rights committee in Geneva asked Canada not to deport Audley (Keung, 2011, September 
1). He was deported anyway. Audley served almost 5 years in prison from 2007 until his 
deportation fighting for justice that never came. 
In Audley’s case, the final decision rests itself on the erasure, dismissal and selective 
interpretation of law used in prior decisions relying on the testimony of the criminal justice 
system, the immigration system and psychiatric and social work testimony from the mental 
health system.  In the end, Audley, who lived in Canada for over 30 years, who was 
“compliant” with the mental health system for over a decade, submitting to complete 
observation, injection mediation and a life without freedom is deported. Deported without 
family support, no stable housing, without access to affordable medication, and likely to end 
up on the streets. This outcome is achieved through the construction of a dangerous 
criminal, a threat to Canadian society quilted together through the elimination of the 
circumstances of his homelessness, struggles in self-defense in the shelter system and 
diabetes. In a brief 11 months period Audley is quickly reminded that he is not Canadian, he 
does not belong and he is undeserving of Canadian support, protection or care. Audley’s 
years upon years held in prison are not taken under consideration with respect to his 
wellbeing. In fact, his jail time while taking medications is viewed as “treatment”. Prison, 
immigration holds and hospitalization are used interchangeably at the confluence of mental 
health, immigration and criminal justice systems. His identity as a biomedically disordered 
anomaly and a foreign Other serves to maintain the necessity of his injections and his 
individual responsibility while in Canada but unnecessary when he is in Jamaica. He will no 
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longer be a threat to the Canadian public once he is gone. The mental health team 
responsible for his treatment in Canada is rarely mentioned in the case. 
In the cases of Carlton Anthony Williams, Wei Yang, Junior Christopher Weekes, 
Steven Anthony Bryan, and Audley Horace Gardiner we can see how specific decision 
making practices at the confluence of mental health, criminal justice and immigration 
systems depend on the construction of a undeserving foreign alien or Other (considered 
qua Žižek as a form of violence) in order to rationalize the violence of deportation, 
confinement, erasure, or the application of harm through psychiatry. The reliance on the 
construction of the undeserving foreign Other is dependent upon the existence of the 
constructed identities of the untreatable biomedical anomaly and the unrehabilitatable 
criminal in order to achieve the common outcome of containment or removal.  
 
 
“Not our problem!” –reinforcing exclusion and expulsion 
 
“Not our problem!”-The case of Carlton Anthony Williams continued: 
In the first two paragraphs of the 2005 decision documents for Carlton Anthony 
Williams, after the introduction, Carlton’s representation is constructed as being from 
"that country", then he is described as criminal, unemployed, addicted to crack, and 
violent. Separately, he is described as "mentally ill". These points are made with purpose 
to depict him as undeserving of Canadian support, deeply uncontrollably criminal, a 
"crack" user thereby a invoking imagery of the crackhead including its racial and classed 
representations. The reference to his uncontrolled violence serves to depict him as a 
threat and the psychiatric discourse as biologically different. A crazy, violent, drug using, 
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criminal, immigrant who does not work. The points are presented as seemingly separate 
facts but are uniquely selected in a very particular arrangement that has significant 
historical relevance. 
Carlton is also depicted as someone who has no control of himself and needs to be 
controlled. The authorities on his deportation are represented as having been generous to 
Carlton by granting a stay but he continues to be violent, criminal and non-compliant 
with psychiatric intervention. He is therefore unable to cope with freedom and needs to 
be detained. He does not know what is best for him. This is a particularly peculiar 
rationale given his choice to appeal his deportation and as stated in the document, he has 
shown improvements and lived in Canada for 29 years. 
The panel decides that Carlton is only a non-threat when he is institutionalized. 
His history is taken as evidence of his “inability to rehabilitate himself”.  Carlton is 
represented as oppositional to the Canadian Public. These items are weighted together 
while erasing any external responsibilities or contributing social, economic or political 
factors.  
Carlton’s suffering is valued as not as important as the feelings of the Canadian 
public. The Canadian Public will be accepting of the level of suffering imposed on 
Carlton through his deportation because he has been portrayed as deserving of 
punishment. Any outrage or guilt from the Canadian public might prevent the suffering 
that Carlton is being forced to endure. However, Carlton’s life is judged to be less 
important than potential discomfort of the “Canadian Public”. 
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Carlton is commanded to comply with the expectations of civility; employment, 
psychiatry, no criminality, no illegal drugs. The expectations for him are provided 
without an acknowledgement of his structural disadvantage, being without freedom, 
without the ability to apply for jobs while having a criminal record, without the freedom 
to seek support that he actually find beneficial to his mental wellbeing or effective. 
The Mental Health Act’s authority to impose institutionalization and forced 
medical/psychiatric treatment is dependent upon a construction of Carlton as a threat to 
himself or others in section 15(1). The advancements of the notions of criminality as 
separate from his mental health and individualized permit a direction of blame towards 
Carlton. This separation is also concretized in the Criminal Code of Canada that provides 
the powers to psychiatric testimony and intervention in section 672.1, while 
simultaneously making him eligible for deportation through the articulation of “serious 
criminality” that is provided by section 36 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Act.   
The laws appear to be separate, have separate authorities and draw on the 
professional knowledge of distinct disciplines. However, they have historically been 
woven together to permit certain outcomes. These provisions listed under the Mental 
Health Act, the Criminal Code of Canada and the Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Act rely on one another to reinforce notions of the undeserving alien, the untreatable 
genetically inferior, and the undeserving Alien. If an argument is advanced with regards 
to Carlton’s mental health treatment, his criminality is leveraged as a separate 
consideration that requires removal. If any argument is forwarded to appeal to his overall 
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wellbeing in Canada vs. Jamaica, his foreign status is leveraged to categorize him as 
undeserving of Canadian services and a threat to the Canadian public to which Carlton 
does not belong. Carlton is portrayed as a symbol of savagery and degeneracy, requiring 
civilizing, his own voice and history are erased and he only participates as the terrain 
upon which his freedom is negotiated. 
“Not our problem!” - The case of Anton Evguenievitch Gabrielev: 
 
  In the case of Anton Evguenievitch Gabrielev we see a very different set of 
outcomes through the collaboration of the mental health, criminal justice and immigration 
systems. Anton’s criminality is excused by his mental illness rather than being bound to it 
thereby rationalizing his need for expulsion or containment. Anton’s family and length of 
time in Canada weighted in his favor. Anton’s is the only case that mentions Pardon’s 
Canada as an option for nullifying a deportation order. The Minister came forward in 
Anton’s case and volunteered to grant him the appeal under humanitarian and 
compassionate grounds, a generous offer that was not necessary in Anton’s case. Anton is 
the only case amoung the 10 analyzed here that is not from the Caribbean, South Asia, 
Africa, or South East Asia. Anton’s is however established as a biomedical anomaly who 
requires psychiatric observation, a community treatment order to provide surveillance on 
his mental health. He is someone who is unable to represent himself or to work. The 
Canadian immigration system, its criminal justice system and mental health system are 
presented again as considerate of humanitarian and compassionate grounds, protecting 
the Canadian public and providing fair and equitable consideration to the Ribic factors.  
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It is important to note here that of the 10 cases selected for in-depth analysis. Anton’s 
case was among the 10 that were randomly selected. It was not selected because he was 
treated so very differently those in the other 9 cases nor because he was White. The 
absence of so many of the processes of Othering evident in the other 9 cases is 
astonishing to say the least. This outlying case also implores that we question its special 
treatment of Anton. An outcome possibly due the role of Canadian and American 
government’s favoritism of those coming from non/post-communist states. We must of 
course also question the role of race in this decision. 
Two documents were available for analysis: 
 
1. Immigration Appeals Division deportation order reasons and decision 2008 
Gabrielev v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2008 CanLII 
76475 (IRB). Retrieved December 23, 2013 from http://canlii.ca/t/23t3g 
2. Immigration Appeals Division deportation order reason and decision 2011 
Gabrielev v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2011 CanLII 
89966 (IRB). Retrieved from December 23, 2013 from http://canlii.ca/t/fq87t 
 
Anton Evguenievitch Gabrielev had a review of his stay requested by the Minister 
of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness “based on a number of alleged breaches of 
the conditions of his stay” on October 20, 2008 (Gabrielev v. Canada [Public Safety and 
Emergency Preparedness], 2008). Anton had failed to report on two of his reporting dates 
to the Greater Toronto Enforcement Centre. He was also charged with criminal 
harassment and failed to report this charge to the CBSA. The document notes that 
Anton’s mother submitted a letter indicating that Anton suffers from “a mental illness”. 
Anton is 26 years of age at the time of the decision. He is stated to be a citizen of Russia. 
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He became a permanent resident of Canada in March 1996 at the age of 14 along with his 
parents and his younger sister. He has lived in Canada for 12 years. 
Anton was ordered deported for serious criminality in 2002 for convictions in 2001 of 
robbery (two charges), carrying a concealed weapon, and possession of a weapon for a 
dangerous purpose he was sentenced for a total of 18 months (two years including the 
6months pre-sentence custody). In 2004 Anton was granted a four year stay with 
conditions. 
The panel notes that Anton has been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia “at 
least since May 2006. He is on a Community Treatment Order that was first issued in 
May 2007 and his mother is his substitute decision maker. Anton was not present at the 
hearing, his mother represented him. The Minister was represented by counsel, Mr. 
Wayne Hagerty. Anton’s mother requested that the stay be cancelled due to Anton’s 
mental health issues. The Minister submitted that Anton’s breaches should result in a 2 
year extension of the stay with a condition that “Dr. Packer, his psychiatrist provide a 
more detailed update of his prognosis”. The panel decided to extend Anton’s stay for 2 
years reasoning that his breaches were not serious enough to warrant deportation at this 
time and they need to hold Anton responsible for the breaches nonetheless.  
The panel states that they have considered the Ribic factors in the decision. With 
regards to the seriousness of Anton’s criminal record, it is described as “not lengthy..nor 
recent..His convictions are the result of a time in his life when he was desperate for 
money to support his drug habit”.  
With respect to the possibility of rehabilitation,  
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his two failures to report and his failure to report his criminal charge 
immediately to the Department can be traced to the untreated mental 
problems he was having at the time.  Also, his criminal charge was reported 
when he filed his next reporting form with CBSA in March 2006, which 
somewhat mitigates his failure to comply with this condition.  He also failed 
to inform CBSA and the IAD of his change of address when he temporarily 
left his parent’s home and went to British Columbia in 2004, but this too can 
be traced to a time just before he was diagnosed with mental illness. 
 
The panel also notes that, “The appellant is now living with his parents, seeing his 
psychiatrist regularly, taking his medications and subject to a Community Treatment 
Order with his mother as Substitute Decision Maker.  The possibility of rehabilitation, to 
the extent possible for someone suffering from a mental illness, appears positive if he 
continues to follow this regime to control his schizophrenia.” The document also states 
that Pardons Canada is assisting in removing his criminal record. 
With respect to Anton’s establishment in Canada, the decision document states 
that “He has been here all of his adult life.  His economic establishment is marginal, as 
would be expected from someone who was first addicted to drugs and now suffers from 
mental illness.  However, his social establishment is now entirely in Canada.  He has 
completed high school by correspondence and he did work in Canada sporadically before 
the onset of his schizophrenia. “ 
With respect to his family and Community supports, the document states that “All 
of the appellant’s immediate, meaningful and supportive family is in Canada.  He lives 
with his parents and his mother is his Substitute Decision Maker.  It would be devastating 
for his family if the appellant were to be removed to Russia, where there are only elderly 
and ill grandparents. “Also, “The appellant has substantial family and community support 
in Canada.  His parents, his psychiatrist and the medical and social network responsible 
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for his care and well-being are in Canada.  His support network is in Canada.  He is now 
on a disability pension.” In terms of hardship, the panel states that removal to Russia 
would result in “significant and possibly life-threatening hardship”. The decision is a stay 
for 2 years with 17 conditions. 
In 2011, Anton appealed his deportation order because his pardon had been 
processed and his grounds for deportation due to serious criminality were also rendered 
invalid (Gabrielev v. Canada [Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness], 2011). Also 
the panel notes that “This morning counsel for the Minister appeared and indicated that 
he would be prepared to consent to the appeal being allowed on humanitarian and 
compassionate grounds.”. The appeal was allowed on the basis of the charge being 
pardoned and the removal order was quashed.  
  Anton’s case appears to be different than the other cases within this analysis in a 
number of ways. Anton’s criminality is excused by his mental illness rather than being 
bound to it thereby rationalizing his need for expulsion or containment. Anton’s family 
and length of time in Canada weigh in his  favor, even though the 12 years Anton has 
been in Canada is less than that of Carlton Anthony Williams (30 years), Kevin Sheldon 
Bennett (29 years), Junior Christopher Weekes (13 years), Guhad Mahamoud Hassan (21 
years), Steve Anthony Bryan (17 years), or Audley Horace Gardner (31years).  
  Anton’s is the only case that mentions Pardon’s Canada as an option for 
nullifying a deportation order. The existence of family in Russia for Anton is not equated 
with a support system favouring his removal. Their description as elderly and ill are 
considered as the non-existence of family support in Russia. In Audley’s case, the 
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existence of his father in Jamaica (who is 80 years old and has pancreatic cancer) was 
weighted as the availability of family support in favour of Audley’s deportation. For 
Anton, his sporadic employment is attributed to his schizophrenia, his receipt of benefits 
from a Disability Pension are seen as a support or evidence of establishment. For others 
like Guhad Mahamoud Hassan or Niranjan Sambasivam, being on social assistance and 
having sporadic work histories were portrayed as evidence for not being established in 
Canada and for being a burdensome cost to the Canadian Public. Anton was not required 
to submit evidence of the potential hardships he would face if deported to Russian, it is 
accepted as a “significant and possibly life threatenting”.  The Minister came forward in 
Anton’s case and volunteered to grant him the appeal under humanitarian and 
compassionate ground. A generous offer that was not necessary in Anton’s case. This is a 
very different treatment of the “evidence” than for the other cases in this analysis. Anton 
is the only case amoung the 10 analyzed here that is not from the Caribbean, South Asia, 
Africa, or South East Asia.  
  There are many similarities in Anton’s case relative to the others including the 
discretionary powers of the mental health, criminal justice and immigration systems to 
work interdependently to achieve a common outcome. Anton remains a non-citizen, had 
to endure 2 years in prison and two years under the oppression of 17 conditions for his 
stay. Anton’s is now a biomedical anomaly who requires psychiatric observation, a 
community treatment order to provide surveillance on his mental health. He is someone 
who is unable to represent himself or to work. The Canadian immigration system, its 
criminal justice system and mental health system are presented again as considerate of 
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humanitarian and compassionate grounds, protecting the Canadian public and providing 
fair and equitable consideration to the Ribic factors.  
When arguments for contextual consideration or for support are advanced, 
counter arguments for ineligibility are relied upon to condone a denial of care for those 
who live and have family in Canada. These arguments delineating the undeserving 
endorse a program that denies any responsibility or belonging for people who have lived 
in Canada for decades. These constructions work with an dynamism and fluidity that is a 
result of the discretionary interpretation of policy and law, a hierarchical determination of 
the validity of knowledge based on an individual focus and professional expertise, and 
the use of positions of authority to control the population based on historically 
established notions of undesirability. Through this construction of a foreign Other who is 
undeserving, the maintenance of notions of the deserving are (re)established. Wealth, 
health, ability and possibly white ancestry are (re)made synonymous with deserving and 
belonging. The contexts of mental and emotional suffering, the social and political 
determinants of “crime”, and the disenfranchisement of a denial of citizenship, status or 
belonging become confined to considerations that depend on knowledge, professions, and 
legislative practices that privilege: individual biomedical malfunctioning, inherent 
criminal behavioral abnormality, and invading threats from the foreign undeserving alien. 
Each violent erasure, reduction and division sets the ground work for rationalizing more 
overt forms of violence. The violence perpetuated by the people in these cases with 
deportation orders occurs upon a violent standard upon which Canadian society operates 
on a daily basis.  
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In these cases borders are drawn among those identified as biologically 
untreatable, criminally unrehabilitatable and those marked as undeserving foreigners that 
separate anyone subjectified into these groups from “the Canadian public”. It is upon this 
division that a legitimization of violence rests. In so many of these cases we see harm to 
one person, constructed as subhuman under the authority of criminal law, biomedical 
psychiatry and immigration regulations presented as an alternative to a potential threat to 
the Canadian public. In order for this to occur, the Other must be manufactured as worthy 
of violence, undeserving of care, a foreign invader or carrier of biological inferiority and 
thereby a threat to the pristine image of Canadian society. The Other must also be 
completely responsible for his own biological deficiencies, his own criminality and must 
accept that he will never be Canadian regardless of how long he had lived here or how in 
need he is of Canadian society.  
The image of Canadian society at the same time reinforces its facade of the 
protector of the public safety, the authority that carefully and uniformly adjudicates 
claims and appeals with pristine objectivity, relying on the most progressive and recent 
expert knowledge and testimony, the most recent and therefore most considerate court 
rulings and decisions, and carrying the heavy burden of weighing harm to one vs. harm to 
many.  
When interrogated with a conceptualization of confluence and the framework of 
violence provided by Slavoj Žižek our ability to construct a dehumanized subject who is 
not included as a member of “Canadian” society and worthy of violence fails. The 
authorization of violence through reliance solely on individualized focused expert 
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testimony, and legitimized through objective truth claims to knowledge also fails. I name 
these failures because violence is not reduced or prevented but rather required through 
the construction of a dehumanized subject, through legitimization of hegemonic 
professions and knowledge structures authorizing violence. When a person living in 
Canada for 20 years is intentionally harmed the Canadian public so too is harmed. When 
the identity of a person is stripped of its social constituents, its historical producers and its 
opposing benefactors, violence has commenced.    
These systems and technologies are historically driven to produce specific 
outcomes that regulate populations for types of people. The colonial and imperial 
agendas become transparent when we interrogate the specific practices, technologies and 
decision made in contemporary regulatory systems at the confluence of mental health 
criminal justice and immigration. With the consideration of the multi-focal 
conceptualization of violence via Žižek and a fluid and dynamic consideration of 
subjectivity and identity formation via confluence, the racial and eugenic rationale 
regulating and permeating our present lives becomes apparent. 
Understanding confluence: The historical, the contemporary, the theory and the 
practice: 
In these cases, an analysis of confluence is required in order to appreciate the 
multiple tracks and trajectories contributing to, the processes and technologies at work 
for, and the products and outcomes of colonial, racial and eugenic violence. In this 
section, I relate the analysis of the historical cases and law to contemporary practice and 
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law, the necessity of Slavoj Žižek framework of violence and the necessity of an analysis 
of confluence to an attention to the processes and technologies of colonization. 
From chapter 7 we have analyses of historically established patterns of colonial 
authorities and administrators reinforcing ideas of desirability and undesirability through 
the selective and discretionary referencing of policy, law or expertise. Also from the 
historical cases, we have examples of colonial authorities working interdependently with 
the criminal justice, mental health and immigration system to authorize violence based of 
perceived ideas of difference and relying on moral and ethical arguments to justify these 
atrocities (i.e. to protect the Canadian public-an idea forged upon a devaluation of those 
deemed inferior, costly, threatening or undeserving).  
The practices of professionals, authorities, and governmental bodies are 
interrogated for their selective record keeping practices (to deny racial profiling and to 
allow for surveillance). This analysis of historical cases upon the contemporary overview 
of policies and laws provided in chapter 3, allows for an appreciation of the continuing 
racial and eugenics practices still embedded in contemporary law and their powers to 
enforce ideas of desirability while (re)enforcing ideas of undesirability, and the Canadian 
public in need of protection. In order to achieve the outcomes required for colonial nation 
building to continue, officials required the application of a eugenic rationale through the 
establishment of “prohibited classes”, the utilization of racial hierarchy (historically 
exemplified in the exclusion of and “Asiatic race” from any protections of the law), and 
the use of discretionary powers to authorize violence (when not provided for in the law or 
without public consultation), while projecting an image of authority and legitimization 
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(through the selective referencing of authoritative texts, legislation, partially and often 
inaccurately). 
As discussed in the case of Carlton Anthony Williams, contemporary law extends 
upon historically established patterns reinforcing desirability based on eugenic and racial 
ideas for colonial nation building. The Mental Health Act’s authority to impose 
institutionalization and forced medical/psychiatric treatment is dependent upon a 
construction of the accused as a threat to himself or others in section 15(1). The 
advancements of the notions of criminality as separate from his mental health and 
individualized permit a direction of blame towards Carlton. This separation is also 
concretized in the Criminal Code of Canada that provides the powers to psychiatric 
testimony and intervention in section 672.1, while simultaneously making him eligible 
for deportation through the articulation of “serious criminality” that is provided by 
section 36 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.   
The laws appear to be separate, have separate authorities and draw on the 
professional knowledge of distinct disciplines. However, they have historically been 
woven together to permit certain outcomes. These provisions listed under the Mental 
Health Act, the Criminal Code of Canada and the Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Act rely on one another to reinforce notions of the undeserving alien, the untreatable 
genetically inferior, and the undeserving Alien. If an argument is advanced with regards 
to the accused’s mental health treatment, his criminality is leveraged as a separate 
consideration that requires removal. If any argument is forwarded to appeal to his overall 
wellbeing in Canada vs. the country to be deported to, their foreign status is leveraged to 
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categorize him as undeserving of Canadian services and a threat to the Canadian public to 
which Carlton does not belong. Carlton is portrayed as a symbol of savagery and 
degeneracy, requiring civilizing, his own voice and history are erased and he only 
participates as the terrain upon which his freedom is negotiated (qua Spivak and Mani 
discussed in chapter 5 regarding erasure). 
As discussed in chapter 7, in the 1915 case of the deportation of hobos, tramps 
and undesirable aliens we have an important instance of the historical practice of 
deporting undesirables (including those identified as mentally ill) through the 
interdependent work of the criminal justice and immigration systems. This case 
demonstrated how surveillance was provided by the criminal justice system to patrol the 
borders relying on racial and eugenic profiling, and legitimizing its work by moral 
argument = “for the protection of the province”. Also, the practice of selective record 
keeping to deny inquiry (as it is not a legislated role of the criminal justice system to 
police the borders, this is a matter for the department of immigration) is 
identified/challenged for its use value in controlling for undesirables. 
In the contemporary cases, we require an analysis of confluence in order to 
appreciate the complexity of how these contributions are necessary in the continuation of 
colonial nation building. In the case of Audley Horace Gardiner, the lack of police 
records was relied upon to deny Audley’s self-defense claim and to establish his 
dangerousness to Canadian society.  In the case of Niranjan Sambasivam, details were 
left out of his records (referring to “two carloads of Tamil youths” rather than reported 
the number of individuals and “trashed a…pizza store” rather than reporting on the nature 
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and costs of damages or as one who “turned on the owner” rather than reporting on 
whether or not a criminal act toward the owner had actually taken place and if charges 
were laid in this regard) to portray an image of threat and, savagery and madness. Also in 
current practice, the CBSA continues to provide surveillance to immigration authorities 
in collaboration with the mental health system to report on the private health information 
of people identified with mental health issues. This current operation of the criminal 
justice system in collaboration with the immigration and mental health system is 
illuminated by the eugenic, racial, colonial project it continues historically. These 
projects depend on established practices of authority, the historically embedded racial and 
eugenic rationales within law and the interdependence of the criminal justice, 
immigration and mental health systems. In doing so, qua Slavoj Žižek, subjective 
violence occurs (through the deportation, arrest etc.), and objective violence occurs 
(symbolic violence to depict a dehumanized subject deserving of violence and systemic 
violence within the law, and the practices of professionals and authorities). 
Orientalism, appropriation, erasure, dehumanization, the reinforcement of North-
South divisions and the use of moral arguments of rationalize atrocities in the cases: 
Within the cases, the colonial processes and technologies of Orientalism, 
appropriation, erasure, dehumanization, the reinforcements of North-South divisions and 
the use of moral arguments to rationalize atrocities a rendered transparent for their use 
value in the continuation of racial and eugenic forms of colonial violence at the 
confluence of mental health, criminal justice and immigration systems. 
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The construction of the dehumanized identities of the untreatable 
biomedically/genetically inferior, the unrehabilitatable inherently criminal subhuman, 
and the undeserving foreign alien Other are insufficiently interrogated or appreciated for 
the violence (qua Slavoj Žižek) propagated within them without an attention to 
confluence, and colonization. These constructions were and are dependent on colonial 
processes and technologies such as Orientalism. When analyzed with a consideration of 
the colonial processes and technologies within Orientalism, we can appreciate the 
encapsulation of a person into a general type, seen through the consistent binaries of 
difference and always represented in terms of lack. We can also appreciate how expertise 
and professional authority is established on the other, hegemonic authority delegated 
solely to psychiatry and decision making powers designated solely to legal and 
government authorities. These positions and hierarchies are secured through time guided 
by self-validating academic and professional fields and disciplines. These mutually 
consolidating factors are also required to act interdependently, while also depending on 
the selective and discretionary application of policy and law, the erasure of an social and 
political histories relevant to a person, and the reestablishment of the fantasy of the 
Canadian public, requiring protection above all threats and potential contaminants. 
As exemplified in the case of Kevin Sheldon Bennett, Orientalism is evident in 
the picture painted of Kevin as one that portrays him as incapable of being free, a body in 
need of civilizing, a servant of our pharmaceutical industrial machine in need of a master 
(orientalism). He is constructed as a ahistorical biological anomaly, untreatable, 
genetically different, and an inferior person that is resistant to treatment even though he 
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takes the medication that he is prescribed and submits to all observation and reporting 
requirements (appropriation occurring by using all his behavior as evidence for 
biomedical inferiority; erasure occurring through the elimination of his history). In the 
end, his deportation order is held as still valid in law and if Kevin were to resist the 
harmful treatments or refuse the restrictions placed upon him via his community 
treatment order or make any decision for himself while he is deemed incapable, he would 
be in violation of his conditions (manipulation of law buy authorities and appropriation), 
thereby reinforcing a case for his “serious criminality” and his removal from Canada (for 
the protection of the Canadian public, thereby reinforcing the fantasy of the Canadian 
public and notions of undesirability carrying onward the eugenic and racial colonial 
project of national building).  
As discussed in the cases, often the histories of people before they have arrived in 
Canada are erased. As detailed in Chapter 9, the historical, social and political 
circumstances (i.e. for convention refugees [Nur Mohamed Jama], persecution due to 
sexual orientation [Guhad Mahamoud Hassan], political oppression [Niranjan 
Sambasivam]) are completely eradicated from consideration. In doing so, any historical, 
social or political complicity and therefore responsibility can also be denied through an 
over emphasis on the individuality of mental illness, criminality and immigration status.  
Also, through this unique practice of temporal erasure hundreds and sometimes thousands 
of years of history is rendered obsolete. The accused are also discussed with their voices 
completely erased. They become (qua Spivak & Mani) neither the subject or object of the 
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discourse but merely the terrain upon which notions of desirability and the “Canadian 
public” are established on eugenic and racial grounds. 
With the drastic directed selection of racialized countries of the global South for 
deportation, we also see the continuation of the re-enforcement of North-South divisions, 
remaking rationalization for further civilizing projects based on established notions of 
supremacy, inferiority desirability, deserving and belonging. These divisions are 
dependent on the processes and technologies of colonial violence that have been 
developed and established to advance notions of the fantasy of the Canadian public, in 
need of protection and the dehumanized other deserving of violence. Racial and eugenic 
ideas forged during European colonization are infused within the practices of 
professionals, the disciplines that guide then, the laws that command and support them, 
and the governments that authorize them.  
Without an attention to colonization, through an analysis of confluence and the 
layered, multi-focal framework of violence provided by Slavoj Žižek, one cannot 
appreciate the violence within both the historical and the contemporary, within the 
practices of professionals (to construct dehumanized subjects deserving of violence via 
Orientalism, the erasure of voice and history, appropriation), the arrangement of 
hierarchies of people (based on eugenic and racial rationales remaking the fantasy of the 
“Canadian public” and undesirability) hegemonies of authority (medical, criminal justice 
and immigration officials),  and the process of embedding eugenic and racial ideas within 
policies and law, then divorcing them from their original colonial nation building project 
322 
 
through the establishment of an image of professional and legal legitimacy and moral 
authority. 
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Chapter 10 
Conclusion  
In this chapter, we examine the implications of deeply hurtful and 
intergenerational forms of racialized and eugenic violence within professional practice, 
disciplines, policies, law, and within the operations and technologies of contemporary 
institutions. The use figurative language to represent a contemporarily accepted forms of 
biological inferioriority, inherent unrehabilitatable criminality, or to identify someone as 
an undeserving alien are no less violent then literal deployments of these meanings as 
their (re)produced outcomes are the same: a denial of care, responsibility, and humanity. 
In this study we  have witnessed the use of very particular colonial tropes for the 
constructing of identities of dehumanized difference and the reliance on racial and 
eugenic rationale to provide the authority for and legitimization of violence. These deeply 
historical interdependent processes constituting the confluence of mental health, criminal 
justice, and immigration systems may have us question our conceptions of progress or 
advancement, of anti-oppressive or anti-racist proposals for their complicity in the 
continuation of the production of ordered subjects, a reliance on old colonial machinery, 
and the (re)positioning of authority and legitimacy through violence and difference. 
Figurative language 
Whether said or implied, notions of human inferiority are hurtful to all people. 
This pain is especially exacerbated when it is directed, layered and reinforced over time 
and place, across systems and institutions, within laws and most painfully within the 
systems that are supposed to be there to help people, protect them or welcome them. Our 
324 
 
inattention to the colonial products of difference based on eugenic and racial categories 
that operate through fantasy and contempt allows for certain kinds of colonial violence to 
persist. Without a way of thinking about the nuances of oppression realizing their potency 
as a confluence, or a multi-level conceptualization of violence via Žižek’s24 that can 
appreciate its subjective, objective and symbolic forms, we often are left to rely on 
difference, North-South divisions, and colonial practices and processes (such as 
Orientalism and dividing practices), in our responses to injustice.  
Difference is currently relied upon in responses that aim to know difference by 
developing competencies or to take positions as “anti” in response to racism or 
oppression. When confluence and violence are appreciated for their fluidity and 
complexity, the position of “anti” is impossible as we are all in a position of complicity, 
the notion of competence is also impossible as we are infinite in our uniqueness and have 
all been transgressed through our encapsulation in totalized systems of 
discourse/power/knowledge.  
Responses that impose Western models of justice, immigration regulation and 
mental health internationally often carry with them the North-South and racial divisions 
24 The physical, structural, epistemic, day-to-day, cognitive and rhetorical of violence, as products and 
processes, human creations, relations of power, and modes of domination. physical violence, the structural 
violence of economic relations, day-to-day violence (marriage and Rape), epistemic, cognitive and 
rhetorical forms of violence, as products and processes, as human creations, relations of power, and modes 
of domination, cultural and social factors of violence, and the dangers of violent means to achieve 
unpredictable ends. We can also recognize the violence resulting from the problem of identity requiring an 
Other or difference in order to exist. With respect to colonization, Žižek’s framework also accommodates a 
consideration of the violence in the writing of history or historiography, the violence reproduced from the 
master/slave relationship (in both the colonizer, the colonized, as products, practices and technologies of 
these relations for humankind, including the ongoing potential threat of violence).  
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that they have been fashioned upon within their technologies and practices. Western 
biomedical models of mental illness, the eugenic policing of borders and the profiling and 
finalizing system of criminal justice denies people the opportunity to be seen as a whole 
person, capable of being well when given the chance to be supported and to belong. 
When systems of knowledge and law have historically fabricated  and reinforced the 
idea/fantasy of a savage, uncivilized criminal through targeted colonial processes like 
Orientalism and dividing practices, the possibility of not being encapsulated as such is 
foreclosed upon for those who have historically been targeted. 
To target people for surveillance, compliance, confinement or deportation within 
the discursive crosshairs of biomedical psychiatry, with the discourse of legislation and 
juridical structures of the criminal justice system and within the status regulating 
procedures of the immigration system is to figuratively speak of them as a biomedical 
anomaly deserving of segregation and a restricted set of freedoms under the law. It is to 
figuratively speak of them as a threat to Canadian society and a lesser kind of person that 
does not belong among those included in historically established notions of desirability. 
By historically and contemporarily examining the processes and technologies used to 
achieve these outcomes and with an attention to who is targeted, the obscurity of 
professional and juridical hierarchies of complex system of knowledge can be 
interrogated for their basic accountabilities to humanity and the human condition. 
Colonial tropes & Old machinery:  
(re)producing (neo)colonial relations of authority and violence 
A system or set of systems that maintains an ability to construct identities of 
untreatability, unrehabilitatability or undeserving foreignness deserving of violence, 
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through the practices of hegemonic professional authorities selectively and discretionally 
utilizing references to legislation or expert testimony to legitimize violence, reenacts 
colonial relations of violence.  
The notion of a person who is an untreatable biological anomaly deserving of 
deportation and underserving of care in Canada invokes an idea of individual savage, 
erased from their social and political context that cannot be controlled. When targeting 
people of colour specifically, the histories of Drapetomania, Dysaesthesia Aethiopis, and 
the conceptions of a person as biologically unfit for freedom 25 cannot be denied for their 
implication of these colonial tropes that carry with them a deep historical disrespect and 
dehumanizing violence. 
The notion of an unrehabilitatable criminal person of color or immigrant who is a 
danger or a threat to the Canadian public invokes the idea of an uncivilized primitive 
person. As exemplified in Howard Odum’s Social and Mental Traits of the Negro (1910), 
this specific, directed characterization is historically bound to the colonial trope of a 
dehumanized person with tendencies toward criminality, addiction, and mental defects of 
idiocy and imbecility. The trajectory of this trope offers a painful rendering an image of 
one who is deserving of subjugation or slavery historically and surveillance or 
confinement in the present. 
25 Drapetomania (the “insanity” of black slaves running away from white masters-coined by 
Samuel A. Cartwright). Dysaesthesia Aethiopis, a form of madness manifest by “rascality” and 
“disrespect for the master’s property” that was believed to be “cured” by extensive “whipping, 
hard labour, and, in extreme cases, amputation of the toes” (Metzl, 2009, p.30).  
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The construction  of an identity of a foreign alien who does not belong and who is 
undeserving of the protections of society or access to its public supports invokes the idea 
of an invasive intruder, a burdensome cost to society and someone who is not our 
problem. This specific colonial trope in Canada for immigrants and people of colour is 
bound to the marring history of head taxes, internment, and turned away ships 26 based on 
racial discrimination through the laws excluding or limiting those of Asian origin. 
If the law, entire fields of knowledge, institutions and professions at the 
confluence of mental health, criminal justice and mental health systems are guided by 
eugenic and racial rationale, we are all at some level vulnerable to the violence that is 
possible within it. The mental health act holds a power over anyone identified with a 
psychiatric diagnosis and these numbers are increasing exponentially. The Criminal code 
of Canada has evolved to deliver harsher penalties and more permanent records to those 
who find themselves within its grasp and the Canadian immigration system is also 
shifting toward greater exclusion. These are seemingly new products made with the old 
machinery of racialized colonial violence. The mental health, criminal justice and 
immigration systems participate in the continuation of colonial and imperial projects 
through these forms of institutional expressions of social disrespect through their reliance 
on processes and technologies of dehumanization, and racial and eugenic colonial 
violence. 
 In order to approach transformation in the direction that aims to reduce violence, 
improve the mental wellness of people, end racial profiling, imprisonment, and that 
26 In 1914, a ship with close to 400 passengers from India who were British subjects were forced to return 
based on racist immigration laws. Only 20 people from the ship were permitted to stay (Johnston, 1989).  
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welcomes and supports those who come to Canada, we cannot proceed without a critique 
that at the very least rivals the complexity that is harnessed in order to achieve the 
violence within the practice of deportation. Possibilities lie within the individualizing 
technologies and practices used to isolate individuals targeted at this confluence and 
organizing with allies who share a belief that freedom and peace does not truly exist for 
any person when it is cultivated on violence done to other people. 
In the case of Niranjan Sambasivam, the Suresh vs Canada, 2002 decision is cited. 
In Suresh vs Canada, a collective resistance of international, national, community, ethno-
racial and human rights organizations allied with Suresh to resist his deportation and 
support his appeal. His co-respondents included: The United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees, Amnesty International, the Canadian Arab Federation, the Canadian 
Council for Refugees, the Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils, the Centre for 
Constitutional Rights, the Canadian Bar Association and the Canadian Council of 
Churches. Although Suresh won his decision, the precedent did not hold for Niranjan, 
who was constructed to not be considered a convention-refugee (his mother was so he 
was not directly) thereby ineligible for the considerations provided for Suresh. What the 
Suresh case does provide is a window into a process that has successfully resisted the 
colonial systems and technologies that direct responsibilities for wellbeing, health and 
establishment solely toward an isolated individual. What if the co-respondents 
represented in the Suresh case were a part of evaluating every case? What if our 
professionals within mental health care and criminal justice systems were also held 
accountable when someone found themselves having more severe and significant 
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difficulties with the law and through their mental and emotional distress? The 
possibilities for transformation lie within opportunities to resist the technologies and 
processes that reproduce orientalism, erasure, dehumanization, the remaking or North-
South divisions, the selective and discretionary manipulation of law, and the use of moral 
and ethical arguments to authorize violence. 
The implications of this work are somewhat disturbing to say the least. They 
question what we determine to be “normalcy” and the violence within the practices, 
processes and technologies established to enforce these notions. Relating back to Aimé 
Césaire’s analysis, the colonizer’s technologies and practices, although aimed at 
civilizing and normalizing have rendered themselves uncivilized, savage and brutal 
(Césaire & Pinkham, 2007, p.35-36). When attempting to formulate or conceptualize any 
form of social justice, one must consider the project, its tools, is rationale, the laws, 
policies and knowledge it relies upon, and how they position themselves and their acts in 
relation to Others in their historical, social and political contexts. If our idea of normal 
and desirable are dependent upon violence, people will need to consider and question 
these ideas within our conceptualizations of justice as we are all at some level complicit 
with the violence that sustains these ideas and sometimes are both beneficiaries and 
victims of the products of their maintenance. 
I feel it appropriate to conclude with an image of resistance and transformation. In 
August of 2013 approximately 200 immigration detainees were transferred from the 
Toronto West Detention Centre to the Central East Correctional Centre in Lindsay 
Ontario, restricting their ability to consult with council, participate in any recreational 
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programs and significantly impeding their ability to see family.  In September of 2013, 
the detainees commenced a hunger strike, an act of “peaceful protest” resisting their 
unfair and unjust treatment Keung, N. (2013, September 20). By December of 2013, 
officials had deported some organizers, moved others yet the strike continued. By 
December 21, 2013 over 75 organizations and prominent individuals had endorsed the 
strike and joined the cause.   
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(9) RG 10-6-0-1154 - The Mental Health Act 1954 
(10) RG 10-407 "LO2"- Mental Health Act Amendment = Bill 78 - PPAO Letter RE: Bill 
78 
(11) RG 10-407 "LO2" Mental Health Act Amendment = Bill 78- 1998 - An Act to 
Amend The Mental Health Act - Mr. 
Patten 
(12) RG 4-32 "W.D. Scott, Department of Immigration, Ottawa: Request for information 
on the deportation of Hobos 
from Ontario. (Dates of Creation: 1915)" 
(13) RG 4-32 “W.W. Dunlap, Inspector of Prisons, Toronto: Query re: authority of 
Department of Immigration to use 
gaols for detention of undesirable immigrants. 
Also concerns the specific case of Elsie Saborowiski, who associated with known 
revolutionaries. (Dates of Creation: 
1919)” 
(14) RG 4-32 “H.M. Robbins, Dept. Prov. Sec.: Request for opinion re power of 
Immigration Dept. to designate 
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Ontario Hospitals for the insane as immigrant stations. (Dates of Creation: 1927)” 
 
I have confirmed with the Information and Privacy Unit that all personal information has 
been removed from the above records for which they provided you access. With this 
confirmation, I am granting you copyright permission to use these records in your thesis. 
 
Please cite the Archives of Ontario as the source of where you obtained access to the 
records. I am attaching a research guide on Citing Archival Records. 
 
If you have any further questions please feel free to contact us at any time through 
reference@ontario.ca or by calling 416-327-1600. 
 
Regards, 
Lindsey Winstone 
Archivist, Customer Service 
Winstone, Lindsey 
Senior Customer Service Representative 
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Correspondence from Citizenship and Immigration Canada regarding the identification of 
people by the CBSA for removal/deportation 
 
Subject:  Citizenship and Immigration Canada - re: removals/deportation  
From:  
CIC - Ministerial Enquiries Division/CIC - Service de renseignements ministériels 
(Ministerial.Enquiries.Division@cic.gc.ca)  
To:  ajesusj@yahoo.ca;  
Date:  Monday, November 25, 2013 3:04:28 PM  
 
Dear Ameil Joseph: 
  
The Canada Border Services Agency has kindly forwarded to Mr. Chris Alexander, 
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, a copy of your correspondence of October 1, 
2013, concerning the removal of foreign criminals.  I apologize for the delay in 
responding. 
  
The Government of Canada has measures in place to prevent the 
abuse of our immigration system.  We combat programme-related 
fraud by frequently conducting investigations and interviews to 
verify suspect documents, confirm facts and assess application 
information. 
  
Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) works in conjunction 
with many partners, including the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 
the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, provincial and 
municipal police forces and international law enforcement 
agencies.  To protect the integrity of the immigration program, 
we work in partnership with the Canada Border Services Agency 
(CBSA). 
  
As published on CIC’s Web site, people who wish to report an 
immigration violation may call the CBSA’s Border Watch Tip Line 
at 1 888-502-9060.  All tips are completely confidential. 
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Border Watch Line officers will analyze the tip information and 
determine if there is a need to refer the case for possible 
investigation.  Tips accepted by the CBSA include, but are not 
limited to, suspicious cross-border activity, marriages of 
convenience, misrepresentation in a temporary or permanent 
resident application or the whereabouts of any person wanted on 
an immigration warrant. 
  
Further information, including how to report allegations of 
fraud, can be found at: 
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/information/protection/fraud/report.
asp 
  
Any information received will be carefully considered and action 
taken in due course.  However, informants and other third parties 
will not be notified of the initiation or outcome of any 
investigation, as the Privacy Act prohibits the Government from 
releasing information on our clients without written consent. 
  
Thank you for writing.  I trust that this information is of assistance. 
  
  
S. Charbonneau 
Ministerial Enquiries Division 
  
This electronic address is not available for reply. 
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